第 318 号垂直品牌

VB

Michael Rubin is always in the news. The founder and executive chairman of Fanatics is often courtside as the co-owner of the Philadelphia 76ers, placing bids for NFL teams, palling around with friend and rapper Robert “Meek Mills” Williams, or advocating for a cleaner justice system. But it all seems like a distraction; he’s quietly building a sports licensing monopoly. Behind the scenes, Kynetic is owned and operated by Rubin. It’s a fascinating company with a rich history; Rubin’s understanding of the internet’s marketing levers has helped Fanatics capture lightning in a bottle.

Shopping cart + Insatiable Demand + Product Exclusivity = Lightning

The parent company of Fanatics has built one of the more innovative and fundamentally-sound, online retailers in all of commerce. Valued at $4.5 billion, the private retailer is equal parts: marketplace, licensed manufacturer, and digitally-native brand. Rubin’s brand has amassed extraordinary power as a vertical retailer in its relatively short birth and rebirth. To better understand its evolution, review a corporate history that spans the majority of the online retail era. One can argue that Fanatics grew the first digitally native vertical brand.

vCommerce brands are born online. They cut out the middle by selling directly to consumer, maintaining 1:1 relationships with consumers. These brands manufacture, market, sell, and fulfill the products. They own the entire consumer journey.

The history of Fanatics is a complicated one. In 1991, Rubin founded KSR Sports, a sporting goods and footwear retailer. The company grew to $50 million in annual sales by 1995 but with razor thin margins. This pushed Rubin towards a v-commerce model, acquiring Apex One in 1996 and merging with Ryka in 1997 to form Global Sports Inc Commerce (GSI Commerce).

This reorganization moved Rubin and his team a bit closer to the licensed merchandising operation that we see today. But this period was more symbolic of another part of Fanatics DNA: logistics excellence. The company went on to move $100 million in GMV in 1999. Just two years later, GSI inked a deal with Dick’s Sporting Goods, Sports Authority, and Gart sports to provide their eCommerce solutions at scale. In a move that may have influenced Amazon’s early partnership with Toys “R” Us. From a 2017 Business Insider article:

Toys “R” Us may have set itself back when it signed a 10-year contract to be the exclusive vendor of toys on Amazon in 2000. Amazon began to allow other toy vendors to sell on its site in spite of the deal, and Toys “R” Us sued Amazon to end the agreement in 2004. As a result, Toys “R” Us missed the opportunity to develop its own e-commerce presence early on.

By 2002, GSI Commerce powered NASCAR’s first online store. The MLB, NHL, and NFL each followed suit by 2006. In a bit of irony, later that year – Toys “R” Us hired GSI to build its first native eCommerce experience after their failed Amazon experiment. After the NBA agreed in 2007, GSI became the first online retailer to partner with all major North American sports leagues.

To develop a brand around its professional sports focus, Rubin acquired the “Football Fanatics” name and operation in 2011.  Football Fanatics was founded by Alan and Mitch Trager as a brick and mortar retailer in Suburban Jacksonville in 1995. After the brothers had trouble scaling beyond that point, Rubin swooped in to acquire it for $171 million and $101 million in GSI stock. By this time, GSI was managing 2.5 million square feet of fulfillment space. eBay would go on to acquire GSI Commerce for $2.4 billion in 2012.

Shortly thereafter, Rubin purchased the rights to Fanatics from eBay. In full – Rubin retained the rights to Fanatics, ShopRunner, and Rue La La: incorporating Kynetic as the parent company to the three online retail properties. Within one year, Andreessen Horowitz and Insight Ventures valued Fanatics at $1.5 billion, investing $150 million into the company. Fanatics would go on to raise capital from Alibaba Group, the Softbank Vision Fund, and Silver lake Partners. It shouldn’t surprise that Fanatics is considered one of the top three in sports apparel licensing. So in that Toys “R” Us / Amazon moment, Dicks Sporting Goods is now a chief competitor and Sports Authority is done for good.

What’s more impressive than the company’s trajectory is how Rubin continues to find innovative ways to reach new, top funnel customers.

Fanatics and Rubin’s Systemized growth

Just one of the latest partnership innovations,  it was announced that a resurgent Kohl’s signed a long-term deal with Fanatics to distribute the sporting goods company’s licensed products through Kohl’s native channels. While Kohl’s stock price is not necessarily reflecting Kohl’s long-term investments, the department store is having its own renaissance. The brick and mortar retailer recently signed a deal with Amazon to handle service all returns, a play to cozy up with the eCommerce titan while improving a key performance indicator: increased foot traffic.

Later this fall, Kohl’s will amplify hundreds of thousands of Fanatics’ SKUs through its native channels. As such, Fanatics will gain access to a new, primed audience. In return, Kohl’s can earn third-party revenue without holding inventory. It is the perfect corporate marriage: Kohls.com averages 40+ million visits per month, a number that dwarfs Fanatics.com’s 5.2 million monthly visitors.

