第 331 期 第一部分:电视上看到的

2PMAsSeenAs

在纽约市的一间私人餐厅里,坐着几十位数字媒体和零售业的高管。其中包括 Chernin Group、Cameo、Instagram、Barstool Sports、Stripe、Digiday、Seat Geek、theSkimm、Andie Swim、2PM 和 Zola 等公司。这些公司既有风险投资支持的 DTC 品牌,也有估值高达九位数的数字媒体公司。每个人都有需要解决的特定问题。我们讨论了整个行业关注的问题,包括:广告效果、利润、规模和可持续增长。

在这个夜晚,Instagram并不是宇宙的中心。至少一开始不是。从这家社交媒体巨头所处的环境来看,这实属罕见。让会场安静下来的并不是新营销技术、创新或黑客的预言。而是一则关于传统营销渠道的轶事。

安迪-库巴尼是 Ideavillage是一家控股公司,专门生产经过深入研究、极具市场潜力的 "强势品牌"。女性脱毛系统 Flawless 就是他最新成功的品牌名称。 强势品牌往往是轻资产、高增长、高利润率、生产杠杆、物流能力和可持续的竞争优势。

2018 年,他将 Flawless 卖给了 Church & Dwight以 4.5 亿美元(相当于收入的 2.5 倍)的价格卖给了 Church & Dwight。根据 2019 年 3 月的一份新闻稿,在第二年,他的公司毛利达到 1.8 亿美元,息税折旧摊销前利润率为 30%。 

为了扩大公司规模,他采用了传统的广告和促销方式。 

在平面广告、纽约市出租车广告和博客活动的支持下--再加上全面的 DRTV 宣传--Flawless 已经迅速成为 "电视上看到的"(As Seen On TV)栏目、美容和剃须刀专柜中最畅销的零售美容产品。[1]

在一间挤满了数字广告商、平台和商家的房间里,每个人都可能在问自己同一个问题:他是如何如此迅速地达到临界质量的?胡巴尼没有筹集任何外部资金,也没有分配任何绩效营销费用,却在短短两年内建立了一个价值近 5 亿美元的品牌。在 DTC 领域,绝对没有人能做到这一点。最近的一次收购是以 2000 万美元收购 Oars & Alps。他们筹集了近 700 万美元。本周,特里斯坦-沃克录制了他的 "我是如何创建公司的 "节目。他以不到 4000 万美元的价格将公司卖给了宝洁。Greats Brand以不到3000万美元的价格卖给了Steve Madden。我还可以继续说下去。

库巴尼的退出规模在 DTC 领域极为罕见。自 2007 年以来,只有不到七个 DTC 品牌的退出价格高达 4.5 亿美元。Flawless的早期盈利能力与这个行业形成了鲜明对比,在这个行业中,LTV:CAC优化是一条类似于《旧约全书》的法则。人们普遍认为,尽管缺乏利润,但现在也 要投入巨资以赢得终身客户。这种方法延长了时间跨度,提高了资本要求,但也免除了高管们早日实现规模的短期压力。我认为,LTV:CAC 优化理论充其量只是一种虚伪的理论。市场在变化,竞争在加剧,技术在进步,消费者的情绪也会随着流行文化和时代潮流而变化。


来自第 310 期:DTC 游戏手册是个陷阱

只要 DTC 品牌试图效仿前人的做法,你也应该对这个行业持怀疑态度。许多投资者似乎都在寻找一本 DTC 指南来交给他们的投资组合公司。好像在说:"这就是怎么做的。现在执行游戏计划!"但很可能永远不会是这样。当数字新贵开始在传统零售业的领地上竞争时,传统品牌应该起到提醒作用。它们拥有通往临界质量的独特道路,很少有品牌遇到 DTC 时代所寻求的可预测性。


当今的挑战者品牌似乎有两种考虑。要么为尽早退出而优化,要么在 15 年以上的时间里实现增长。风险投资通常不会强迫这两种结果。追求令人不舒服的 "两者之间",即 5-10 年的期限,可能是 DTC 流动资金问题的根源。对于该领域的许多公司来说,可以从强势品牌中学到很多东西。那些快速扩张和退出的品牌。Flawless 只是其中之一。

