No. 329: The MLM-ification of DTC

On Mavely and the unspoken opportunity ahead for the DTC industry. When Greats Brand was reportedly acquired by Steve Madden after their most recent year that saw $13 million in earnings, it was a shock to many in the industry. Revenues seemed lower than what many expected but inline with the realties of buildng an omnichannel brand with an often-costly means of customer acquisition. It’s likely that profitability was an issue. This begs the question, how would things have been different if Greats’ customer acquisition model was one built on profitability and value? The venture-dependent, high growth model may elevate a select few brands in the ecosystem but it seems to be depressing the exit optionality of the majority of them.

Percentage of ad spend is a fine tool for aligning incentives. The problem is not with tested and vetted agencies. It’s with bad ones using it to pad income before providing value.

Marco Marandiz

Founded by Ryan Babenzien, Greats was considered a well-respected, independent shoe company with great propects to become a brand as promising as Allbirds. Babenzien’s marketing team had command over several types of outreach. Greats employed several methods to include performance marketing, direct mail, strategic partnerships, and even text-based promotion. But in the end, the brand never achieved profitability. It was a stark reminder that we may be turning a corner in the DTC space; there seems to be an added weight to the importance of earning profits. A rebuke of the SaaS multiple model that many tech companies can adopt to grow in value. At the intersection of growth and profitability, its the street named ‘Profitability’ that DTC brands should run along.

Greats, which still sells most of its shoes through its eCommerce site, opened a 500-square-foot location on Crosby Street last year. The brand also inked a wholesale partnership with Nordstrom and unveiled a buzzy collaboration with men’s fashion authority Nick Wooster.[1]

The company seems to have done everything right and yet, Greats reportedly sold for no more than two times the previous year’s revenues (June 30, 2018 – June 30, 2019). Greats raised $13 million in funding and sold for around a reported $26 million. It became abundantly clear that an absent path to profitability became the issue that drove the wedge. Steve Madden’s supply chain and organization will be a great fit for this reason, the company drove north of $410 million in the previous year. And they did so while maintaining profitability.

We want to build a profitable business and we’re one of the few digitally-native brands that hasn’t raised an ungodly amount of money that makes it challenging to build a profitable business and exit where everybody wins. We weren’t trying to build the company that had the biggest valuation in round one. We’re trying to build the company that had the biggest valuation at the end. [2]

The news of this acquisition served as a wakeup call for many in the direct to consumer space. What else can be done to improve the viability of DTC brands? Is an early-stage path profitability that crucial? If there is one thing that’s clear, the days of optimizing for ‘at any cost’ growth may be over. As customer acquisition costs continue to skyrocket, retail media has begun reporting on several marketing alternatives. Of them is Mavely, a relatively new platform that launched with a unique approach to reducing CAC for these brands. Mavely’s big idea: turn these DTC brands into multi-level marketing companies.

Mavely is trying to put a new spin on the multilevel-marketing model, in which companies recruit people to sell for them but which has gotten a bad rap for leading a lot of people to actually lose money. Wray said Mavely has no cost to join, no inventory requirements that consumers must maintain, and no minimum follower count that users need to recommend products. [3]

Founded by Evan Wray, Peggy O’Flaherty, and Sean O’Brien, the Chicago-based company has raised $1 million and is reportedly profitable “on a per user basis.” The app-based service has 10,000 users and currently operates as a glorified, peer-to-peer affiliate model. But while it may eventually and significantly supplement organic and paid growth for brands, that timeline is likely to be longer than Mavely would care to admit. Critical mass for this type of service means that Mavely will have to earn tens of millions of users. It will be interesting to observe whether or not Wray’s company can remain committed to growing the way that they’re preaching to their DTC partners: cost-effectively, perhaps a bit slowly, and by one customer (down-line) at a time. In the meantime, the performance marketing industry may be due for an evolution of its own.

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I’m not sure that a lot of DTC brand owners realize that they’re building companies valued at 1 – 1.5x revenues.

