第 325 号合并与电缆 2.0

家庭的中心仍然是有电视的房间。在这个房间里，一场军备竞赛正在我们眼前展开。流媒体正在采用一种端到端的形式，这种形式反映了数字原生品牌的本质：拥有产品，拥有渠道，你就拥有了消费者。但以前不是这样，以后也不一定。

上周末，我妻子想看我们最喜欢的节目。但在我父母所在的佛罗里达州西北部市场，周日晚上的节目被打乱了。他们的家介于传统有线电视和流媒体服务之间。但如果没有HBO Now，我们就无法观看我们一致同意的节目。这种情况不无讽刺意味。

现已退休的Cleon Smith在有线电视行业担任了 30 多年的高管。先是在时代华纳，然后是康卡斯特，最后是考克斯通信。在时代华纳公司，我曾在他新成立的宽带互联网部门实习，该部门的代号为 "Road Runner"。作为该服务的总经理，他所在的市场（休斯顿、达拉斯和奥斯汀的密集三角地带）在纽约埃尔米拉测试后不久就启动了。14 岁那年，我亲眼目睹了他的团队对产品进行调整、营销和推出，而这一产品将塑造德克萨斯州乃至整个国家的未来。这项宽带服务是首个面向大众的宽带服务，它将永远颠覆他公司的核心业务。我也是这么想的。

我理解流媒体行业兴起的原因，但归根结底，这些消费者还是会向往简单的有线电视时代。我们卖出了好产品。

随着宽带互联网的出现和普及，Youtube 等服务于 2005 年推出。随后，Netflix 就像一场飓风袭击了毫无防备的胶合板住宅岛，于 2007 年转向流媒体服务。这的确改变了一切。

康卡斯特（Comcast）、时代华纳（Time Warner）和考克斯通信（Cox Communications）等公司开始创新，推出了点播选项，并最终实现了在 OTT 设备上登录 Netflix 或 Hulu 账户。但这并没有结束。上述每家公司都受到了干扰。首先是 Netflix 的市场增长方式--这一创新为数百万有线电视、Dish 和 DirecTV 用户提供了 "断线 "的动力。

这是 1995 年消费家庭的一个例子：

  • 广播电视：有线电视或卫星电视提供商
  • 基本：有线电视或卫星服务提供商
  • 高级服务：有线电视或卫星服务提供商

这是 2012 年消费者家庭的一个例子： 

  • 广播电视：有线电视或卫星电视提供商
  • 基本：有线电视或卫星服务提供商
  • 高级服务：Netflix、iTunes

这是 2020 年消费家庭的一个例子：

  • 广播电视：天线、Hulu+、Sling、DirecTV Now、CBS All Access
  • 基本：Philo、Sling、YouTubeTV、Playstation VUE、Netflix、Roku、iTunes
  • 高级服务：Netflix、Showtime（流媒体）、HBO Now、Prime Video、Vudu、Disney+

2007 年至 2018 年间，Netflix 通过购买、授权或制造知识产权，建立了一个众所周知的 "商城"。它类似于传统有线电视的元素，但它强调的是节目，而不是频道。Netflix Originals 从独立制片人手中购买，并作为 Netflix 自己的产品进行营销。像《老友记》和《办公室风云》这样的广播电视节目，每年的授权费用高达数千万美元。好莱坞大牌明星和顶级导演获得了 3 亿美元的电影预算，足以与大制片厂发行的电影相媲美。然而，Netflix 目前的股价却创下了六个月来的新低，此前传出的消息包括：历史性的订阅损失、提价 2 美元后出现的小规模反弹以及两部主要影片的流失。行业分析师安迪-米克（Andy Meek）[1] 就此事发表了看法：

Netflix 在本季度流失了 12.6 万名用户，这是自 Netflix 开始制作原创内容以来首次出现这种情况。哎呀。再加上本季度缺乏新的热门内容，《Friends》和《The Office》等节目即将流失，以及苹果、迪士尼和 HBO 母公司等竞争对手即将推出流媒体，这简直就是一场灾难，也是一场流媒体大战的 "肉搏战"，每个人都要从 Netflix 身上分一杯羹，不是吗？

