第 344 期首次公开募股与 "前沿理论"

2PM-前沿-民主

成千上万的淘金者乘坐飞机和轮船来到加利福尼亚,追逐财富。他们被称为 "49人"。1848 年 3 月,800 名非本地人前往加利福尼亚。到1848年底,这一数字激增至2万人。到1849年,这个数字达到了10万。淘金热是美国最早的边疆理论 范例之一历史学家弗雷德里克-杰克逊-特纳(Frederick Jackson Turner)于1893年撰写了一篇文章,阐述了美国的经济实力和活力与走向边疆息息相关。

我对 "前沿 "的定义是,在开放式、高潜力的金矿开采中,大量拥有不同技能、教育水平和阶级背景的人在大致平等的条件下并肩工作,由此产生的社会分化。[1]

这条 边界线是已知与未知的分界线,它推动了商业、行为经济学、政府和社会科学领域的创新。当然,现在已经没有任何物理边界了。如今,这条界线已经具象化。对于任何新兴产业而言,这些行为都会以可见和不可预见的方式重复出现。直接面向消费者的品牌已经开始在风险投资的支持下走向成熟。与过去的实体边界一样,这条新的分界线也具有许多相同的特征--不确定性就是其中之一。

在淘金热中,真正赚钱的不是矿工。他们是工具制造商,是为成群结队的矿工制造致富所需工具的工人。 我们记得列维-施特劳斯公司,但很少有人记得当时的顶级金矿工人。工具制造者发财了,而绝大多数矿工却空手而归。他们甚至连工具都没有带回去。俗话说:要么挖金子,要么卖镐头。 与商业工具本身一样,风险资本最终也涌入了品牌零售业。这不仅影响了谁能扩大规模,也影响了公司扩大规模的方式。

不过,所有技术驱动的客户渠道的问题在于,人人都可以使用这些渠道。事实上,当涉及到平台和聚合器时,技术集中的反面就是堆栈中其他所有人的民主化和商品化。截至 2019 年 8 月,共有 175 家不同的在线床垫公司。[2]

在一架从俄亥俄州飞往明尼苏达州的航班上,坐在我右边的是一位推销员,我们称他为戴夫。"你想开一家床垫公司吗?"他似笑非笑地说道。喝完第三杯威士忌后,他打开笔记本电脑,露出一张有近 100 行数据的电子表格,说:"看看这个。"我很感兴趣,眼角的余光立刻认出了其中的几家公司。其中,Casper 名列榜首。戴夫是一家为许多顶级品牌生产床垫的公司的员工。我惊呆了。"等等卡斯珀不生产自己的床垫?我问道。戴夫接着问我是否想知道如何开始。我很好奇,他就给我讲了一遍。

建立一个网站,使用 Spotify [SIC] 或其他软件。预售 800 美元的床垫。以 400 至 500 美元的价格从我这里购买。我们会在售出后三周内给你送货。如此反复。

戴夫是众所周知的 "锄头贩子",DTC 时代是他的淘金热。据他说,卡斯帕是他公司的众多客户之一。我不相信戴夫的话,直到我读了卡斯帕公司的 S-1 文件。他说得没错,卡斯帕公司自己并不生产床垫。近 200 家竞争对手中的绝大多数也不生产床垫。相反,卡斯珀团队从供应商那里购买床垫,然后再标价转售。

虽然我们的大部分产品设计都是内部开发的,但某些泡沫配方目前是根据我们与某些合同制造商签订的生产协议从他们那里获得许可的,其中有些协议包含不同程度的独家代理权。[3]

这家制造商并不是唯一的镐卖家。虽然Casper.com是一个定制购物车,但大多数数字原生代都是在 Shopify 生态系统中建立的。这反映了现代零售业的整体情况,它受到了最伟大的镐卖家的影响。

风险投资以多种方式颠覆了零售业。想象一下,在 20 世纪 90 年代,一位企业家通过筹集风险投资来创办一家服装、鞋类或床垫公司。这种想法是不可思议的。但零售品牌并不是新事物,其工具才是。2006 年以前,这类企业寻求其他资金来源:私人贷款、信用额度或亲朋好友融资。他们在开始时往往认为单位经济效益是最重要的。有些企业决定依靠现金流发展。盈利越早越好。

如果这些公司真的上市了,那也是在几十年后,而不是几年后。拉尔夫-劳伦公司(Ralph Lauren Corporation)成立于 1967 年,30 年后才上市。耐克公司也是如此,这家零售商在成立近 16 年后才上市。在俄亥俄州哥伦布市,也有许多专业零售商走过了同样漫长的上市之路:Express、L Brands、DSW 和 Abercrombie & Fitch就是其中几家。

