第 334 期书信的现实意义

BoF

本周, 《大西洋月刊》(The Atlantic)的凯特琳-蒂芙尼(Kaitlyn Tiffany)撰写了一篇关于通讯行业历史的报道,内容细致入微,很有价值。历史的长短取决于你问的是谁。对于她的观点,Substack 希望你相信他们的团队开创了这一运动。她正确地认为,他们已经成功地为不同的受众进行了调整。他们很可能会取得巨大的、长期的成功。只要看一眼 Substack 的付费排行榜屏幕,你就会明白作者自始至终提出的观点。她在文章中写道

安-弗里德曼(Ann Friedman)说:"[时事通讯]已经成为一种事物,"她自 2013 年起开始撰写每周时事通讯,拥有 40,000 名订阅者,被公认为第一波时事通讯热潮的领军人物之一。

蒂芙尼的文章在很多方面都与我一段时间以来的一些想法有关。她恰如其分地指出,虽然安德森-霍洛维茨(Andreessen Horowitz)对 Substack 的 1530 万美元投资标志着一个开端,但对于其他群体来说,它已成为让时事通讯 "变酷 "的有用工具。她逐条介绍了通讯行业历史上一些最重要的名字。这份报告值得您花时间阅读。

在九月份的 "Destination D2C"展会的后台,十几位同行聚在一起畅谈职业世界,我们每个人都以自己的方式追求着这份激情。我们每个人都有一些共同点,但最重要的是对直接面向消费者行业的兴趣。现在,凯特琳-蒂芙尼(Kaitlyn Tiffany)在《现代零售》(Modern Retail)杂志的《DTC 兄弟的崛起》(The Rise of the DTC Bro)一书中纪念了这一重要时刻。凯尔-魏斯曼首先发言:

首先是奢侈品时事通讯《Lean Luxe》的创始人保罗-蒙福德(Paul Munford)和网站 2PM 的创始人韦伯-史密斯(Web Smith),后者与 Haus 的创始人兼首席执行官海伦娜-普莱斯-汉布雷希特(Helena Price Hambrecht)坐在一起。然后是 DTC 战略家兼顾问马可-马兰迪兹(Marco Marandiz),他坐下来和大家一起讨论他们的客户。之后,在 Twitter 上自称 "DTC 达人 "的 Nik Sharma 也加入了讨论。

也许,《现代零售业》的记者没有看到的是,在那个场景中,在座的每一位成员都忍受着不相称的拒绝。海伦娜-普莱斯-汉伯瑞希特(Helena Price Hambrecht)是一位著名的直接面向消费者的创始人,她最初是一名创意人员。Hambrecht 本身就是一位沟通大师。

她很快就证明了自己,但对于我们这些在瓶子发货前就认识她的人来说,她已经得到了证明。

但在此之前 Haus推出之前,她共同创立的品牌面临着一场艰苦的战斗。没有人愿意资助她的想法。早期,记者们私下对她的理念和方法大加挞伐。我个人知道,为了完成 100 万美元的种子轮融资,她投了 500 多次。这是一个非常高的失败率。传统风险投资人考虑的因素有:地域、行业、年龄、性别等等。模式匹配提供了安慰和一点保险。Hambrecht 并不符合模式匹配。不过,她募集的下一轮资金将在几天内完成。Haus创始人海伦娜-普莱斯(HelenaPrice)在给 2PM 的评论中写道:

我们的第一个 100 万美元花了 8 个月的时间和大约 500 次推销。我们听到了很多拒绝。我们经历了许多黑暗和怀疑的时刻。话虽如此,但如果你真的相信你所做的东西会有受众,你也会在风险投资中找到这些人。我现在告诉正在融资的人,他们可能还没见过 90% 最终会投资他们的人。你只需不断获得介绍和发送冷邮件,最终就会找到你的人。

她很快就证明了自己,但对于我们这些在瓶子发货前就认识她的人:什么都没变,她已经被证明了。她只是不符合零售业管理者和制造商的想法。至于电子商务行业的领导者或思想家,我们坐在后台的人中也很少有人符合这种模式。马兰迪兹、夏尔马、芒福德和我都不是商业和媒体行业高层资源的原型。在这份业内人士名单上,你找不到我们中的任何一个人。不过,名单上有几位成员订阅了《2PM》或《Lean Luxe》。

