Memo: GoPuff and Basically

When a retailer launches a private label, it means they’ve achieved a critical mass. According to Placer.ai data, Gopuff’s launch of “Basically,” is right on time.

A lot can be said about the state of the retail industry, and the modern consumer, by looking at the companies that are expanding their store footprint most aggressively. Recent data from Placer.ai reported the top ten retailers to watch in 2022 based on their expansion plans. The list, which features fast food chains, Dollar Store spinoffs, and a store-in-a-store partnership, confirms that today’s customers are drawn to physical stores when there’s a reason to visit them, and the companies that best deliver are those that are most aware of current consumer trends: DTC, bifurcation, instantaneous delivery, and convenience.

Most notable on the list is Gopuff, which has turned some of its micro-fulfillment sites into customer outlets after building up a business based on ultra-fast delivery. Gopuff is expected to IPO this year, after Reuters reported it has hired banks to help it go public, with a valuation of close to $15 billion. The physical locations could make Gopuff even faster by bringing customers to the delivery point, cutting down on time workers take to get items to customers at home. The stores are not typical convenience stores, but ordering hubs, where customers use digital kiosks to place orders that are then fulfilled from the warehouse. To facilitate this omnichannel strategy, GoPuff acquired companies in a land grab, with 161 BevMo stores and 23 Liquor Barns now acquired.

The Gopuff model does what retailers like Target are trying to retrofit their stores to accomplish: functions seamlessly as order fulfillment centers by serving both in-person and online customers simultaneously and sustainably. One look at instantaneous delivery data shows that Gopuff is not optimizing for sub-15 minute delivery:

By building its retail business off the back of its delivery business, Gopuff is poised to meet customers exactly where they want to shop: either online, at home, with instantaneous delivery, or in person when they’re out already and it’s easier, or they want to avoid additional fees.

Getting customers to build a Gopuff habit both via delivery and physical retail will place the nine year old company in a league of its own. With the launch of Basically, – Gopuff’s private label – and the in-store model that only DoorDash’s Dashmart comes close to in function, and Gopuff could present a case for why it may lead the convenience delivery market in the years to come. According to YipitData, as of now, DoorDash leads with 45% to Gopuff’s 23%. Instacart and Uber have earned 16% and 15% of the market.

This could – and should be – a wake up call to grocery and convenience store chains that have slowly turned to delivery. From Grocery Dive:

Gopuff is hardly the first online retailer to move into physical stores, joining a long list that includes large companies like Amazon and niche players like Warby Parker. This underscores the importance of bricks as well as clicks to companies’ retail strategies, even as the pandemic has boosted online shopping. But a strictly digital ordering model for in-store shoppers is unique among grocery and convenience stores, and could prove to be a useful test of shoppers’ expectations for convenience and store experience.

Gopuff’s physical retail strategy isn’t the only one to watch.

DTC brands are the new mall brand. Placer.ai also lists Warby Parker and Allbirds, both of which IPO’ed last year. More stores are integral to both DTC brands’ plans as they’re massive money makers, with customers who shop both in store and online spending more than customers who only shop online. In last week’s member brief on Glossier, Skims, and Savage x Fenty, I explained:

Malls need them, and they’ve effectively built passionate customer followings supported both by savvy marketing and products that people want to buy.

That also applies to Allbirds and Warby who are representative of the future of mall retail: they have enough of a following online that customers seek them out, and they are both pushing to build enough of a national retail footprint to allow existing consumers to buy more impulsively (a benefit of owned retail). They are also benefiting from cheaper customer acquisition costs as new consumers are introduced to them through more efficient channels.

Beauty is a sales driver, but only for certain retailers. Ulta and Sephora have amassed an in-store beauty monopoly to the detriment of department stores. Retailers that have won their business have gained from their statuses as retail destinations for beauty fans. Placer.ai found that Kohl’s stores with Sephora locations inside drew more foot traffic than those without Sephoras. And Target is already expanding its partnership with Ulta after a successful start. What’s more interesting is what’s happening online in this space, much to the dismay of Glossier:

Notice the shift from brand eCommerce to marketplace eCommerce as a preference in beauty. As companies like Sephora, Ulta, and Walmart have grown their eCommerce presences, Glossier has avoided partnerships with them (both in-store and digital). Walmart recruited nearly 100 beauty brands over the trailing 12 months, Ulta has partnered with Target, and Sephora is within Kohl’s.

Retailers are following customer bifurcation. Two brands on Placer.ai’s list, Arhaus and pOpshelf, reflect the continued trend of consumer bifurcation. Furniture brand Arhaus is targeting high-income households, particularly those in suburban areas, as an alternative to RH, with 70 stores and showrooms so far. pOpshelf, meanwhile, is the Dollar General spinoff designed to appeal to wealthier, younger, suburban shoppers who turn the nose to the Dollar General but appreciate the treasure-hunt shopping experience known at stores like TJ Maxx.

The bottom line? Rightsizing is still underway as overly stretched retailers with weaker online presences and less relevant brand names shrink their footprint. Waiting in the wings is a new class of retailers that more closely mirror today’s consumer, with digital innovation in stores and omnichannel cachet becoming top competitive advantages.