推特上的网络史密斯

关于品牌上限和价值。1967:RL 成立。1994:高盛以 5.2 亿美元的估值收购了 @RalphLauren 28% 的股份。1997:RL 在 30 年后以 24 亿美元的估值首次公开募股--其中有不少是亏损的。2020:88 亿美元市值(1.3 倍收入) 摘自 S-1:

就像寒武纪大爆发 一样风险投资为各种平台、应用程序、物流服务和包装解决方案打开了大门。它还开发了一种新的零售业态,一种基于超高速增长的零售业态。进而,风险资本家开始为建立在此基础上的公司提供资金。对于未来的零售业创始人来说,创业门槛达到了历史最低点。而在同一时期,风险资本的融资能力也达到了历史最高点:2014 年。过去十年的电子商务既是工具的销售,也是金块的挖掘。

不过,虽然风险投资对镐头的破坏是好的,但也可以说它对矿工的破坏是坏的。在 DTC 时代,并购很少,上市更少。即便如此,Stitch Fix 总裁迈克-史密斯(Mike Smith)认为,保持私有化是许多此类品牌的最佳选择。他向Recode 的Jason Del Rey 解释道:

你应该成为一家上市公司吗?在很多情况下,我的答案是否定的。你必须在公开市场上拿出你的看家本领。你可以躲在私人市场,把大量风险资本花在 Facebook 上。

对于今天的数字原生品牌来说,当他们接近新的前沿领域时,他们的思维和行为将与当代同行大不相同。因此,Casper 的首次公开募股将成为数字原生品牌时代的风向标。在没有现实盈利途径的情况下,它们能上市吗?这种想法有其不利因素。在下面这些推文中,我总结了大部分熊市论点。

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卡斯珀的管理层必须让华尔街相信,他们有能力做到很少有品牌做不到的事情:他们必须 "拥有这个品类",并且能够盈利。这其中有两个障碍。这就有点技术性了。

相似之处卡斯珀和床垫公司

基于消费者的企业估值。 在公司的 S-1 中,他们选择不报告同期收入数据。但有几个关键数据非常突出14%的顾客在购买后一年内退货。在 S-1 报告中,Casper 引用的是回头客,而不是销售额。据风险投资家亚历克斯-陶西格(Alex Taussig)称,该公司的年美元留存率仅为 6%。他们的回头客几乎为零。

根据市场营销学教授丹尼尔-麦卡锡(Daniel McCarthy)的研究,Casper 的平均订单价值(AOV)为 867 美元,重复 AOV 为 87 美元。这是基于 80% 的订单都是主要 AOV,重复 AOV 为 87 美元的假设。867 美元销售额的客户获取成本(CAC)为 324 美元。 在引人入胜的营销数学中,麦卡锡教授列举了五年客户价值为 455 美元,终身价值(LTV)为 131 美元:

看涨者可能会指出,商店是降低 CAC、追加销售和提高供应链效率利润率的一种方式。熊市则会指出,后期采用者更难引入,竞争也会加剧。

回到我们开始的地方。 卡斯珀以直接面向消费者的送货方式颠覆了传统零售业,而现在,它的最大希望是实体零售业。在 Casper 推出的一年内,出现了两起值得注意的事件。当然,Casper 很快就扩大了其直接面向消费者的模式。而床垫公司(Mattress Firm)则投资了一家实体公司,因为卡斯珀的 DTC 产品在第一年就创造了近 1 亿美元的销售额。

[床垫公司]在2015年以7.8亿美元收购零售连锁店Sleepy's的决定制约了它的发展。Mattress Firm没有投资数字工具和运输基础设施,而是在错误的时机扩大了门店数量。[4]

Mattress Firm 的零售收购使该公司的零售店数量过多(近 1000 家),而当时床垫盒装零售的客户收购套利正达到顶峰。仅一年后,Steinhoff International 以约 1 倍的总收入收购了 Mattress Firm。

南非零售商斯坦霍夫国际控股公司(Steinhoff International Holdings)和美国最大的专业床上用品零售商 Mattress Firm Holding Corporation 周日表示,双方将以 38 亿美元(包括债务)的价格收购该公司。这笔交易将创建全球最大的床垫零售分销公司。[5]