电视上看到的/商店里看到的

在过去的几周里,有几个数据表明,DTC玩法的时代早已过去。随着传统品牌采用技术和网络优先的发展方式,许多传统品牌扩大了自己公司与挑战者产品之间的优势,争夺相同的货架空间。

电子商务是一项极具挑战性、经常无利可图的业务。这也没有考虑到消费者仍然非常希望亲身接触品牌、产品和人。

安迪-邓恩

在Yotpo副总裁拉吉-尼杰尔(Raj Nijjer)的一份有趣的分析报告中,这位零售业高管提出了一些令人惊讶的指标[2]:丝涟床垫 2018 年直接面向消费者的销售额超过了 Casper 的总收入,尽管 Casper 占据了在线零售广告和消费者聊天的心智份额。他还指出,Madewell:一个主要由实体房地产、传统广告和传统宣传册驱动的品牌,将通过在线零售渠道实现 5.34 亿美元的销售额。

[邓恩]说,就 Bonobos 而言,该品牌目前 "最赚钱的业务 "是与 Nordstrom 的合作。Bonobos 现在还拥有 66 家被称为 "指南商店 "的实体店。[3]

库巴尼详细介绍了他是如何将Flawless打造成为一个相对强大的公司的,他明确指出,DTC时代的部分问题在于无法真正促成购买。简而言之,很少有 DTC 高管知道如何进行真正的销售。许多人依赖于肤浅的印象作为衡量标准,而不是当管理者把目标锁定在消费者的眼球之外时所发现的深度。

我不太喜欢数字原生的垂直品牌。让我感到兴奋的是那些真正强大的、直接面向消费者的品牌,同时还拥有全方位的品牌。

安迪-邓恩

他认为自己已经掌握了一门科学。很难说他错了。当典型的 DTC 品牌或数字媒体运营商想到 "定位 "一词时,就会产生一种现代感。"电视广告不如 Facebook 和 Instagram 的量化能力",这是典型的媒体机构创始人常说的一句话。库巴尼建议,品牌管理者应该重新考虑 "定位 "的定义。虽然电视广告支持更广泛的触达方式,但它针对的是不同部分的消费者。

屏幕截图 2019-09-16 at 3.32.01 PMInstagram 或 Facebook 广告的一贯做法是吸引眼球。我们访问应用程序是为了无意识地消费图片。离开应用程序后,我们很少会仔细回想所看到的内容。我们不会在推特上谈论它,也很少谈论它。这些有针对性的内嵌广告都是经过精心设计的印象。它们是通过捕捉消费者的视线引发心理思考的视觉效果--哪怕只有一秒钟。这就是为什么你会看到滚动的.gif优惠券代码、价格优惠图表或标有面料品质的照片。在社交网络上,品牌广告往往是一门科学,而不是艺术。品牌经理们通过价格和比较的逻辑来促成销售。电视则不同。它激发人的内心。当我们观看自己喜爱的节目时,我们会通过社交渠道谈论并传播消费的快乐。

在这个夜晚,Instagram并不是宇宙的中心。至少一开始不是。

正如上传到 Instagram 或 Twitter 的实体广告牌会成为社交广告一样,我们在电视上发现的消费品也会通过社交和分销渠道加速增长。众所周知,那些粗制滥造的 "所见即所得 "广告能够很好地吸引消费者购买,以至于商店专门为这类产品开辟了过道。但在这个时代,像 Flawless 这样的品牌所能获得的好处更大。在电视的助推下,早期的吸引力往往会带来更广泛的实体和网络销售。这将使联盟交易、社会影响者的参与和赚取的媒体收入得以延续。对于许多品牌来说,这些都是 DTC 营销牵引力的关键绩效指标。

两个安迪邓恩和库巴尼

据传,在2018年这1.8亿元的销售额中,《无懈可击》支付的传统广告费用不到200万元。4.5亿美元的退出+奖励,广告回报的规模和速度显然非同一般。但令人惊讶的是,这并不是关键的收获。