The internet has reshaped class and how the affluent shop. What the Placer.ai data shows is just how great the influence of eCommerce on retail real estate seems to be.

By Web Smith | Edited by Hilary Milnes with art by Alex Remy and Christina Williams 

Memo: Shopify, Fulfillment, and Disruption

This isn’t as much a story about Shopify as it is one about supply chain disruption and the assessment of the company’s risk tolerance. Logistics and fulfillment is now one of those disciplines that require a company’s full measure of attention and discipline. Amazon could do it, while Shopify cannot.

Shopify’s fulfillment network – and its ambition to compete with Amazon in the fulfillment game – has suffered a setback. Shopify is shrinking its network of warehouse and fulfillment partners by about half. We learned of the plan to scale back the strategy last week after an existing partner notified 2PM of the impending change. He noted: “Any merchants that use custom packaging, do wholesale, or kitting, won’t be serviced by the new offerings.” A recent report by Insider made it official.

The move is telling in terms of where Shopify sees itself in the grander retail landscape. Shopify’s goal has long been to build an “army of rebels” that can compete with Amazon’s larger machine. That’s worked well as a retail movement and Shopify has had a considerable past year. Brands use it to launch and build their businesses and the company has become synonymous with direct to consumer retail. It’s positioned itself as the anti-Amazon, a market position that has served it well. But there are some areas where Amazon’s moat provides undeniable advantage.

Retail logistics is a monstrous undertaking in the best of times. The past year has been one of the worst. Supply chain disruptions have increased by 88% over 2020, with 47% of disruptions impacting the US, Shopify’s chief market. We provided this breakout below:

 

On December 27, we wrote:

While Shopify has the advantage now, Amazon’s network of fulfillment systems is quickly becoming essential. Shopify’s great rival, may eventually become its most necessary partner.

Shopify cannot absorb the increasing complexity of the shipping industry, not even with world class software. Why? Because it’s a people and vehicle business. Software can optimize manpower; it cannot replace it. There are rules and external forces that dictate the state of shipping, deliveries and returns that even the best software cannot overwrite. When disruption becomes that dictator, the best-equipped machines are needed. Amazon is that machine. It’s built a business, and a moat, designed to maintain optimum performance even in the worst of times. Also from December:

Through years of investments, Amazon has created its own cargo shipping fleet and is leasing planes, along with the opening of an Air Hub in Cincinnati, to avoid out-of-stock problems that have begun plaguing other retailers at this stage in the holiday shopping season. Amazon has stretched its business in myriad ways, but its advantages are no longer just product and digital-driven.

Shopify Fulfillment Network is nowhere near DOA, according to Insider’s report and insider reports. The company is eyeing third-party acquisitions. It will likely retool, with a smaller warehousing footprint and a heightened focus on one of eCommerce’s biggest pain points: returns. Now for Shopify, returns may not be one piece of a massive fulfillment network but rather the selling point of a slimmer, software-driven operation.

Returns is one of retail’s modern problems that could be greatly improved with more capable software. In the post-returns marketplace, we suggest that with enough returns volume, a marketplace or returned goods could thrive. But first, Shopify or a Shopify partner like Loop would need to become the de facto solution for returns administration. The following is a relevant snippet from that report:

After analyzing dozens of warehousing operations and interviewing countless owners, one thing became clear: There is an elegant marketplace opportunity disguised within an unglamorous industry. In a recent discussion with a top independent third-party logistics CEO, he said:

“With the exception of our two largest clients who use Loop, the rest of our clients all use our WMS/OMS to facilitate their returns. We’re a drop in the bucket doing $150M in GMV last year. But right now no one we ship for is using Shopify’s internal system to facilitate the process.”

Shopify’s fulfillment setback is a reminder of why Amazon is the rare, full stack retailer: marketing, search, buy, ship, return. This strategy shift is a chance for Shopify to better navigate its next moves, not as Amazon’s replacement but its potential partner. In December’s Bloomberg feature on Tobi Lutke’s leadership style, a former Amazon executive was the source of the quote: “Shopify made us look like fools.” That response was short-sighted. Retailers are buying containers by the dozen, they are building new 500,000 square foot fulfillment facilities, or  outright renting entire container ships. Logistics is now an all or nothing proposition and few have exemplified this new reality than Amazon, who Shopify should just partner with at this point. We ended our memo on this Bloomberg report with a different takeaway:

While Shopify has the advantage now, Amazon’s network of fulfillment systems is quickly becoming essential. Shopify’s great rival, may eventually become its most necessary partner.

Everyone needs a frenemy in their life.

By Web Smith | Editor: Hilary Milnes | Art by Christina Williams 

Memo: China Strategy Revisited

This is a continuation of the original essay: The China Strategy (2018)

At 8 am on May 10, 2003, Taobao went online on the fourth day of the SARS quarantine. The homepage read: “Think of those who start a business in trying times.” Nineteen years later, and China’s online retail economy is the envy of the world. Currently with a nearly 37% online penetration and growing, analysts estimate that rate will reach 63.9% by 2023. It’s evident that online retailers like Alibaba, which owns Taobao, used the crisis to move China into eCommerce leadership that then belonged to the United States. China owes its eCommerce dominance to Alibaba, but its future may be with JD.com. This as the U.S. Government is becoming increasingly adversarial with Alibaba.