In a recent conversation on the merits of percentage of ad spend as a profit center for media buying agencies, agency owner David Hermann provided his perspective on how business should be pursued between DTC brands and agency partners.

This is why we do percentage of revenue tied to ROAS that’s based on their margins and what the break even point is after costs associated with our fees and expenses. Trust is key, we lay everything out before we get started so they never are in dark on anything. [4]

It presented a worthwhile question. As institutional investors continue to pour more and more venture capital into the DTC space, the approach to marketing should evolve with the volume. CAC has risen as a result of an influx of capital spent on performance marketing. This cycle has led to an unintended result; larger but largely unprofitable businesses. Perhaps the math of success or failure should be reconsidered by investors and founders, alike. What Hermann suggests is correct, agencies should consider a new model for compensation – one that emphasizes healthy contribution margins for these retailers.

Hermann went on:

[My firm is] dealing with one client’s margins right now. [We’re] helping them find a better supply chain. They needed a 2.15x margin just to break even after fees and expenses, so I am now helping on their margin-side. As I always say, media buying is just one side of the job now.

There is an opportunity for a new style of performance marketing agency. Agencies equipped with brand-side, practical expertise could build acquisition strategies around healthy margins, paving the way for percentage of profits as the key performance indicator shared between DTC brands and their agency partners. This solves several problems. Of those concerns, this model accounts for: (1) sustainability, (2) efficient paths to profitability, (3) longer-term relationships between agencies and brands, and (4) decreased dependence on institutional capital. Rather than media buyers being compensated for what they spend, agencies should consider compensation on the profits that they earn for brands.

It’s acquisition vehicles like Mavely, BrandBox, DTX Company’s Unbox, and Showfields that may influence this shift in the agency business model by providing meaningful opportunities for CAC diversification. And if so, the DTC era may finally begin to solve its profitability problem. This could be the first step towards improving valuation multiples and exit optionality for an industry in need of another feather in its cap.

Report by Web Smith | About 2PM

 

No. 328: Open Letter to DTC Founders

It’s common for consumers to lose affinity for a brand. We grow older and more practical. Perhaps our lives evolve and children enter or exit the picture. Our bodies change and so do our minds. Our sensibilities shift over time. In one lifetime, a consumer can express a number of identities. It’s why the expectation of lifetime value (LTV) can be disengenuous at best.

There will always be natural attritition; retention is never 100%. But this isn’t about natural attrition. There’s a point in the lifecycle when a brand may lose its soul. It’s usually the case that it’s a result of a lean into hyper-growth. The decision to pursue performance-driven, hockey stick growth can lead to several changes in creative and managerial inputs. Those inputs have first, second, and third order effects that can be subversive to longterm growth.

Christopher Mims recently published a perspective [1] on Tumblr’s failures. In many ways, some DTC brands mirror that era of media. His report has a special relevance in today’s DTC space: The End of the ‘Eyeballs Are Everything’ Era.

But inherent in Tumblr’s structure, culture and even code base were, from the beginning, problems for any potential owner. On the business side, it operated under the assumption that it could make money off its users the same way people had since the invention of the banner ad: Build a big enough audience, and “monetization” will take care of itself.

Beyond his take down of eyeballs and the impracticality of optimizing for reach, consider the same strategies being observed in online retail. With performance arbitrage long past its prime, the value of funneling the majority of resources into Facebook and Instagram-driven marketing has become increasingly risky. Even so, the concept below is on the minds of many in DTC:

[x] pair of eyeballs x CRO = efficient ROA

If you’ve ever observed a digitally-native retailer’s site traffic, you’ll notice something shortly after that brand puts a fresh round of capital to work. Site traffic rises over the next quarter; a flood of eyeballs visit the site for the first or second time. It’s not uncommon to see a 20-40% bump in traffic vs. the monthly average. There’s a reason for this sudden spike. With traditional, institutional investment comes a few strings attached in the form of (highly) recommended milestones. Bolstering a brand’s performance marketing spend tends be a short-term band-aid over a gaping hole (a lack of demand).