随着 Netflix 价值的爆发，一种反向关系显现出来：Netflix 的成功和电影公司的商品化。流媒体行业为终端用户提供了更多的消费选择权和钱包谈判权，从而增加了他们的影响力。在此过程中，剪线也开始对电影公司造成伤害。不仅有线电视合同的价值在减少，他们的流媒体付费也无法弥补损失的收入。

再加上消费者行为的变化、制片厂与流媒体渠道之间的合同纠纷，以及高速数据服务的不断涌现，这些都为行业的持续分裂奠定了基础。

2PM 数据：流媒体的宏观经济学

2018 年美国部分有线电视公司用户流失情况 | 资料来源：Leichtman Research Group：莱赫特曼研究集团
2010 至 2018 年美国付费电视普及率 | 资料来源：Leichtman Research Group：莱赫特曼研究集团
2017 年美国有线电视用户使用的电视服务替代品，按观众类型分列 | 资料来源：尼尔森：尼尔森
美国每月用于观看 OTT 服务的时间 | 资料来源：comScore

最后一张图表可能是最有趣的。迪斯尼旗下的 Hulu 已经开始缩小与 Netflix 之间的差距。随着迪斯尼旗下产品越来越受欢迎，分析师预计 Hulu 将继续缩小 Netflix 的领先优势。

Netflix 计划成为现代消费者的有线电视迭代--这种模式依赖于临界质量的内容和收视率。这种临界质量必须大于所有潜在流媒体竞争对手的总和。有一段时间，里德-黑斯廷斯（Reed Hastings）经营的媒体公司拥有足够多的美国人需要的内容：伟大的经典作品、经典电影、辛迪加情景喜剧、改变游戏规则的原创节目。然后，生态系统开始分裂。老友记》（Friends）等剧集转投华纳传媒（WarnerMedia）的流媒体服务，而《办公室》（The Office）则准备离开 Netflix 的内容菜单，转投 NBC 的流媒体服务。Becca Blaznek 谈《办公室》为何离开 Netflix[2]：

其中包括拥有《办公室》版权的 NBC 环球公司。2019 年 6 月 25 日，该公司发表声明称，他们将不再与 Netflix 续约，而是从 2021 年开始将这部 "稀世珍宝 "引入自己的平台。据《好莱坞报道者》称，这暂时不会影响国际观众。

与在新经济环境下进行垂直竞争的消费类别一样，制片厂品牌也在争夺剪线消费者的心智份额。然而，这却产生了意想不到的效果。与传统广播或服务提供商相比，现代消费者更喜欢流媒体，但与其他流媒体设备相比，传统消费者仍然更喜欢传统电视。

DTC 的演变

OTT 设备销售额战略分析

随着媒体分裂的继续，电影公司与现有流媒体服务之间的合同谈判只会愈演愈烈。这将增加消费者的订阅成本。剪线时代的承诺有两个方面：（1）改善家庭经济；（2）问责制。消费者希望避免闲置电视节目被忽视。如今，"剪线者 "通常会每月订阅 5-10 项媒体服务，以实现同样的消费倾向：无论使用率如何，都能获得服务。

如今的消费者只能屈从于 "订阅/登录/找回密码/闲置订阅 "这种令人眼花缭乱的舞步，却无法享受到传统有线电视服务提供商为消费者提供的便利。

因此，破坏者应该受到破坏。这样看来，之前的推断可能是错误的，而我父亲最终可能是对的。康卡斯特（Comcast）、考克斯（Cox）和 AT&T 等有线电视和数据提供商控制着管道，而电影制片厂与新时代的流媒体服务之间的矛盾日益突出，这种势头正朝着有利于传统的方向发展。虽然 Roku 和 Apple TV 等 OTT 盒子让订阅和节目搜索变得无限简单，但消费者与流媒体代理商之间的 1:1 连接仍在颠覆创新的初衷：便捷、一致和价值。

传统媒体消费者很可能已经达到了他们的极限。剪线是经济驱动的现象。放弃流媒体经济而回归传统有线电视是一个节目可用性和易用性的问题（试试用亲戚的有线电视盒子登录 Netflix）。

