备忘录即时需求行业
Whether we are post-pandemic or not, some behaviors are beginning to return to the way things were. Of them, quick delivery grocery appears to be one of the pandemic practices that may not reach the zenith that was once predicted. And now, the fall out. On the heels of a recent report by the New York Post, Petition published a deep dive on a struggling sector. From the NY Post:
Investors in Gopuff — a Philly-based delivery service that’s backed by Softbank — were eyeing a valuation of up to $40 billion in January as the company enlisted Goldman Sachs to help prepare for an IPO. But investors have lately been scrambling to unload their stakes at valuations as low as $15 billion — and have still been unable to find buyers, The Post has learned.
Petition places GoPuff in the same category as the 15 minute competitors that are competing in a crowded market. In addition to GoPuff, Petition rattles off Getir, Jokr, Gorillas, Just Eat, Fridge No More, Buyk and Food Rocket in the lengthy list of upstarts wanting to compete alongside DoorDash, Uber Eats and GrubHub.
The category has seen massive growth padded by venture funding, but the smoke is starting to clear, and market capitalizations have plunged as investors look to cut their losses. The problem, at its core, is that grocery retail is an industry built atop of stubborn customer habits – people fall back to their old ways, especially when prices rise. But larger competitors are not faring much better. Instacart has been marked down and Amazon has yet to find profitability in grocery delivery, according to sources. If Amazon can’t figure it out, it’s bad news for the VC-backed category. Petition sees the entire category “going puff.” Investors are turning their backs, legislative forces are cracking down, and customers may be realizing that hefty delivery fees and tips aren’t worth paying for in exchange for quick service.
Petition’s insights are rarely wrong. But as we discussed in Consumer Trends 2022, there is potential for GoPuff to separate itself from the likes of Gorillas, UberEats, DoorDash, Getir, and Jokr. The quick delivery service recently launched its own private label and has begun the process of verticalizing its business (with one critical fault that may hinder margins for the foreseeable future). In Consumer Trends, we explained:
榜单中最引人注目的是 Gopuff，该公司在建立了以超快送货为基础的业务后，将其一些微型配送网站变成了客户网点。据路透社报道，Gopuff 已聘请银行帮助其上市，估值接近 150 亿美元，预计将于今年首次公开募股。实体店可以把顾客带到配送点，缩短工人把商品送到顾客家中的时间，从而使 Gopuff 的配送速度更快。这些商店不是典型的便利店，而是订货中心，顾客使用数字亭下订单，然后由仓库发货。为了推动这一全渠道战略，GoPuff 通过抢地盘的方式收购了多家公司，目前已收购了 161 家 BevMo 商店和 23 家 Liquor Barns。
This is a timely separator between GoPuff and the other brands that rely on the storefronts of convenience stores and small retailers. To further circumvent any potential legislation, GoPuff will have to further invest in its physical real estate. This is a recent point on regulatory scrutiny made in a recent report by Vice:
Ultrafast delivery companies like Gorillas, Jokr, and GoPuff are facing increasing government scrutiny at the same time as profits for their services are failing to materialize. The Information reported Jokr is looking to sell its New York operations to a competitor in the face of losses of some $150 per order, which Jokr denies. And GoPuff, in an attempt to prove its storefronts are not warehouses and avoid regulatory scrutiny, have claimed its New York locations will also sell directly to walk-in customers, although the New York Post found even such “retail” locations are unmanned and have no prices listed on items.
GoPuff wants to be less reliant on third-party vendors by using its warehouses like retail stores, but it will likely find that operating retail stores is by no means an easy fix to future-proofing its business in an unstable market for pureplay delivery services. By layering delivery on top of the stores, GoPuff wants to do both. But does that really put it in a position to compete with the likes of Amazon? Or by splitting its attention, is GoPuff undermining both sides of its business without successfully pulling in customers to its stores? As Seeking Alpha reported:
The goal is to make GoPuff more like Amazon than like Uber. That was the elevator pitch captured in a recent Axios profile, with vertical integration that hasn’t even occurred to its competitors. Whereas the aforementioned companies rely on someone else to provide the goods, Gopuff has almost 600 micro-fulfillment centers, up from 380 in 2020, filled with the staples of daily life. Cutting out the third-party vendor, Gopuff ships directly to its customers who are saved a trip to 7-11 or the corner grocery store.