随着 DTC 品牌销售能力的提高,它们的广告宣传将更像最初的直销品牌,那些通过电视吸引消费者的品牌。这些品牌通过电话、电脑或沃尔玛或 Target 的独特购物通道进行蛊惑销售。

该报告综合了代表52个不同类别的125个顶级DTC品牌的信息,发现纳入研究的DTC品牌2018年的电视广告支出比2017年增加了60%,去年的电视广告支出总额为38亿美元。 [4]

消费者将看到更多像Away这样的品牌的电视广告 但对于某些类别的产品来说,制作风格将品牌声明转向只有在电视上才能看到的长篇销售风格。新时代的零售商将很难像营销主管那样,以长篇幅的方式使用电视。传统的电视观众可能不适合许多新品牌或其产品。

但是,对于某些类别而言,营销和分销战略将继续朝着这个方向发展。这些策略将包括那些卖力推销的信息广告中的许多线索。 对于那些希望采用更多商家基因的品牌来说,有一些新的工具可以使用。随着电视、广告牌和类似 QVC 的平台上出现更多的 DTC 品牌,这些销售策略也将进入数字优先平台。

这样看来,安迪-胡巴尼的想法很有先见之明。直销行业通常通过两种媒体风格来吸引消费者:(1)崇高的品牌宣言或(2)优惠券代码价值主张。推动 Flawless 从 0 美元飙升至 1.8 亿美元的广告风格是这两种风格的结合,旨在让潜在客户从发现、吸引、转化到传播。正如安迪-邓恩(Andy Dunn)所指出的,数字原生品牌如果不采取全渠道的增长方式,将继续举步维艰。

品牌正在利用传统的零售感觉,在第三年实现 5 亿美元的退出。即将上市的 J. Crew 旗下自有品牌 Madewell 的 DTC 收入接近 5.34 亿美元。沃尔玛建立自己的品牌,而不是收购数字原生品牌。DNVB "一词的教父指出,作为数字原生代现在是一个不利因素。

在接下来的几个月里,DTC 品牌将围绕上述电视广告风格展开活动。它们将在 Instagram 等平台上进行测试,广告将俏皮地模仿其节奏和语调。他们将在更新的平台上建立流程,量身定制,以实现有效的扩展性和参与度。两位安迪似乎都在倡导类似的最佳实践。到 2018 年,网络第一品牌常用的云技术已被传统零售商广泛采用。挑战者品牌要想重新获得竞争优势,就应该借鉴老牌零售商行之有效的广告和分销策略。然后,他们应该把这些策略变成自己的策略。

点击这里阅读第 331 期策划

报告人:Web Smith |关于2PM

第 290 号关于 DtC 品牌的可辩护性

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If you’ve seen a battle scene from a movie about knights, soldiers, and castles, you may understand the concept of an economic moat. If you watched an old war film lately, a moat is often depicted as a water-filled ditch. It typically helps to defend a fort, village, or castle. In that film, you may have seen projectiles fly toward the castle and cannons fire from atop, in return. Enemy combatants rush the castle only to encounter a deep and wide area of water, poison, hot tar, and sharp spears. As the castle faces fire on all sides, the offensive is often ineffective. The moat helped the castle defend its position. 

People don’t know what they want until you show it to them.

Steve Jobs

In traditional tech, there are moats all around us. Apple builds moats into many of their hardware devices. Your Macbook prefers its Safari browser (until you otherwise designate Chrome), Apple Car Play exclusively defaulted to Apple Maps until iOS 12, and your Airpods defaulted to Apple Music unless you specified Spotify. For physical goods, there are brand moats as well. The best example happens to be at Nike.

Nike works with youth leagues to outfit elite teams, providing young players (and their parents) incentives to purchase all of their wears from the brand. The sportswear manufacturing giant outfits the NFL, the NBA, and the vast majority of NCAA sports. When fans purchase licensed apparel, consumer psychology tips in favor of Nike.

Amazon Prime has become a funnel for the retailer’s private label brands and their high margin devices. Walmart has operated at such a low cost-basis, that their most loyal consumers have little to no market substitute. Shopify attract new merchants with little revenue and fosters them along their path to $20 million per year, introducing a suite of products to keep them from replatforming.