在一个对那些不按常理出牌的人的贡献视而不见的行业里,通讯运动提供了一个平台。我们每个人在这一时刻分享的东西都被这段话记录了下来。在成为出版商之前,我们都曾是经营者:创始人、董事、经理、建设者。这些来之不易的经验是推动我们个人项目前进的风。

曾任Hint Water(后为 Vaynermedia)电子商务总监的夏尔马经常与多产的大卫-佩雷尔(David Perell)合作撰稿。芒福德(Munford)的职业是公共关系主管,他在 2PM 推出几个月后就创办了Lean Luxe。马可-马兰迪兹(Marco Marandiz)在推特上发表了对Away和Glossier等DTC品牌的分析文章,一举成名。他在HomeAway负责产品时就开始这样做了。在我为媒体刊物《Gear Patrol》和《Uncrate》管理商务之前,我与他人共同创办了Mizzen + Main。不过,这些资历往往还是不够的。

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Sherrell Dorsey、Dan Runcie、QuHarrison Terry 和 Web Smith

就在三个月前,2PM 还参加了全国黑人记者协会(NABJ) 的专题讨论会,与会的还有成功的(利润丰厚的)时事通讯出版物:The PlugInevitable HumanTrapital。讨论的主题是 "建立付费订阅媒体公司"。但我们不难发现其中的共同点:如果没有通讯受众的临界质量,我们的想法很可能会被传统媒体通过与专业记者的现场或非现场对话进行重新包装。时事通讯出版商努力掌控其观点的传播及其周围的社区。

因此,当我读到《现代零售》的这篇文章时,我并没有感到不快。魏斯曼是一位伟大的作家,他可能没有恶意。但我感到困惑的是,为什么没有人看到我们所做的一切。我不确定许多读者是否理解我们当初坐在那里是多么自豪。就在三年前,那一幕还不会发生。对我来说,那一刻就像是莫大的荣幸。每一次,我们都找到了自己的方法,向竞争激烈的生态系统传递我们实用的、以经验为导向的想法。而在那一天, Yotpo的创始团队认识到了这一切的正确性。这是一个重要的时刻。

前子栈时代

目标:发表 180 封信。重新评估。 2015 年成立的 2PM 公司可谓是雪中送炭。那年 12 月,我不再共同经营 DTC 业务。相反,我开始为出版商提供建议和/或建立电子商务运营。作为一个副业,我创办了2pml.com,以此来对自己负责。

2PM 的主张很简单:了解一切,才能更好地做好一件事。

我想在自己的专业领域做得更好。当时,我只专注于一项任务,导致盲点多于实际进步。因此,我错过了在阅读、思考和认真分析之后获得的实用知识。第一封 2PM 电子邮件发布给了 11 个人;出于需要,我在发出 180 封邮件后将其货币化。建立这家公司成了我的全职工作。

通过了解 2PM 与商业相关的行业如何相互作用,对彼此产生消极或积极的影响,我能够为我所参与的项目规划出最佳步骤--无论当时还是现在。通过 2PM,我希望能为其他行业的同行复制同样的能力。这是个简单的命题:了解一切,以影响那一件事。

如果说蒂芙尼的《有人会靠电子邮件通讯致富吗? [1]一书中可能存在的盲点。现在有越来越多的前经营者把大部分时间花在磨练出版技能上。他们了解商业、营销、品牌、物流和数据科学。他们运送过包裹,洽谈过分销协议,领导过绩效营销工作。而读者似乎也会被这些在围墙内讨论行业的人的原始视角所吸引。无论您是在阅读艾米丽-辛格(Emily Singer)的《Chips and Dip》、马格达莱纳-卡拉(Magdalena Kala)的《Retales》、里奇-西格尔(Richie Siegel)的《 Loose Threads》、珍妮-吉兰德(Jenny Gyllander)的《Thing Testing》,还是保罗-蒙福德(Paul Munford)的《Lean Luxe》,都能感受到运营经验的存在。