流媒体服务将被捆绑。我们很可能已经接近 OTT 运营商向消费者推销预先商定的、经济实惠的捆绑式流媒体服务的机会。无需登录、统一价格、无需担心错过--过去的一切都已成为现在。迪斯尼的流媒体产品可能是唯一的胜利者；它们的价值和影响力可能会超过合并后的转变。对于所有其他公司来说，流媒体视频点播（SVOD）市场的分化已经开始蚕食直接面向消费者的机会，而这正是最初的吸引力所在。

因此，零售业的 DTC 成本弹性与 SVOD 的弹性有相似之处。对于在线零售商而言，随着数字原生品牌充斥市场，CAC 也随之上升（效果广告库存保持不变）。对于 Netflix 这样的流媒体公司来说，由于电影制片厂涌入流媒体市场，其产品的广告费用变得高昂，因此 CAC 也随之上升。虽然 Facebook 和谷歌的广告库存限制导致了价格弹性，但 SVOD 的情况略有不同。流媒体消费者的支出已接近其弹性点。最终的结局可能是合并，这也是人们对昔日有线电视美好时光的向往。

点击这里阅读第 325 期策划。

韦伯-史密斯的研究与报告 |关于 2PM

补充阅读：（1）会员简报：网飞报告》(2) 《周一来信》：百年泰坦》(3)Nate Poulin 的 这篇精彩文章进一步介绍了这份报告的来龙去脉。

第 315 号数字原住民

Native

Aggregation defined an era. The aggregation throughout media, retail, and service platforms determined the economic viability of many in the vendor-class throughout the modern digital economy. Uber began as a luxury black car service. Spotify streamed music. Youtube published silly videos. Amazon began by selling books. And Netflix rented films by DVD. Imagine a world without these companies as aggregators. Companies grew market share by adding products and services, rendering their analog competitors incapable.  Like the inevitability of westward expansion, the aggregation theory continues to move certain platforms towards critical mass.

The theory is akin to the digital version of Manifest Destiny. For a time – platforms maintained an advantage, much like physical retailers possessed an early advantage over e-tailers. In the traditional retail model, individual product brands were less important than the shelves that they were marketed on. Consumers came for product selection, ease, and the universal checkout process. The one stop shop was the draw; product loyalty was a secondary feature.  In this way – content publishers, product brands, and services were merely value-additives for existing platforms. Few learned this hard lesson like popular musicians at the beginning of the streaming era. Podcasts seemed to have learned from those difficult lessons.

Gaining leverage is the mission.

The market-making opportunities that began with early digitally vertical native brands (DNVBs) began to influence adjacent industries as that sales model had its success. For decades, it was nearly impossible to achieve critical mass in retail without partnering with a brick and mortar retailer or a department store. To defend against what seemed (for a time) to be physical retail’s Manifest Destiny, digitally natives circumvented the infrastructure and went direct to consumer (DTC). This meant that they had access to increased margins, efficient customer acquisition, access to data, and stronger relationships with the consumer.

With little access to mainstream consumer channels, physical brands launched native channels with the help of platforms like Shopify and BigCommerce. It’s unclear whether or not the intent of the DTC industry was their indefinite independence from big box retail. I’d argue that it wasn’t the goal. But, regardless, the result of the last ten years has been palpable: product brands have never possessed more leverage than they do right now. Even if that leverage is temporary.

As newer platforms go to market, vertical brands are beginning to notice a shift in leverage from platform to the vertical. This is an untimely shift in momentum for platform companies, businesses that once had the leverage to act indiscriminately.

DNVB-speak in digital media

In early April, comedian Russell Brand was interviewed by the host of the Joe Rogan Experience (JRE), a wildly popular podcast that covers everything from combat sports and geopolitics to archaeology and sociology. It’s important to note that JRE is consistently ranked in the top five of the most downloaded podcasts. Toward the end of the discussion between the two men, Rogan prompted Brand to promote his business interests. And though it was a subtle promotion, this is where things became interesting.

Luminary is the premium audio publisher and content aggregator that has set out to become the Netflix of podcasting. Founded in 2018 by Lauren Sacks, the company raised $100 million from New Enterprise Associates. The funding equipped Sacks and team to recruit several sizable podcast networks and high visibility media personalities to include: The Ringer, Guy Raz, Trevor Noah, and Wondery Media. Wondery is the last remaining podcast network known for its original programming and Ringer, a successful podcast network in its own right, is still in search of Barstool Sports-level network effects. In hindsight, Spotify’s acquisition of Gimlet and Parcast were as defensive as they were offensive developments.