Shopify’s next geographical ploy isn’t in the early-stage metaverse, it’s in the late-stage region that’s been trickiest for America’s modern brands to find success. Context is necessary. In 2017, Alibaba wanted to partner with digitally-native brands, so it thought like Amazon and went on a public relations campaign to attract American retailers to the marketplace. I sat in a Detroit conference center as a guest of Alibaba when a charismatic Jack Ma stood on stage wooing middle America’s small businesses. He’d later say, “Alibaba’s existed for 18 years, and we are so influential in China–but nobody in America knows about us.” And he was right, even after Alibaba’s record-setting IPO in 2014.

The same year, JD tried to appeal to the same country but with a slightly different market: It invested $397 million in Farfetch to bring American luxury to China. It fizzled. In 2020, Farfetch revised its strategy and ended up partnering with Alibaba and Richemont in a deal structure that far exceeded the original JD partnership.

Alibaba CEO Daniel Zhang was quoted saying at the time:

This highly complementary partnership brings together some of the world’s leading luxury retail and technology platforms, representing another milestone in Alibaba’s strategy to meet the rapidly growing demand for luxury products in China. The Chinese luxury market — which is expected to account for half of global luxury sales by 2025 — consists of hundreds of millions of young, digitally native consumers.

Over the past two years, JD and Alibaba retooled their approaches to gain traction with America’s direct-to-consumer brands. Alibaba homed in on the luxury market and poached Farfetch from JD. Now, JD has made its counter move. It is teaming with Shopify, the leader in online merchant services for modern retailers by GMV (and potential). They’ve essentially switched strategies: one traveled from middle America up market and the other traveled down market in its focus on the American middle. It’s rare that JD outmaneuvers its larger Chinese rival; here it has its second chance to try.

This is take two for JD and it’s counting on Shopify’s direct relationship with a growing number of smaller brands. The Chinese mainland is perhaps the most coveted audience for North American retailers today but without a high level of sophistication and relationship development, it’s close to impossible for American merchants to market their products to the largest eCommerce audience in the world. GlobalData estimates that China’s online retail economy is more than double that of the United States:

According to GlobalData’s E-Commerce Analytics, e-commerce sales in China grew at a CAGR of 17.7% between 2017 and 2021 to reach the value of CNY13.8 trillion (US$2.1 trillion) in 2021.

Shopify found a way to help its merchants reach those trillions of CNY. It’s joining Chinese marketplace JD.com, and not Alibaba, in a partnership that portends to help its merchants succeed in a market that will be worth $3.3 trillion by 2025.

The deal is a win for both sides. Shopify’s business soared during the pandemic, and unearthing new areas of growth for its merchants is key to Shopify’s next level-up. Cross-border commerce is a logistical hurdle for many small and medium sized brands as they attempt global expansion. Shopify, which wants to be the internet toolbox for online sellers, will gain a competitive advantage by helping its brands make the jump to new markets.

In 2018, 2PM predicted that China would become the next growth market for DTC brands otherwise facing climbing customer acquisition costs. As believed then, the brands that could successfully go-to-market in China would be the haves; the rest will be the have nots.

Chinese eCommerce is a worthwhile investment for well-prepared DNVBs. McKinsey&Company estimates that by 2025, Chinese shoppers will account for nearly 45% of global luxury spending. This translates to “7.6 million Chinese households will represent RMB 1 trillion in global luxury sales, an amount that is double that of 2016, and equivalent to the size in 2016 of the French, Italian, Japanese, UK, and US markets combined,” according to the consultancy.

The Shopify x JD partnership levels the playing field, to be a part of the “haves” be a part of Shopify, or so the theory goes. It is now a conduit to the largest market and JD is now a pathway to bringing more products from East to West. As part of the partnership, JD.com will set up an accelerated channel for Shopify brands that will narrow the onboarding window from 12 months to three to four weeks. JD will handle logistics including warehousing and deliveries for the US brands.

For JD, Shopify is a coup considering that $SHOP’s current link to China is through Alipay, the financial wallet powered by Alibaba-affiliate Ant Group. That deal will likely go sour.

The Chinese government has set a target to increase national online retail sales by around 44% between 2021 and 2025. JD, Alibaba, and now Shopify will be a key part of that push. There are risks. Even with the support of Shopify and JD.com, business in China needs to be closely managed to tailor marketing, messaging, and even inventory selection to appeal to the region. In this way, there is only so much that a platform can do to facilitate opportunity for its brand partners. Shopify’s global success here will depend on the individual successes of the brands themselves. This is in line with Lütke’s philosophy who doesn’t love to play the king maker.

By Web Smith | Edited by Hilary Milnes | Art by Alex Remy and Christina Williams