运营商优先的出版商

没错,Substack 在其 7 月 17 日的博客 "更好的新闻史"中遗漏了相关历史。当然,他们强调了本-汤普森(Ben Thompson)和杰西卡-莱辛(Jessica Lessin)这两位独立付费订阅行业的名人。但 Substack 可能忽略了另一个趋势。Substack 在向出版业致敬的最后写道

纽约太阳报》创刊至今已有 184 年,我们正站在新闻行业新革命的风口浪尖。哀悼旧媒体模式失落的时代已经过去。现在是展望未来两个世纪的时候了。

这场革命本身并不新鲜。但它正在影响那些寻求平台以推动行业发展的新型思想家。它会让出版商致富吗?也许会,也许不会。但作为一个平台,出版与单独发送新闻简报完全不同。吉兰德刚刚完成了一轮规模可观的天使投资,投资方包括硅谷的众多精英。她的订阅方式新鲜、可信、吸引人。西格尔刚刚成功举办了为期一天的零售业会议,如果没有他的《Loose Threads》时事通讯,这次会议就不会举行。Munford 每次举办Lean Luxe社交活动时都会爆满。虽然这不是一个以订阅者为导向的付费平台(暂时如此),但他已成功地通过每周赞助实现了盈利。此外,2PM正在为商业和媒体高管推出首个会员制论坛:Polymathic。每家公司都面临着巨大的机遇。

运营商优先的出版商时代令人目不暇接。从某种程度上说,它正在为媒体界创造一个公平的竞争环境。但是,在 Yotpo 的豪华会场后厅的一张桌子上,有一群人无疑脱颖而出--无论从字面上还是从形象上。我们的举止与众不同,我们的外表也与众不同。商业相关媒体中的非传统声音正在对传统媒体圈产生积极影响。我们希望,这些由新闻通讯转变而来的平台能继续为成熟的数字行业高层提供新思路。2PM 再次观察到一场来自内部的静悄悄的运动。

点击这里阅读第 334 期策划

Web Smith 报道 Tracey Wallace 编辑 |About 2PM

第 333 期:食品 52 和线性商务

food52.jpg

There have been few meaningful exits over 13 years. As such, questions surrounding the direct-to-consumer industry’s lack of exits have reached fever pitch. Investors have long questioned the viability of marketplaces and DTC brands. Initially pitched as technology companies, platforms like Shopify and BigCommerce streamlined the technical requirements for many go-to-market strategies. This left many investors questioning defensibility, proprietary advantages, or the value of a brand’s intellectual property – if any.  With many DTC companies raising capital with the intention of growing like software companies, it begs the question: do they understand their true value? The short answer is no.

无标题

我不确定很多 DTC 品牌所有者是否意识到,他们正在建立的公司的估值是收入的 1 - 1.5 倍。

When venture capitalist Fred Wilson published his thoughts on the Great Public Market Reckoning, he set the stage for an important discussion on the valuations of venture-backed companies. WeWork’s 2018 revenue was $1.8 billion on $1.9 billion in losses. In August 2019, America’s finest investment banks were selling consumer investors the story that the company’s discounted cash flows (DCF) justified a $47 billion valuation at IPO.

If the product is software and thus can produce software gross margins (75% or greater), then it should be valued as a software company. If the product is something else and cannot produce software gross margins then it needs to be valued like other similar businesses with similar margins, but maybe at some premium to recognize the leverage it can get through software.

Softbank, WeWork’s latest investor, believed that the company could eventually exceed $100 billion in value. As of today, that IPO filing has been shelved indefinitely; the IPO prospectus that once valued the company at nearly $50 billion has been rescinded. WeWork is back to the drawing board and on a hunt for a healthy EBITDA, as it’s likely that a company like that will be judged by a different standard. This may be a difficult path. The coworking company maintains 20% gross margins. Until recently, the cognitive dissonance between value and valuation continued to widen.

Peloton is trading at 6x revenues, rather than the 7-8x that underwriters intended. Based on their gross margins (46%), it’s likely that the multiple will 5x. Lyft maintains a 39% gross margin; Lyft is trading at 4-5x and may eventually fall to somewhere between 3-4x. The commonality shared by Lyft, Uber, and Peloton is the software leverage that they share. Each of the three maintains a software angle that places a premium on their respective valuations.