In the episode – Russell Brand promoted his latest venture, a podcast with Luminary. The elevator pitch had somewhat of a dual purpose: (1) use one of the most influential platforms in audio to promote a business interests and (2) recruit Rogan into the fold of the Luminary-faithful. The second part did not work, the jury is still out on the first proposition. But the effects of that conversation were immediate. Within 72 hours, JRE was pulled from Luminary’s catalogue. From Hotpod News: 

The [JRE] team explicitly cites licensing issues as the reason behind the intent to withdraw. “There was not a license agreement or permission for Luminary to have The Joe Rogan Experience on their platform,” a representative from the team told me last night. “His reps were surprised to see the show there today and requested it be removed.”

The Joe Rogan Experience wasn’t the only big name in podcasting that removed content from the platform. Spotify denied Luminary access to their shows and the New York Times pulled The Daily. PodcastOne, Barstool Sports, Endeavor Audio, and many others followed suit. From No. 304: In-app audiences:

The pending acquisition of Gimlet Media is about more than building a direct-to-consumer podcasting powerhouse, it’s about monetizing DTC audio in new ways. Spotify doesn’t own the music that millions of us listen to, they license the rights from three music labels: Universal Music Group, Sony Music Entertainment Group and Warner Music Group. With Gimlet’s pending acquisition, Spotify is positioning themselves squarely as the Netflix of audio. And Gimlet’s portfolio of audio properties could be another tool that Spotify uses to convert casual subscribers to premium, paid users.

And here’s Luminary CoFounder and CEO Matt Sacks:

We want to become synonymous with podcasting in the same way Netflix has become synonymous with streaming. I know how ambitious that sounds. We think it can be done, and some of the top creators in the space agree.

Spotify and Netflix were exclusively aggregators before they began to pursue their modern subscription growth strategy. By acquiring popular properties (like Gimlet and Parcast Network) or by investing in the development of  the native properties that Netflix is now known for, both companies moved further away from aggregation and closer to becoming digital natives. For Netflix, this was timely. Media companies like Disney have begun to pull their properties to develop their own digitally native businesses. Another sign of aggregation theory’s diminished role for newer companies.

Perhaps, the age of aggregation is nearing its maturity. According 2017’s Defining Aggregators by Ben Thompson:

Aggregation Theory describes how platforms (i.e. aggregators) come to dominate the industries in which they compete in a systematic and predictable way. Aggregation Theory should serve as a guidebook for aspiring platform companies, a warning for industries predicated on controlling distribution, and a primer for regulators addressing the inevitable antitrust concerns that are the endgame of Aggregation Theory.

Two years later, we’re witnessing a war over proverbial land rights. As platforms have begun to lose leverage over specific verticals, they’ve heavily invested into the development of their own properties (private labels / native brands / native media projects). In some cases, like Spotify’s acquisitions – they chose to acquire the properties to move consumers along the content-to-subscription funnel. For Luminary Media and their Head of Partnerships / Business Development Meaghan Quindlen, the stakes are much higher than they would have been 3-5 years ago.

She has an unenviable job; she must convince alienated podcasts to work with them by communicating her vision, by employing a new licensing compensation structure, or a combination of both. Even Spotify and Apple Music had their own similar episodes. But with $100 million in funding and grandiose aspirations – Luminary will have to out-Spotify Spotify on its way to becoming the Netflix of podcasts – a title that the first audio platform to achieve 100 million paid subscribers wants all to itself.

Who is to say whether digital media properties returns to the types of  platforms that were once required for growth; there is now a dueling loyalty between independence and potential reach. This contradiction didn’t exist a few years prior.

Digitally native retailers are open to working with big box retailers (the original aggregators) as long as they can maintain a unique in-store appearance with access to some form of consumer data.  In this way, DTC retail is a decent enough analog for what’s happening in podcasting today. Product and media brands now hold the levers – they’re the draw. Consumers walk through the door, proverbial or otherwise, for their beloved brands. Aggregators must learn to operate in a world where the leverage exists with digitally natives. At the very least, aggregators need to learn to develop real symbiosis.