The abundance of easy venture capital in DTC retail may be the root cause of the rise in customer acquisition costs. DTC brands have relegated proven brand marketing tactics to their second and third tier of marketing strategies. Instead, they’ve emphasized uninspired PPC advertising. They are searching for that quick uptick in sales and traction. And rightfully so. Brand founders often find themselves positioning for the next round of investment, a milestone that rarely existed for retailers before 2007.

Prior to the DTC era of retail, financing outcomes looked slightly different. This was before retail founders sought SaaS multiples and tech exits.

  • Build a profitable business and remain private
  • Build a valuable business and sell to private equity
  • Build a profitable business and IPO

In a recent report by Marketing Land [2], consultants discuss the abundance of Instagram advertising purchased by direct-to-consumer brands:

Recently, a colleague mentioned that she had noticed a significant surge in the number of Instagram ad placements. Conducting a quick test via her feed, she found ads accounted for 22% of 45 posts and 23% of 26 Stories. She isn’t alone. Peter Stringer, a Facebook and Instagram ads consultant is among the marketers we’ve heard from that have noticed an uptick in Instagram’s ad volume. Stringer noticed the increase at the start of 2019.

Instagram and Facebook are effective tools for reach. They are ineffective tools for depth. The traditional forms of top funnel and mid-funnel retargeting are designed to keep consumers in the sales pipeline, not to inspire them. This platform-driven sales strategy has influenced teams to pursue superficial styles of marketing communications.

Brand statements have shifted away from carefully crafted messaging and presence. Instead, DTC brands are beginning to focus solely on its products attributes. You’ll observe more SKU features than storytelling. You’ll see ads highlighting perceived technological advantages or even its value in comparison to their nearest competitors. Rather than shaping the medium to their message, messages have amended to the medium. Quality of advertising has fallen as a result. And like Facebook, Instagram is often the first interaction for many of these brands’ potential consumers.

Consider how much of Nike’s communications are devoted to the construction of the shoe or a tit-for-tat comparison to Adidas or Under Armour. Nike, like other traditional brands, focus on messaging and affinity. By the time a consumer is ready to consider a purchase, decisions are more irrational than rational. To the consumer,  the construction of the shoe means much less than it should. For instance, Nike didn’t miss a stride when their shoe exploded on a coveted athlete playing on national television. They have their brand equity to thank; Nike is arguably the best marketing company on earth. Their ability to make the world’s best equipment is up for debate.

DTC brands are further jeopardizing their brand affinity for that short-term uptick in sales. These brands used to be referred to as “challenger brands,” the types of companies that would one day upend their counterparts in traditional retail. As the number of DTC brands have reached the thousands, many of lost sight of that goal: to replace the brands of yesteryear. This, and not just to compete against other brands with similar funding and technological DNA. By losing sight of this, the advantage has shifted back to the incumbents. For them, marketing has become easier while DTC’s have suffered from heightened platform competition and prices that reflect as such.

The brands that have the best shot at winning over the longterm would do themselves a favor by revisiting the strategies that existed before retail was taken over by attempted SaaS multiples, cookie cutter agency processes, and new age strategies to reach millennials. These consumers are only slightly more receptive to digital-natives than they are to traditional brands.

Consumers are always switching their preferences, losing affinities, and forging new passions for new product communities. In a battle for eyeballs, it’s important to remember that the distance between seeing and buying is actually lengthening as noise increases. A top funnel, performance marketing-driven sale is not as sure of a bet as at was just a few years before. As digital media has begun to understand the new economy (depth over reach), DTC brands should certainly follow suit. Positioning for longevity must become a key performance indicator. That way, a brand is less likely to lose its soul for a quick uptick in sales.

Read the No. 328 curation here.