For many DTC brands, that same leverage rarely exists. For every StitchFix, there are dozens of retailers that fall within that range. These are companies without much technical IP, if any at all. This is a gift and a curse. Shopify has streamlined many of the requirements that would have required a technical co-founder just a decade ago. It’s for this reason that tech’s multiples of revenue shouldn’t be the measure at all. Online retailers are EBITDA businesses. And it’s time that the category optimizes for improved gross margins and sustainability. This may mean less venture capital raised and slower growth over a longer time horizon.

Venture capital isn’t right for many businesses, but if you do want to raise from a VC at some point, you need to understand that often investors care more about growth than profits. They don’t want high burn rates but they will never fund slow growth. [1]

The public market’s rebuke of WeWork is just one of the latest hits to the private market’s penchant for marketing overestimated valuations. In online retail, there is a key adjustment that can be made to better position the DTC industry for exit optionality. The first of which is to learn community building from digital media publishers.

A common DTC multiple of revenue is 1.5-2x. The Steve Madden acquisition of Greats Brand was reportedly within this range. A $13 million revenue year resulted in a sale for $20-25 million. A common marketplace multiple of revenue is 2-4x, this is a company like Chewy.com or StitchFix.com. A common multiple of revenue for a commerce-first media brand is 3-7x. Glossier has been valued at over $1 billion with a revenue total ranging between $100 – $150 million. For tech companies, SaaS has a premium. In some cases, 10x revenue multiples.  For retailers, valuation multiples are influenced by organic audiences.

Linear Commerce and Revenue Multiples

1565363735634-buyables2_2Food52 is a member of a new breed of digital platform, one that combines commerce and media operations. This aids diversificaton of revenue channels while minimizing the rising costs of traditional customer acquisition. It is not easy but it can be rewarding. There are a number of publishers in this category, to include: Barstool Sports, Uncrate, Highsnobiety, Hypebeast, and Hodinkee. And remember, Glossier began as a blog called Into The Gloss.


No. 314 Linear Commerce: for the brands that are most suited to the modern retail economy, media and commerce operations combine to optimize for audience and conversion. This is the efficient path for sustained growth, retention, and profitability.

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Food52 is a ‘Version 4’ retailer. Most DTC brands maintain a ‘Version 1’ structure.

Each of these publishers attracts a niche, passionate audience. Their audiences fuel several revenue operations: affiliate marketing, display advertising, native advertising, and DTC retail. Commerce is prioritized and traditional advertising is minimized.

The deal does fit in with the direction The Chernin Group has been headed: The company, which once had plans to put together a very big internet conglomerate after acquiring an big anchor like Hulu, has instead been buying and building a stable of internet companies aimed at distinct audiences, all of which rely on revenue streams beyond internet advertising. [2]

In early September, 25 operators spanning digital media, traditional media, and commerce were seated in a Manhattan dining room. Of them were the founders of Food52, Amanda Hesser and Merrill Stubbs. The venture firm and host of the evening’s festivities let the cat out of the bag. In a surprise announcement, The Chernin Group mentioned that they were set on acquiring a majority of Food52. The room applauded the founders. It was a rare exit in an industry that has struggled to gain its footing.

TCG owns a controlling stake in MeatEater Inc., a digital media company aimed at hunters, fishermen and home cooks, and has also invested in Action Network, a sports-betting analytics startup. [3]

The attendees brushed the impromptu announcement aside and allowed the natural public relations cycle run its course. And that it did. Yesterday, a number of outlets reported the sale. Here are the numbers:

  • $83 million acquisition of the majority of the company
  • A valuation of $100 million
  • $13 million raised over four equity rounds
  • A reported 2018 revenue of $30 million (not profitable)
  • Traffic: 7 million monthly active uniques
  • Paid traffic: less than 2.5% of overall volume
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Mike Kerns, President

A Fund 1 investment by Lerer Hippeau, the Food52 acquisition was a positive outcome for investors and founders alike. It’s also a glimpse into the methods that more digital-first companies employ to improve their exit optionality. Those methods? Building brand equity, fostering community, and owning their audience. In a 2PM conversation, Mike Kerns, President of The Chernin Group, stated:

We love to invest in entrepreneurs who are building enduring brands that have engaged audiences. Food52 has built a growing commerce business with very little marketing spend. Their marketing is building their enterprise value and defensibility which is the investment in to their content and community.