Luminary may need to raise more money.

Report by Web Smith | Join the Executive Membership

备忘录百年泰坦

330UeJCU.jpg

The direct-to-consumer (DTC) era has yet to influence how we consume big budget, blockbuster films. To watch the latest Marvel Studios production, consumers still have to endure the trip to the movie theater, eat the expensive popcorn, and pay the exorbitant prices for soft drinks. In a recent conversation with the co-founder of AfterMarq and Executive Member Vincenzo Landino, I learned why the DTC era was coming to big budget film.

A day-and-date release combines theatrical release with a video-on-demand (VOD) offering while the film is screening in the theaters. The length of this window is typically 60 days, and there is a notable disparity in the price by venue. According to an Indiewire article from 2015, traditional VOD rental costs a consumer around 50% of the price of the theatrical showing. Traditional studios make more money on theatrical releases than VOD releases. Non-traditional studios (Amazon, Netflix) do the same, except their economics are reversed. Streaming is more profitable for them than theatrical release (though brick and mortar releases unlock awards season potential). We will see on occasion. Some recent examples include Amazon’s award-winning Manchester by the Sea or Netflix’s Roma.

Both Manchester and Roma are films produced by a streaming service. The films were provided a day-and-date release to improve their chances in award season. But we’ve yet to see a traditional film studio (Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century-Fox, Sony, Universal Pictures, United Artists, Warner Brothers Pictures, or MGM) lean into a day-and-date release for a mainstream film. There is a significant reason for this. None of the major studios of the time controlled the exhibition side between 1948 and today. Only Walt Disney’s Studios is in position to benefit from end-to-end control.

The market power of the studios is less than it was [in the 1940s]. Per se offenses like price fixing and market allocation are still illegal. But other horizontal arrangements between competitors or vertical arrangements between companies and their partners are more likely to be upheld today.

Michael Carrier, an antitrust expert at Rutgers Law School

Long before the modern DTC era, movie studios did control the product from production to the theater house. This changed in 1948. The Paramount case, and its resulting decrees, changed the motion picture industry for decades. Between 1945 and 1948, the Supreme Court mandated a separation between film distribution and exhibition by requiring that the major studios divest distribution or their theaters. It was a near-unanimous decision to divest in the theaters and not divest their distribution businesses.

Understanding the 1948 Paramount Decrees

When Netflix announced to shareholders that players like Fortnite gave executives more anxiety than rivals like Hulu, YouTube or HBO, they explained with this:

Our growth is based on how good our experience is, compared to all the other screen time experiences from which consumers choose.

This is an echo of a sentiment Reed Hastings, CEO of Netflix, told Fast Company in 2017 in an article titled Sleep Is Our Competition:

It’s 8:00 in the evening, you’re next to your TV–which remote control do you pick up: PlayStation remote? TV remote? Or do you turn Netflix on?

Understanding Paramount Decrees: research and breakdown by 2PM contributor Tracey Wallace.

It makes sense that Netflix views Fortnite as a primary competitor. For younger people, two years ago, the answer to Hastings’ 2017 question would have been Netflix. Now, that’s being challenged by gaming platforms or by subscription services like MoviePass or AMC Stubs A-List. While MoviePass remains on the decline, thanks to poor unit economics, AMC’s native service boasts a reported 600,000+ subscribers paying at least $19.95 per month. Services like AMC’s are bridging streaming media prices and the in-theater premiere experience.

Of course, Netflix has its own premieres like the acclaimed Bird Box or Bandersnatch or Outlaw King. Each featured a Hollywood-esque budget and at least one A-lister.

Netflix finished up 2018 with 139 subscriptions worldwide, up by 29 million from the beginning of the year. The incredible subscription growth clearly justifies hiking membership prices in the US. Netflix reported $4.19 billion in revenue, just under international forecasts of $4.21 billion. 

Netflix is experiencing a renaissance in audience growth and fanfare. What is stopping Netflix from implementing a direct to consumer approach to in-home blockbuster films? The The Paramount Decree, a 1948 antitrust law, prevents it.