And then there’s Whole Foods Market, who – prior to acquisition – competed in a red ocean. They succeeded for a long time by building an economic moat around their brand and user experience. For decades, Whole Foods’ economic moat was a collection of subtle advantages: nicer fixtures, a wider assortment of organic foods, great lighting, and a knowledgeable floor staff. There was little to nothing technical about the retailer’s growth, but the collection of these advantages locked customers in. An economic moat can be built by more than a company’s technological advantages.

How do you compete against a true fanatic? You can only try to build the best possible moat and continuously attempt to widen it.

Warren Buffett

The internet didn’t destroy the moat, it changed the definition. The smaller the niche, the less the competition. For products in a small niche, there’s less of a need for brand defensibility. But for product manufacturers in a red ocean, defensibility is the difference between stalling out and taking flight. Yet, brand defensibility is often deprioritized. In some cases, brands will focus on customer acquisition (at all costs), often at the expense of building a lasting economic moats.

Old consumer economy. Initially, there were three influences to consider when launching a product in this new consumer economy: brand, product, distribution, the hive, and acquisition model. Prior to the rise of direct to consumer retail, a brand’s moat consisted of these:

  • brand: the impression made upon consumers. The perception created around a physical good mattered most. This impression helped brands remain top of mind between their visits to their shopping centers or the occasional television advertisement.
  • product: the quality of the goods. The value created by the manufacturer influenced brand perception, customer satisfaction, and even word of mouth influence.
  • old distribution: where it is sold. The better the product, the more likely that a consumer could find it anywhere. This signaled that there was consensus around the quality and durability of what is being sold.

With this model, a brand’s trajectory and defensibility was mostly predictable. This was pre-internet: before the rise of the internet and digitally native vertical brands. With the proliferation of direct to consumer brands, influences have changed.

New consumer economy. With the internet, any retailer can market, sell, and deliver physical goods. Brick and mortar distribution is no longer defensible against upstart brands. The web democratized the ability to build product-based brands. In the new consumer economy, a brand’s moat is not only its features, price, and availability. It’s a consideration of product experience, technical advantages, and brand evangelism.


If you don’t land the first and loyal 100, your brand is less likely to earn the early adopters who look like the first 100. Without early adopters, you will not achieve the attention of the masses. The first 100 are the foundation. Without the support of the 100, the masses will not adopt. Made famous by Simon Sinek, heed the diffusion of innovation theory: the early majority will not try something until someone else tries it first. Brands are judged by this early majority.

No. 277: The Power of the 100


In the new brand economy, maintaining defensibility has become more complicated. In physical retailers, traditional luxury brands know their buyers’ preferences. Today, the savviest DNVBs are in direct contact with many consumers by way of customer service, email, and private messaging. They are using these channels, pricing strategies, branding to influence outcomes. Brands have optimized around, beautiful packaging (see: Lumi) fast shipping (See: ShipBob), and easy returns (See: Loop). And with these technological and brand advantages, they are siphoning the loyalty away from incumbent brands like Gillette, who are still operating under the rules of the old consumer economy.

Here are the revised influences:

  • brand: the reputation of the product manufacturer. The collective sentiment of the brand’s consumers.
  • product: the value created by the product. But also, the value created by the ease of purchase, the fulfillment process, and the customer follow-up  upon purchase.
  • new distribution: how is it sold? The better the product, the more likely that a consumer has a 1:1 relationship with the brand.
  • acquisition model: how does the brand achieve meaningful foot traffic? And what is the right combination of paid and organic growth? Is organic growth sustainable?
  • the hive: who is the product’s first 100? Has the brand experienced organic growth on the foundation of this digital community? Will the “100” defend the brand when skeptics criticize it?

A practical example of competition

In this recent post by Harry’s, their team addresses Gillette head on:

In the face of competition from companies like Harry’s, Gillette has lowered its prices for certain razor models. Yet, Harry’s may still be the best value if you’re looking for a 5-blade razor with a flexible head, lubrication strip, and trimmer blade—the key features many guys consider to be most important for a great shave.