By Web Smith | About 2PM

Memo: The Gilded Age 2.0

thegildedage.jpg

Mark Twain once wrote, “History doesn’t repeat itself but it often rhymes.” According to historians, the groundwork for the New Gilded Age began in 1990. Nearly 30 years later, the age of the “robber baron” industrialist and the cutthroat financier has returned. Since that time, there are few industries that have seen the magnitude of disruption that housing and retail have endured. Nearly 26,000 stores have closed in the past three years; 2019 will double 2018’s closures. There are echoes of this bifurcation throughout the physical and digital spaces of commerce. Contrary to popular opinion, retail isn’t dying. Instead: changes in earnings, increased debt loads, and decreased consumption rates are beginning to polarize some consumers. The middle is being squeezed and retail failed to anticipate this socio-economic shift.

“The retail reckoning has only just begun.” Those are the words of reporter Jack Hough who released a blockbuster, paywalled report for Barron’s. But reckoning and death are not necessarily synonyms in this context. Retail is not dying, it is bifurcating. In The Ballad of Victor Gruen, the boom and bust of retail real estate is explained through the lens of socio-politics and tax policy:

Source: Barron’s

According to CNBC reporter Lauren Thomas, apparel mall retail profits are at recession levels. As of June 2019, Macerich, Simon Properties, Kimco, Washington Prime Group, and Taubman properties are trading at five-year lows. There aren’t enough viable challenger brands (DTC) to fill the 67,000+ store closures projected by 2026. So, it’s difficult to determine whether or not an American retail empire built on post-war consumerism, suburbanization, and accelerated depreciation will return to its former glory. But when we wonder how the “retail apocalypse” happened, look to 1954.[1]

Per capita, America is over-retailed; it always has been. But for nearly 60 years of suburban retail expansion, it seemed as though the industry would never contract. According to Randal Konik, an analyst with Jefferies: “There are about 1,350 enclosed malls in the United States but only 200 to 400 are needed.” But while retail stores shutter, sales are expected to grow 3.5% to $3.7 trillion. According to reports by UBS, it may take ten years to reach the equilibrium (1,350 to 200). The investment bank forecasts 75,000 additional stores closing in that time.

To better understand who the store closures are targeting, we must first consider the definition of the middle class – a shrinking cohort of the American consumer. There’s a great chance that if you’re reading this, you are statistically in the upper middle and wealth classes and gaining. That group earns greater than $140,901 in annual household income.

At top, the typical consumption of the average middle class family. And at bottom, the wide range of salaries that make up the American Middle Class. These figures are influenced by region, number of dependents, and a host of other factors.

But for many hard working, middle Americans, something is lost in translation. With inflation, under-employment, rises in college tuition, mounting consumer debt, and healthcare costs – typical consumption has fallen. And families who earn a comfortable wage are living closer to the lower end of the middle-class range or below. In short, levels of wealth are polarizing and retail’s bifurcation is following suit.

Understanding the Gilded Age

The times of mining bonanza kings, railroad barons, merchant princes, bankers, generational trusts, and utility tycoons were rife with brute capitalism and a stark economically inequality that America hadn’t seen before. The country began to lead the world in the production and refinement of valuable goods and services. For the select few who benefited, new, economic monarchies were forged. For everyone else, life seemed more like scene from Sinclair’s “The Jungle.”

If you’ve ever had the good fortune of visiting Newport, Rhode Island – you’d recognize something peculiar: The Gilded Age presents itself in certain areas of the city like the era was never replaced by the middle-class boom. Between 1870 and 1900, three of the largest and most extravagant homes in America were constructed along the shores of the beautiful New England city. Of these palatial homes is what many consider the crown jewel: The Breakers. On 14 acres, the 65,000 square foot mansion serves as an archetypal memory of the age of industrialism. Cornelius Vanderbilt II bought the land for $450,000 in 1885 and finished construction on the 70+ room “summer cottage” in 1895.

As a student, I walked the halls of The Breakers with several of my classmates. We’d never seen anything like it before. Frankly, I was in shock. Growing up squarely in the middle class, I could barely imagine living in 4,000 square feet. But in the structure that harkened to the Italian renaissance, we marveled at a family’s home that spanned an entire acre of land. I didn’t know that this level of wealth existed and I surely had yet to see any of modern derivatives of that boom’s past. Castles were for history books and midieval films, or so I thought.