Kerns continues:

For TCG we like businesses that can build businesses with their audience established versus trying to purchase the audience from someone else.

In Kerns short statement lies a bit of truth that many in the DTC space fail to recognize. The stronger the organic audience, the higher the premium on a company’s valuation. All revenue is not equal. If a retailer can earn a sale without buying an audience each time, this becomes attractive to potential investors. So why the resistance towards this approach? In short, it isn’t easy to do.

The most viable companies across the digital ecosystem will share a common trait: established, organic audiences. Content and community are core to that outcome. For the well-executed linear commerce brands, retention rates will be high and CAC will be low. The road map is there for the brands looking for a sustainable advantage and improved optionality. Perhaps, the public and private markets will reward more of them.

Read the No. 333 curation here.

报告人:Web Smith |大约 2PM

 

第 332 期:Peloton 的风险与宗教

AllyLoveYall

Today’s public markets seem to penalize the cults of personality. For an example, look no further than WeWork’s current debacle. In a sequence of events that may remind you of the ouster of Uber’s founder and CEO, WeWork also raised venture capital from Softbank and Benchmark. And the company’s board happens to be at odds with its own founder and CEO, just in time for a long-anticipated initial public offering.

It’s kind of stunning how quickly Adam Neumann has become a pariah. I have always thought the business was of questionable value. But it goes to show you how many people are ‘outcome over process.’ And the second the IPO stumbles, the knives come out.

Nick O’Brien

Two venture-backed companies with growing losses and questionable paths to profitability and only one of them looks to clear the bar to IPO. One possesses a cult of personality in Adam Nuemann, the other lords over a cult of fitness thanks to consumers like you. A notoriously fickle industry, Peloton has combatted the ebbs and flows of fitness micro-trends by recruiting and retaining top management. To Peloton, retention is the KPI.

Led by John Foley, Peloton is equal parts: quality of product, quality of programming, and quality of its users.  These users are Foley’s collective x-factor. It’s also a cohort that is more vulnerable than you’d think.

Peloton reported an impressive $915 million in total revenue for the year ending June 30, 2019, an increase of 110% from $435 million in fiscal 2018 and $218.6 million in 2017. Its losses, meanwhile, hit $245.7 million in 2019, up significantly from a reported net loss of $47.9 million last year. [1]

As Peloton nears IPO, the company has chosen to experiment with a new sales promotion. The expectation is that Peloton will bolster a few key metrics: new users, new subscriptions, and number of streams. By instituting the “30 day guarantee” found in informercial fitness products like NordicTrack and Bowflex, Peloton runs the risk of reducing lifetime value (LTV), increasing churn, and ostracizing the company’s highly motivated base by marketing to casual users and moving down market.

In the beginning, Peloton buyers were required to purchase the equipment in full. By partnering with Affirm, the consumer finance startup, the hardware / software company opened the doors to 0% financing over 36-48 months. This opened the product to middle class consumers without degrading LTV and average order value. This week, the company took one final step to reduce friction.  But while analysts laud the move as an enabler of growth, I’d argue that it may backfire.

Peloton is unlike anything that we have seen. For power users, the matte black cycle has become a source of inspiration, motivation, and even accountability. Personalities like Ally Love and Alex Toussaint have become household names. Just this summer, tennis legend Chris Evert made note of her apreciation for Ally Love during the broadcast of Tennis’ US Open. She noted that Love was “her spin instructor.” Before that moment, they’d never met in person. In my own household, I ocassionally ask my wife about her training sessions, “How was Alex, today?” She laughs every time; the running “joke” between us is that she refuses to stream another instructor.

The cult of Peloton isn’t anchored by the equipment. Rather, it’s the company’s human resources that remains the draw. And surprisingly, the company seems to be willing to manipulate it for short term growth.

IMG_0113As of the June filing of the the company’s S-1, Peloton showed over 511,000 subscibers and nearly 85 million cumulative sessions. To many users, it is an addiction of sorts. But the addiction is less a result of the physical product and more of a product of its efficacy. That takes time to materialize, much longer than a month. The hardware company’s marketing flywheel is perpetuated by the consumers who evangelize it. I’d argue that the time horizon to understand its value is closer to three months. A one month trial seems like a churn engine, not an acquisition funnel.