860 respondents; 18 years and older who purchased sport clothes in the past 12 months | Source: Statista

Earlier this year, Fanatics began selling merchandise on Walmart.com in a similar deal. That one supplied Walmart with coveted access to licensed apparel. In exchange, Fanatics’ products are in front of an estimated 305 million estimated monthly visitors. Unlike the Kohl’s agreement, Fanatics has a branded store on the Walmart site. This model resembles the company’s agreement with JCP, the middle-market retailer has begun to regroup by partnering with relevant brands like Fanatics.

A savvy move by CEO Doug Mack; these merchandising agreements are subtle signals to customers that Fanatics is a low-substitution brand. Mass-market retailers can barely compete in costly, licensed merchandising without a Fanatics co-sign. And in an effort to expand internationally, Fanatics also partnered with Coupang – South Korea’ largest online retail marketplace to launch a store within a store on the platform. This effort goes live this summer.

Consolidate and Capture

Rubin’s team built an extraordinary commerce play and retail brand atop key partnerships. This stack has helped Fanatics secure the rights to run the following stores:

  • The National Football League | NFLShop.com
  • The National Basketball League | NBAShop.com
  • Major League Baseball | MLBShop.com
  • NASCAR | NASCARShop.com
  • Major League Soccer | MLSStore.com

Meanwhile, the list of merchandising acquisitions haven’t slowed for Kynetic. In 2012, it acquired one of its main rivals, Fansedge; in 2017, it bought Majestic and Lids, the brick and mortar hat retailer.

With the exception of Kohl’s agreement (one that was surely influenced by Amazon’s counsel), Fanatics has succeeded in maintaining its branding across its growing portfolio of retail partners. This has helped them maintain direct relationships with consumers. Fanatics built a competitive advantage where there was none. While far from the traditional DNVB, it’s become one of the most successful digitally native brands on the market by protecting intellectual property, achieving manufacturing superiority, and emphasizing industry-leading fulfillment operations.

Rubin and Fanatics found a way to modernize a commodity product; Fanatics is now the premier retailer for sports apparel. And it has a growing legion of fans who see what Rubin envisioned a long time ago. To own the merchandising market: you need airtight contracts, a great consumer experience, brand equity. Most importantly, you need strong, organic demand to offset steep licensing fees. This lack of organic demand has served as a death sentence for smaller licensing retailers; there’s little margin available for traditional CAC. More than ever, consumers see a team name on the front of a shirt, a player’s name on the back, a league patch on the sleeve, and a brand label that says “Fanatics.”

Michael Rubin’s decades-long eCommerce evolution may not have the typical arc of DNVBs. But Fanatics shares digitally-native DNA and there is a tremendous amount to learn from an operation that maintains growth while paying for less than 9% of its traffic. Modern brands should license a page from the Fanatics playbook.

Read the No. 318 curation here.

报告人:Web Smith |大约 2PM

第 291 期:西尔斯破产档案

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After many years of struggles, Sears Holding Corp followed through on their anticipated Chapter 11 bankruptcy after missing a crucial debt payment of $134 million.

推特上的 2PM 公司

News: @Sears to file for bankruptcy after 12 PM EST. 150 anchor stores at Tier B / C malls will be closed and nearly 19,000 jobs will be lost.

History. Sears has a story that dates back 132 years. For over a century, that history was rich and awe-inspiring. From a mail order catalogue (that sold everything) to one of the largest retailers and land holders in the world – only to be surpassed by Walmart in 1987.  For a long time, Sears met consumers where they were.

It wasn’t just that Sears failed to improve its in-store experience and merchandising strategy. Lampert also failed to see how digital could boost the overall business. According to Dennis, the e-commerce business was positioned as a separate play, distinctly different from physical stores. Using stores as digital assets with technology like buy online, pick up in store is a common shield retailers like Nordstrom and Kohl’s use to protect themselves from Amazon.

How Sears’ cost-cutting strategy sealed its fate

While Walmart has evolved to compete in the online-first economy, Sears has not. Of two of the top reasons that Sears’ century of good fortune began to crumble: they incurred massive debts and suffered from severe corporate mismanagement issues.

推特上的网络史密斯

TIL: @Sears used to sell cocaine, codeine, and opium. They were profitable then.

But that doesn’t tell the entire story. Here is a great quote from today’s CNBC article on the matter:

A separate survey of U.S. consumers by Cowen & Co. found the average Sears shopper today is about 45 years old and makes a little more than $59,000 each year. The average Kmart shopper, meanwhile, is a little more than 43 years old and makes about $53,000 annually. That makes Walmart ($55,200), Burlington Coat Factory ($59,100), J.C. Penney ($61,000) and Ross Stores($61,400) the most comparable retailers for Sears and Kmart shoppers when looking at household income, the firm said.

J.C. Penney and Walmart set to benefit

Economics. In a recent study by the Pew Research Center, the middle class is defined as a household with two-thirds to double the national median income. This metric currently includes about half of American households. However, from 2000 to 2014, families that were considered “middle class” decreased in 203 of 229 studied metropolitan areas. This decrease has only accelerated in the past four years. Sears was built for middle-class mall goer. It’s been the thesis of 2PM, Inc. that retailers who’ve built their businesses for this American demo will continue to struggle until the American middle class rebounds.