The rich get richer and the poor get – children.

F. Scott Fitzgerald

There are a number of Gilded Age-era homes across the United States; many have been repurposed into public buildings and monuments to the era. San Francisco has the mansions of their Big Four. Just a ways away, you’ll find the Hearst Castle. Connecticut is home to the Lauder Greenway estate. Massachusetts has The Mount. And of course, the streets of New York are peppered with homes like the Arden, Indian Neck, Olana, and Woodlea – the now-home of the Sleepy Hollow Country Club. In all, there are nearly 80 homes of this caliber in America. Not one was built after Jay Gatsby’s 1920s. That is, until recently.

There’s a paragraph in the recently published The Triumph of Money in America by Jack Beatty:

But, brazen as it was, inequality then conformed to the pattern of the unequal past. Not so inequality in what publications from the Atlantic Monthly to Seattle Weekly have denominated the “New Gilded Age,” when for every additional dollar earned by the bottom 90 percent of the income distribution, the top .01 percent earn $18,000. From 1950 to 1970, they erned $162. […] Paul Krugman notes, “Not since the Gilded Age has America witnessed a similar widening of the income gap.

The Gilded Age was a salicious spectacle of glory and tragedy. It seems that we are on the precipice of another flashpoint, where years of quiet build-up led to an “aha!” moment. Housing, mounting middle-class consumer debt, and retail trends all seem to point in that direction. Consider last mile delivery services like DoorDash or GrubHub, a luxury experienced by the upper-middle and wealth classes. But a job that takes advantage of the underemployed – many of whom are likely white collar professionals fighting to remain somewhere in the depleting middle.

There is a polarization of American wealth and it’s progressing at a dizzying pace. Look no further than San Francisco, where the newly homeless camp against the walls of four and five star hotels. The dichotomy is striking. Or consider New York City, where there may be slightly less of a wealth disparity (to the blind eye). Yet, the city’s private helicopter traffic is growing noisier while the subway system is failing many who are fighting to remain in the middle class. There are as many last mile workers on the streets of New York as there are pedestrians at times. A noticeable number of New York’s miles of retail storefonts lie vacant.

In 2018, USA Today reporter Rick Hampson wrote: “That time (roughly 1870-1900) shares much with our time: economic inequality and technological innovation; conspicuous consumption and philanthropy; monopolistic power and populist rebellion, […] and change —  constant, exhilarating, frightening.” Understanding the mirrored socio-economic patterns of then and now should profoundly impact the retail operations of today.

Gilded AGE 2.0 And Modern Retail

Sears, the once-famed retailer earned its beginning in the Gilded Age. Richards Sears, a railroad worker, founded R.W. Sears in Minnesota. Operating as a reseller of jewelry and watches, early success moved the business to Chicago where he met and hired Alvah Roebuck. The retail founder and the watchmaker built an innovative business: they’d own products and brands and sell direct to consumer. A predecessor of eCommerce, today. On the heels of direct-sales and catalogue success, the retailer went public in 1906 [2].

Sears went public with preferred shares selling at $97.50 each, or more than $2,500 now. Goldman Sachs managed the offering. That year, Sears also opened a mail-order distribution center on Chicago’s West Side that, with three million square feet of floor space, was among the largest buildings of its kind in the world.

The boom of Sears’ brick and mortar growth relied the boom of rural and suburban penetration throughout America. Nearly sixty years of fortune followed. Richard Sears adjusted for the times. A business built for the wealthy became a symbol of the burgeoning middle-class. He saw the opportunity, I suppose.

Online retail sales as percentage of total retail | Source: eMarketer 2018

Fast forward to 2019 and retail’s lines of my demarcation are clear as ever. Online retail has been adopted by nearly a quarter of Chinese citizens and across the country’s economic strata. In the United States, the makeup of online retail customers skews towards the affluent. Amazon Prime’s membership boasts over 110 million users, or a third of all of American households. Of all internet consumers, 66.3% of those who earn over $150,000 use Amazon Prime. Just 31.6% of those who earn $35,000 annually have purchased the membership.