So what we are beginning to see is that the service side of the quick delivery business may not make it with a solid vertical operation attached. As Amazon has learned, this gives the advantage to the grocery retailers whose foundations are built atop physical retail penetration.
Whether it is for margin protection or product availability (after publishing Consumer Trends 2022, it was noted that GoPuff sources some products through Instacart to maintain stock), big grocery’s eCommerce pioneers will be the traditional companies who’ve built the technology atop their existing storefronts. This mirrors the world’s of GPG and digitally native brands. Though eCommerce began as a digitally-native sport, its accelerated adoption means that the old guard is employing many of the tactics pioneered by modern brands. In this respect, the grocery industry is no different.
Petition was correct in a number of its statements. The funding and the IPO markets for such services seems to be drying up for now. But if there is one exception to the quick delivery rule – it may end up being GoPuff. They are steps ahead of impending legislation in New York, its biggest market. But in the longer term, they will have to contend with the same reality that Instacart and others are now contending with – the advantage goes to the delivery company with the inventory on hand. Refer to the graph above. True digitally native vertical brands don’t always begin online. In grocery, it appears quite the opposite.
作者：Web Smith | 编辑：Hilary Milnes，美术：Christina Williams
备忘录ButcherBox 与 Instacart 的套利交易
这是一个关于直接面向消费者的先锋领导者的故事，他拥有一支精干的团队，谦虚地接受 2PM 的见解，合作制定战略，并取得了积极的成果。这种合作关系将影响整个 CPG 行业。
我从未将 2PM 的作品视为纯粹的新闻报道。我没有受过新闻艺术大师的训练。相反，我在这里发表的文章是以操作者为导向的，充满了实践经验。我的任务是将总体观点浓缩为有用的见解，指导高层领导的决策过程。许多文章不是从局外人的角度观察，而是从局内人的角度发表的。在某些情况下，商业或媒体领域的成功与失败都带有深刻的个人色彩。2PM 的过程是一种循环：研究概念和新闻，制作内容，在运营环境中实施想法，评估影响，然后利用它为更广泛的公众提供更多见解。这是一个良性循环。
理论上讲，内容越是以运营为导向，对我们的同行和竞争对手就越有用。我强化内容生产流程的方法之一，就是与企业级品牌、软件公司和物流公司建立业务合作伙伴关系。ButcherBox 就是这三者的结合，2PM 是我们的长期成长合作伙伴。
这家成立六年、直接面向消费者的肉制品公司拥有 160 多名员工、广播电视广告预算以及预计数亿美元的收入，取得了其他公司鲜有的成就。在创始人兼首席执行官迈克-萨尔盖罗（Mike Salguero）的领导下，公司仅通过直销渠道就实现了 "独角兽 "的发展轨迹，而且没有获得一分钱的机构资本。萨尔盖罗和他的组织通过自力更生实现持续盈利，从而达到了企业规模，这是非常罕见的。
在 2PM 上一篇关于早期影响者营销的文章中，我介绍了他如何利用早期影响者套利机会，帮助公司在不到两年的时间内从零增长到年收入 2000 万美元。对于任何套利而言，关键是要尽可能接近第一。通过使用有影响力的健身和营养专业人士，萨尔盖罗找到了一种低成本、低风险的捕捉需求的方法。