I’ve sold a number of colleagues on owning a Peloton of their own. This is commonplace, the S-1 suggests a high rate of word of mouth sales. In selling the product to peers, I’ve noted that the rides are painful but well worth the commitment. The hardware is beautiful and the augmented live stream is extraordinary. But it’s the sense of accomplishment and the commitment to the platform that I have found to be most valuable to the product’s brand equity. So yes, part of the lock-in stems from the commitment to ownership.

Understand the dualing strategies in the fitness industry:

  • Planet Fitness thrives on low motivation, short-term commitment, relatively minimal lock-in, and low attrition. The costs are so low, many members forget that they are still paying. This is by design. Costs are minimal because volume is key. If every member showed on the same day, there would be no space to exercise. Planet Fitness is a gym model.
  • Equinox thrives on high motivation, network effects, longer-term commitment, and low attrition. Costs are relatively expensive;  this cost prevents overcrowding and funds amenities. The network and those amenities keep customers coming back. Equinox is a club model.
S1
A high participation, high retention model resembling a club model.

At the height of the functional fitness craze, CrossFit’s growth was driven by high participation, efficacy, and peer-to-peer evangelism. Patrons from traditional gyms paid a premium to join one of 7,000 grungy, glorified garages and warehouses around the world. These customers were seeking a twisted enjoyment of challenging workouts (and the physical transformation that followed). But more importantly, they sought an active community. Peloton is shifting from the exclusivity of the club model to the inclusivity of the gym model. And this is where things become trickier for Peloton. The new pricing strategy conflicts with the longterm viability of its market position.

Nothing happens in a month

The 30 day trial promotion has been widely reported in publications like Bicycling Magazine and Shape.

This new offer is a clever way for the brand to give potential long-term customers a true taste of the bike experience and the wide variety of workout classes. For you, it’s a great way to try before you buy. [2]

This messaging conflicts with many of its value propositions. If I had to guess, it was likely a point of conflict within the c-suite. The company’s corporate structure is unique. It has nine members in that c-suite. Yet, a chief of marketing (CMO) is not one of them. It’s one example of an unfortunate trend in consumer retail.  After three years as PepsiCo’s senior brand manager, Carolyn Blodgett left a short stint with New York Giants organization to become Peloton’s senior marketer. As an SVP, it’s likely that she reports to the Chief Revenue Officer (Tim Shannehan) or the Chief Content Officer (Jennifer Cotter).

In this way, the lack of a singular vision may play a role in Peloton’s decision to test a trial system. While pricing incentives aren’t rare in SaaS sales or the marketing of physical goods, they do tend to be the tip of the spear for brands seeking to introduce further discounts and incentives. And they spell trouble for a company that will be largely defined by the best practices of fitness clubs and software-based network effects. Peloton will have a hard time explaining the supremacy of its product as the trial periods grow from one month to three or four. Or worse, when the $2,300 cycle that you paid for is on sale for $1,200 over the holiday season. Pricing incentives are a slippery slope.

With marketing and real estate costs eating into Peloton’s net profitability, the writing is on the wall.  The company believes that growth costs have become too expensive and with a $1.2 billion IPO in waiting, the story of efficient growth may determine the company’s viability over the next two quarters. Unfortunately, this may be a short-sighted injection of growth.

Like WeWork’s attempt to silence its cult of personality, Peloton risks weakening its cult of fitness. Only one of these seems intentional. It’s unclear whether Peloton’s management fully understands the risks involved. The company’s strength is two-pronged: its on-screen talent and its cult-like early adopters. The market may reward Peloton for leaning on new methods of influence and acquisition. However, their management won’t begin to see the unintended effects of mass adoption (and increased churn) until its marketing flywheel begins to sully.

In the unfortunate case of that happening, Peloton will become just another in-home cycle with a screen. And in that case, consumers will see a lot more of the words Peloton Infomercial 20:00 in their cable guide’s lineup. And that’s no place for a religion to be sold.

Read the No. 332 curation here.

报告人:Web Smith |大约 2PM

Additional reading: Peloton vs. Tonal (Member Research)