JC Penney is another retailer that is facing these troubles. Whereas companies like Walmart, Target, Amazon, Dollar General, or Kohl’s have achieved growth by appealing to the upper middle class or economy shoppers. Straddled in debt, and with little to no visionary leadership, Sears failed to execute this pivot. The results have been tragic. Mall owners and commercial real estate developers will have to adopt new strategies to prevent the negative cycles that have occured in the past when anchor stores are abandoned.


Issue No 179: House of Cards

But the real economic shift will be felt in exurban, lower-to-middle class areas. These areas are more dependent on shopping malls and the associated commercial real estate developments to fill their open swaths of land. This is where these communities go to shop, eat, and work. This is also where a sizable amount of tax revenue is generated. Without anchor stores or foot traffic for smaller businesses, exurban commercial real estate is nothing more than a house of cards. Next generation retail will not be there. And neither will appreciating homes.


2PM 数据

The top 100 retailers are listed below. A common misconception is that Sears was a forgotten retailer. In this recent dataset by Statista, Sears is currently in the top 40 stores in America.

[table id=29 /]

Here is a look several data points that will influence commercial real estate for years to come.

Screen Shot 2018-10-15 at 2.01.41 PM
Visual: Sears closings (2011-2017) / Source: Statista
Screen Shot 2018-10-15 at 2.12.20 PM
Top middle class retailers in sales (2017) / Source: Statista
Screen Shot 2018-10-15 at 2.17.36 PM
Sears’ net losses: 2013-2017 / Source: Statista
Screen Shot 2018-10-15 at 2.19.35 PM
Number of stores of the leading apparel retailers in America (2017) / Source: Statista

The Sears bankruptcy should be viewed as a warning shot for companies like: J.C. Penney, Burlington Coat Factory, and Ascena Retail Group – a conglomerate of middle class retail brands. Ascena is currently operating 4,400 stores in North America and trading at 25% of its historical highs. Retailers that have been dependent on debt and brick and mortar foot traffic are overdue for an evolution of their approach to reaching a) existing customers in a dwindling demo or b) finding innovative ways to reach new customers in growing demos: economy and up market. 

The death of retail as we now know it is greatly exaggerated. Retail isn’t dying; it’s evolving. Just like it has done before. There has always been disruption in the retail sector. A major disruption occurred in the late 1800s when Sears introduced the catalog and brought the entire store into the homes of U.S. consumers. This gave Sears the same advantage over brick and mortar stores that eCommerce sites have today. Sears was simply responding to the needs of its customer since 60 percent of the U.S. population lived in rural areas at the time and didn’t have convenient access to stores. Sears would bring the store right to them.

Marshall Cohen of NPD

Nearly 111 million square feet of retail space will be lost in this bankruptcy. For the Tier A malls that will be affected by Sears’ closings, consumers will see new consumer or events spaces in place of the historic retailer. But for Tier B/C malls, Sears’ closing will become another eyesore that will influence aspirational consumers to shop elsewhere. Sears once thrived on the principles meeting customers where they were. Evolving customer needs requires leadership that understands where consumer mindshare and dollars are going.

Read the curation here.

By Web Smith |About 2PM

第 252 期:内容与商业中应遵守的 10 条规定

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谁能控制供需谁就能统治互联网。出版商认识到,他们必须成为一个完整的生态系统,才能蓬勃发展,而商业是其中的关键组成部分(再次)。

当本-勒勒(Ben Lerer)(Thrillist)和杰森-罗斯(Jason Ross)(JackThreads)选择分道扬镳时,"内容与商业 "运动据说已经死亡。这次失败(提示:这其实不算失败),让出版界的许多人更加大胆地宣称商业活动行不通。

在 2014-2017 年间,从沿海到内陆的新闻编辑室中,许多出版高管都忽视了对电子商务的投资。联盟营销团队优先于广告销售团队,结果,写得好的文章从文学展示变成了商品拼贴购买。 随着广告销售的持续萎缩和联盟销售的摇摇欲坠,许多最健康的数字出版商发生了某种范式的转变:

  • 我们如何从 Facebook 等平台中获得独立?
  • 如何对冲广告销售额下降和联属营销市场疲软的影响?
  • 我们如何在读者群中培养社区意识?

对于许多非订阅和订阅数字出版物来说,商品销售都被用来解决上述问题。通过建立社区,出版物成为了一个目的地。Digiday报道了这一现象,"《纽约客》手提袋背后的故事"。

2017 年,都市精致的必备标志不是 Yeezys 或破洞牛仔裤。而是《纽约客》送给新订户的手提袋。

这款包本身并不新鲜--它是该杂志自 2014 年起就开始赠送的礼物--但由于唐纳德-特朗普和标志性的设计,这款包一炮而红。该杂志的市场部已经向新老订户分发了超过 50 万个这样的包,而这些订户很快就开始要求获得自己的包。

Continue reading “No. 252: 10 to Observe in Content and Commerce”