In this landmark US Supreme Court case, it was determined that movie studios could not own their own theaters or grant exclusive rights to preferred theaters. At the time (1945), film studios like Paramount owned – either partially or outright – 17% of the theaters in the country. This accounted for 45% of American commercial film revenue in 1945. The 1948 decision caused a massive recession in movie studio revenues, lasting more than two-and-a-half decades. In 1972, the release of The Godfather became the first modern blockbuster and the first project to increase movie studio revenue to pre-Paramount Decree levels.

The ruling is also considered a bedrock of antitrust law and is often cited in cases where issues of vertical integration play a prominent role in redistricting fair trade. But in 2019, Netflix boasts 139 million subscribers worldwide and produces a handful of their own minor premieres, turning our living rooms into intimate cinemas. Fortunately for Netflix, the Department of Justice recently announced that it would review the 1948 decree that prohibited Hollywood studios from pursuing a DTC approach to owning and operating theaters.

The review of the 1948 antitrust ruling, and its potential reversal, would give major distributors, exhibitionists, and streaming service providers –  like Netflix or Disney – real power to run more like direct-to-consumer entertainment brands. The revision of the ruling would allow Netflix to seek partnerships with companies like AMC Theaters (or the aforementioned studios) to co-brand in-theater and in-app premieres.

It’s unlikely that Netflix and AMC Theaters will partner when the time comes, but the line in the sand is marked deeply. Once those antitrust laws expire, these two companies stand to gain a lot from cooperating with studios. But not the most.

The 100 year titan in waiting

j5qJDowo.jpgNetflix is the dominant streaming service with over 139 million paying customers. AMC Theaters has the best prospects in all the cinema-side of the film industrial complex. The company has successfully navigated the Moviepass economy by instituting its own growing movie-watching program ($19.95 / month). While heavily dependent on revenue driven by concessions and alcohol, the membership program grew to over 600,000 users in its first year. Its dependence on external revenue (concessions) is the program’s flaw.

While it is fun to envision a world where Netflix offers an AMC Premiere package in which at-home consumers pay $50 for the rights to rent a big budget blockbuster on its opening day, AMC remains the middle man. According to Matthew Ball, an analyst and former Head of Strategy for Amazon Studios:

[AMC] owes 55-67% per ticket [to distributors], with floors. [Concessions] are a big priority because of confection economics. Like gym memberships, these subscriptions only work if predicted use is <x%.

According to CNBC: in the past year, Disney has lost nearly $1 billion in its streaming business between its investment in Hulu and its work with BAMtech, the technology behind ESPN+. But DOJ’s reversal of the 1948 decree could change everything for Walt Disney Studios, a company that began just 25 years before the 1948 decision. And was but a blip on the Hollywood radar, at the time.

Disney is hoping that, over time, millions of paying customers will subscribe to Disney+ for its new original content and library of Disney movies and TV shows. Pricing hasn’t been disclosed. Netflix, which announced its quarterly earnings on Thursday, has 139 million global subscribers and just informed them that it’s raising prices by 13 percent to 18 percent.

Alex Sherman for CNBC

Disney is best suited for the DTC era. There is organic demand, loyalty, and the mechanisms to deliver it to your doorsteps. When the company announced an end to its streaming deal with Netflix, the writing was on the wall. The Disney+ product is slated to be the exclusive home for Disney films, television projects, and other original programming. According to Bob Iger, Disney’s CEO, the streaming service is the company’s priority in 2019-2020. He’s also assured the press that major releases (Marvel Studios, Star Wars etc.) will not go straight to the streaming service – though with time, even that will change.

But through the lens of the Paramount Decrees being overturned, it’s smart to consider the implications of Iger’s words vs. Disney’s impending actions. When the US Department of Justice reviews and amends these decrees, Disney will have the power to upcharge for a blockbuster premiere streamed into your home. And they will. Disney will be able to command a fee that is more lucrative than traditional day-and-date releases and at margins far greater than their streaming competitors (Netflix), marketplace vendors (Apple’s iTunes), or cinema competitors (AMC Theaters). Before Walt Disney Studios’ 100th anniversary, you will be able to rent a blockbuster premiere through your Disney app. With respect to the overturning of the Paramount Decrees of 1948, this is Walt Disney’s end game.

Report by Web Smith and Tracey Wallace | About 2PM