2015 年，Instagram 并非核心销售驱动力，链接分享也很有限。取而代之的是，与拥有大量电子邮件订阅者的博主建立合作关系，成为实现早期增长的策略。萨尔盖罗了解到，许多有影响力的健康博主经常撰文支持草饲牛肉，但他们缺乏行动号召力--网上没有地方让读者囤货。ButcherBox填补了这一空白。[1]
虽然这一特殊渠道后来已经饱和，但 ButcherBox 仍保留了寻求套利的精神。就公司目前的规模而言，这种形式已无法达到预期效果。这样一来，公司的规模就开始对其产生不利影响。寻找更好的方式来拉动需求的压力始终存在。2021 年，2PM 分析的数据表明，增长放缓是多种因素共同作用的结果：实体经济的重新开放、肉类替代品占据中心位置（Beyond、Nuggs、Impossible）、供应链问题，以及在没有第三方市场分销商品的情况下难以保持闪电般的速度。萨尔盖罗、他的参谋长雷巴-哈彻和 2PM 依靠线性商务原则找到了解决方案。问题是
哪里有大量参与 ButcherBox 的受众？我们能向他们销售吗？
本公告是参谋长雷巴-哈彻（Reba Hatcher）在回答上述问题并做了大量工作后的成果。2PM 宣布 Instacart 与 ButcherBox 建立市场合作伙伴关系。ButcherBox 于 2015 年由 Mike Salguero 创立，是美国领先的数字化肉类公司。Instacart成立于2012年，在成功应对大流行病后，Instacart正在掀起一股新的热潮，并即将进行首次公开募股。
在 2021 年中期首次公开募股之后，Instacart 为数字原生品牌提出了一个新颖的概念。ButcherBox 将成为第二个被纳入 Instacart 新兴第三方商品市场的数字原生品牌。现在，Instacart 购物者可以直接通过应用程序订购 ButcherBox，订单将在一到四天后通过联邦快递、UPS 或地区承运商送达。克里斯-罗杰斯，Instacart 零售副总裁：
Instacart 致力于为客户提供广泛的商品选择和更多的方式，让他们能够从自己熟悉和喜爱的零售商那里准确获得所需的商品。随着 ButcherBox 加入 Instacart 市场，我们将使全国各地的顾客更容易获得他们精心挑选的优质蛋白质。
ButcherBox 发现了受众套利的机会；Instacart 则发现了一种销售紧俏产品而无需物流成本的方法。双方互惠互利的合作关系就此诞生。
2021 年初：拟议概念
在过去的 12 个月里，ButcherBox 的广告负荷增加了 431%，而同期的网站流量却下降了。虽然这并不令人惊讶，但却表明市场的负面力量对其不利。现实情况是，很少有零售商能以这样的速度持续增长，其业务完全由第一方直接商务组成。
就在我提出解决方案，开始实现 DTC 品牌三大目标的那一周，2PM 和 ButcherBox 之间长达数月的发展合作关系逐渐成熟。值得称赞的是，萨尔盖罗愿意倾听。我们合作成长的标志之一就是他认识到了我在这一领域的研究时间和强度。萨尔盖罗信任我的可执行想法。此时，我们都不知道 Instacart 正在尝试成为第三方市场。
我们所知道的是，由于亚马逊 Prime 征用了全食超市的外卖业务，Instacart 成功地驾驭了这场大流行病，为 2020 年前正在萎缩的业务注入了新的活力。我们都相信，双方的合作会取得丰硕成果。我们是对的。随着 ButcherBox 的配送业务不断向实体零售空间发展，Instacart 将成为我们的营销和配送合作伙伴。最终，一旦沃尔玛或 Target 等零售商开始销售该品牌，我们就会推出当日送达服务。在此之前，Instacart 的合作主要以营销为导向。
2021 年年中：执行概念
对于非易腐食品和包装消费品（如 Siete Foods 或 Olipop），批发合作的时间相对较短。但对于易腐食品来说，可能需要 18-24 个月才能上架销售。通过这种合作方式，ButcherBox 可以通过展示其预期销售量来加快合作时间。今天，Instacart.com 上的微型网站正式上线：
Instacart x ButcherBox 战略是出于扩大受众和改善销售分布的需要。通过参与这一市场战略，ButcherBox 为 CPG 品牌建立了一种新的顶部漏斗营销形式。
这一结果证明了萨尔盖罗和哈彻能够跳出框框，接受新的想法，并执行有前景的想法。增长往往是不可预测的，套利机会也很少出现在显而易见的地方。有时，只需对相邻行业采取通观全局的视角，评估它们之间如何进行良性互动，并提出建立合作伙伴关系的途径。
我在思考线性商务的概念时，产生了市场放大的想法。同样的想法发展成了 Reba Hatcher 和 ButcherBox 团队采用的战略。该战略得到了 Instacart 的认可并付诸实施，这种别出心裁的合作关系将为合作双方带来丰厚的利润。但最重要的是，ButcherBox 为志同道合的品牌通过 Instacart 的渠道建立品牌奠定了基础。而 Instacart 则有了一种新的方式来增加收入，而无需承担相关的物流成本。
套利机会往往是伪装成离奇想法的双赢结果--但最初只是离奇。就像套利一样，我们很可能会看到从 Daily Harvest 到Primal Kitchen等数十家数字化原生易腐食品公司抓住机会，而在六个月前，这还是一个遥不可及的想法。
作者：Web Smith | 编辑：Hilary Milnes | 艺术：亚历克斯-雷米