How long have you been overpaying for your razors?

At Target stores, Harry’s maintains the majority of the mindshare in the men’s skincare aisles. Often in spite of Gillette’s legacy of long-term performance. And today, Procter & Gamble disclosed that the company is downsizing it’s valuable Gillette real estate in Massachusetts. Presumably, the P&G label is preparing to more efficiently compete with online-first brands that are eating into their market share.

A moat for DtC brands is the competitive advantage earned by focusing on brand, product, distribution, acquisition, and the hive – the brand’s most visible customers and product activations. This competitive advantage fuels incremental growth in established industries.

I’ve compiled two distinct lists of the DNVBs that have emerged in industries that are highly competitive: luggage, skincare, supplements, digital media, and athleisure. These brands aren’t notable because of their lack of competition; rather, they are notable because they rise above tremendous competition. Paul Munford, founder of Lean Luxe, reports on direct-to-consumer brands. He made the following selections:

  1. Away
  2. Rapha
  3. Soylent
  4. Outlier
  5. Wone
  6. Bevel
  7. Hodinkee
  8. Monocle
  9. Casper
  10. Rxbar

And here is 2PM’s list (more at our DNVB Power List):

  1. Away  | revenue leader in the carry-on travel DNVB industry
  2. Casper | revenue leader in the DTC mattress space, distributorship through Target
  3. Harry’s | leader in the men’s shaving, effectively growing into other verticals.
  4. Chubbies | top performer in the men’s casual space
  5. Glossier | leader in makeup, a substantial amount of traffic driven organically
  6. Hodinkee | there isn’t a more credible community of watch journalists
  7. Four Sigmatic | the leader in alternative coffee sales
  8. Mizzen + Main |combines DtC commerce with a targeted physical retail presence
  9. Serena & Lily | leader in DTC furniture, organically driven by quarterly brochures
  10. Wone | redefined ultra-premium in athleisure by selling out of $320 leggings.

One similarity that our lists seem to share: brands’ focus on its customers. And not just traditional customer service but the incorporation of customer feedback in many of their decisions. Above and beyond price and product, a brand’s hive can influence its defensibility.

A common mistake made throughout the consumer economy is the belief that customers are won and lost on features and price – alone. It’s a product manufacturer’s responsibility to build 1:1 relationships with consumers who are power users. In our recent report on Nike’s physical retail efforts, we began with this:

我走进梅尔罗斯店时,觉得它根本不适合我。我不是千禧一代的奢侈品消费者。而这正是耐克所追求的。洛杉矶的零售店在美学和产品方面都非常符合该地区的特点。店里的每一平方英尺都是为 Instagram 打造的。一瞬间,我意识到,虽然我是千禧一代,但我不是耐克所追求的千禧一代。这家店就是为他们准备的。

第 289 期耐克与超本地化

A defensible product becomes consumer’s first choice. Building a community around this is very difficult but this is what separates defensible brands from the brands without it.

A common misconception is that a brand with a strong economic moat has no competition. Quite the opposite, brands with the strongest means of defensibility often have numerous competitors vying for increased sales and brand equity. What sets the one apart from the many? A focus on relationships, value, and retention – not acquisition, alone. The conversation begins when the purchase is made.

As more brands focus on DtC commerce, an economic moat does more than protect the product manufacturer from growing competition. Without an economic moat, existing customers may depart for alternative options based on price, merit, and availability. In this context for brands, defense can be the best offense.

New to 2PM? Read the latest subscriber curation here.