The suburbs are overstored and undershopped, and experts say only the top 20% of malls are thriving.[WWD]

Online retail and “Tier A” malls attract an affluent consumer. Off-price physical retailers and “Tier C” malls skew towards the economically-distressed. Between 2018 and 2019, the following specialty retailers have shuttered en masse: Nine West, Claire’s, Brookstone, Samuel’s, Mattress Firm, Sears, David’s Bridal, Charlotte Russe, Payless, Gymboree, Topshop, J. Crew, J.C. Penney, Pier 1 Imports, and DressBarn.

More closures are to come. Of them: GAP and L Brands will accelerate closures, further diminishing middle class retail. Not only are we witnessing a polarization of American wealth at a dizzying pace, it is now reflecting in retail real estate. The institutions for the affluent have remained steady, in some cases contributing to a growing retail sector. The institutions for the economically-distressed are also doing quite well. Historically, off-price and luxury retail were at the periphery. If these trends continue, these two cohorts may become the collective majority.

There are implications for digital-natives. Consider the rising customer acquisition costs of today’s direct to consumer business. Facebook, Instagram, and Google’s advertising inventory have remained static while the volume of DTC founders who launch companies continues to rise. Rather than a go-to-market that appeals to a growing number of modern luxury consumers and HENRY’s (high earners, not rich yet), many DTC brands optimize message, branding, and ad spend to reach a contracting number of middle-class consumers. Or worse, off-price consumers who’ve yet to fully adopt online retail as a method of consumption. It’s unclear whether or not this dynamic is contributing to a rising CAC but the shifting dynamics of an audience should concern marketers.

Meanwhile, off-price digital natives like Brandless and Jet.com have struggled as they focus on forms of bargain-driven promotion. While over 100 million Americans use Amazon Prime, we’re still at 11-13% of retail being attributed to online transactions. The United States is still in the early stage of eCommerce adoption; as such, off-price consumers continue to lag behind in the adoption curve. It’s reasonable to assume that this contributed to what may have been an overestimation of total addressable market (TAM) for retailers in the off-price category. Brandless has since adjusted their strategy to appeal to more affluent shoppers. “The average order value today needs to move from $48 to probably $70 or $80,” the words of Brandless’new CEO who has committed to charging more for products, leaving behind the company’s bargain basement strategy.

This era has begun to reveal sharp contrasts in how Americans approach the consumption of goods and services. Net consumption continues to grow despite a catastrophic number of store closures. Some in retail and media are quietly recognizing that the most competitive approach to growth is the pursuit of the modern luxury consumer – a cohort that seems to be invulnerable to these shifts. Products have become more exclusive, with higher quality production, and superior service. As online retail penetration continues to grow from 11% to levels resembling China’s, off-price retailers will begin to see more success – a notion that should bode well for Walmart, Costco, and others.

While history doesn’t repeat itself, it does rhyme. The economically-disadvantaged deliver food, novelties, alcohol, and commodities to urban sprawls and gated suburbs – within the hour. Across the country, the net worths of the top 1% have become noticeable as conspicuous consumption of products and services have risen; the rise of platforms like StockX, Hodinkee, and Uncrate demonstrate this. For the top .01%, there are more 40,000+ square foot homes than there were in the Roaring 20’s. Retail is responding to economic realities of today. Wealth is galvanizing; retail strategies should adjust to meet the shifts head on.

The term retail apocalypse has always been an uncomfortable generalization to make. This research suggests that it’s also an innacurate one. Rather, Gilded Age 2.0 is a casualty of the middle class; a consumer that emerged in response to the industrial and financial booms of the late 19th century. The early 21st century resembles a time when the middle barely existed. It was an unfortunate time of boom or bust, feast or famine. For commerce and its adjacent industries – 2.0 is a correction that can no longer be ignored.

Research and Report by Web Smith | About 2PM