By Web Smith |About 2PM

No. 264: Welcome Common Thread

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Pictured: The founders of Qalo

2PM has the privilege of working with a new corporate partner [1] for Q2 2018. Common Thread Collective is one of 2PM’s noted eCommerce agencies, notable for what they are doing on behalf of digitally vertical native brands. Demand generation for eCommerce is an oft-discussed topic on 2PM. There are three styles of content x commerce strategies. The most talked about models:

(1) publishers who are building an eCommerce as a revenue source:

(2) vertical brands who insource content-publishing to bolster organic traffic, improving net promoter score (NPS):

There is a third way that brands interact with top-of-the-funnel consumers. And it centers around connecting brands to influencers, using messaging to develop content that resonates with prospective buyers. From there, it’s about harvesting first-party data to develop one on one relationships with consumers. Here is a highlight from a recent 2PM Executive Member Brief that should provide context for you:


成员简报 3:注意力堆栈

First-party data (FPD) is information compiled and stored by by DNVB’s, media groups, and marketplaces. FPD describes your brand’s visitors, customers, and loyalists. Because companies with FPD have a prior relationship with their customers, they are in a position to use the data, to include names, addresses, email, demo, and gender — to communicate directly with them. First-party data is what is stored in your brand CRM. The attention stack is what your brand and data-minded operatives work to build by harvesting this data.


There isn’t just one way to approach the attention stack or the collection of first-party data. Here’s a look at one of Common Thread Collective’s methods.

  • Step one: understand the brand’s existing and potential customers.
  • Step two: recognize who influences the brand’s potential customers.
  • Step three: configure the most efficient and effective approach to reaching potential consumers with the influence that CTC has cultivated on behalf of your brand. Invite them to engage with your brand.
  • Step four: drive them to conversion or re-engage and retarget with the previously engaged consumer with dynamic product ads.

Given the importance of building the eCommerce sales funnel (i.e. the attention stack), I sought out an agency partner that would allow 2PM to observe their work with DNVB’s and mainstream retailers. Over the next three months, 2PM will examine the processes that have worked for their brands.

As Facebook begins to address their data controversy, agencies like Common Thread Collective will be the first to adjust, better serving their brand partners who are dependent upon Facebook’s marketing data to drive numbers at the bottom of the sales funnel.

Why should you know Common Thread?

Their approach to optimizing a brand’s attention stack is working and it’s working well. On top of this, their culture is truly unique. Prior to settling in on agency life, the group of managing partners focused on two areas of business that remain pivotal to their work: product entrepreneurship and professional athletics. The CTC partnership includes the former founders of Power Balance and are the existing owners of Qalo. Common Thread’s key clients are:  Diff Eyewear, QALO, Theragun, 511 Tactical, 47 Brand, and Owl Cam.

Many of CTC’s influencers were introduced to brands through the partners’ personal network for professional sports contacts. And influence is vital because CTC’s approach to bolster product sales is driven by social proof. There are two reasons that the average American consumer purchases a product: (1) low pricing (2) recommendations from someone that they trust.

We believe social networks are fueled by human interactions and video content, so to be great at social advertising you have to be able to create human content. We create content and activate influencers in unique and scalable ways. 

Taylor Holiday, Managing Director

Growing their own eCommerce brands, in house, is an additional datapoint that sets them apart. The founding team operates a holding company of micro-brands under their 4×400 incubator umbrella, to include: Slick Products, Opening Day, and FC Goods.

By building an attention stack for their own brands, it provided them with a deeper understanding of the economics that determine paid media’s best practices at scale. Common Thread Collective has skin in the game and proving sales efficacy on your own products is not often seen in the agency space. And their work is serving them well, Common Thread Collective’s typical return on advertising (ROA) ranges anywhere between a 4.06x to 8.3x ROA.

Elephant in the room: Facebook changes?

The success of digital ad buys depends heavily on the troves of data that Facebook has on consumers. Given that Facebook could face regulation, this could spell trouble for retailers who are dependent upon Facebook’s ability to influence product sales. The common fear is that Facebook will begin to roll back some of the data collections that allow the best brands and agencies to do their work.

My top priority has always been our social mission of connecting people, building community and bringing the world closer together. Advertisers and developers will never take priority over that as long as I’m running Facebook.

Zuckerberg, Testimony before U.S. Congress

Considering that greater than 70% of Common Thread Collective’s ad money under management is with Facebook and Instagram, Common Thread will be at the forefront of  the agencies tasked with managing these potential changes. We’ll continue to discuss those developments here. In the meantime, learn more about Common Thread by clicking the logo below:

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By Web Smith | Web@2pml.com | @2PMLinks