2018 年,Mattress Firm 申请破产保护,开始重组进程,关闭了公司 3230 家门店中的近 700 家。实际上,破产开始抵消了 2015 年收购Sleepy的糟糕时机。随着 Mattress Firm 的收缩,Casper 希望获得自己的份额。根据卡斯珀的 S-1,实体零售是其增长的主要组成部分。

事实证明,我们在实体零售店的业务与我们的电子商务渠道相辅相成,因为我们相信与多种渠道的互动产生了协同 "网络效应",从而提高了整个系统的销售额。零售店扩张的持续成功将对我们未来的增长和盈利能力做出重要贡献。

问题在于,卡斯珀能否说服华尔街的投资者,让他们相信他们攫取 Mattress Firm 价值的计划是可行的。虽然卡斯珀的睡眠经济愿景更为宏大,但 Mattress Firm 2019 年的年收入为 32 亿美元(根据 Steinhoff International 的数据)。为了抓住这一机遇,他们可能必须从内到外重建公司。

卡斯帕公司拥有近 700 名员工,没有自己的产品制造部门,是一家不生产自己产品的大型产品公司。这一点在其一般及行政费用类别中显而易见。卡斯珀的一般及行政开支是销售额相近的紫罗兰的 5 倍(1.062 亿美元对 1910 万美元)。为了抓住现有竞争者的价值,抵御挑战者,卡斯帕必须提高竞争力。卡斯帕要想成为 "品类拥有者",就必须在内部变得更像耐克。耐克创始人兼首席执行官菲尔-奈特(Phil Knight)说得好

战胜竞争对手相对容易。战胜自己则是一项永无止境的承诺。

更精益求精的 "睡眠耐克"

 

屏幕截图 2020-01-13 at 5.17.05 PM
在线床垫零售份额 | 资料来源:Rakuten Intelligence:乐天情报

比较始于《福布斯》上的一段话。2016 年,也就是 Mattress Firm 被收购的同一年,Casper 的联合创始人 Luke Sherwin 阐述了他对公司的愿景。在接受罗恩-罗夫(Ron Rofe)的采访时,谢尔文解释道:

卡斯伯对睡眠的贡献就像耐克对运动的贡献一样。我们希望让睡眠成为一种生活方式,让睡眠环境成为您生活的重要组成部分。

在提交的证券文件中,卡斯珀通过扩大床垫以外的可寻址市场总量,为解决产品商品问题奠定了基础:

随着健康等式越来越多地包括睡眠,睡眠业务也在不断增长,并演变成我们所说的睡眠经济。我们正在帮助加速这一转变。我们的使命是唤醒一个充分休息的世界的潜力,我们希望卡斯珀成为改善我们睡眠方式的一流产品和体验的顶级品牌。

耐克公司拥有 17.9%的鞋类产品,其营销和广告支出占总收入的 10%。卡斯珀拥有 5%的床垫,却将高达 33%的收入用于市场营销。如果没有资本效率和短期盈利能力,Casper 就无法模仿它所向往的品牌。要想成为 "睡眠界的耐克",卡斯帕必须变得更像营销和销售界的耐克。他们必须在高效获取客户的能力方面领先于行业。我的建议很简单:完全抛弃 DTC 行业。有了与亚马逊、塔吉特、沃尔玛和好市多(Costco)的合作作为坚实的基础,卡斯伯可以通过以下方式向更精简、更有利可图的模式转变:

  • 强调与第三方销售商的销售和分销关系
  • 从短期绩效营销转向品牌营销战略

尽管卡斯珀的融资估值已达 11 亿美元,但就在 2019 年 3 月,该领域内及其周边的大多数公司的 EBITDA 或收入的交易价格为 10-20 倍或 1-2 倍。对 Casper 来说,这意味着初始市值为 5-6 亿美元(他们已融资 3.39 亿美元)。仅在这份报告中,就有两个可比公司值得考虑:拉尔夫-劳伦公司(Ralph Lauren)的息税折旧摊销前利润为 1.4 亿美元,市值达 20 亿美元。Mattress Firm 上市一年后,市值为 19.1 亿美元,EBITDA 为 24 倍。

为了实现盈利,Casper 必须 "战胜自己",就像战胜市场上的其他挑战者和现有竞争者一样。他们必须像以前的早期零售商一样建立自己的公司,那时候风险资本还不充裕,CAC 也还没有上升。只要每年将总务和行政开支减少哪怕 5000 万美元,他们就能接近收支平衡。通过将营销支出从数字优先转向第三方合作,Casper 可以在第一年就实现息税折旧摊销前利润(EBITDA)正增长。

卡斯珀采用了多年来一直困扰 DTC 行业的技术邻近型模式:募集巨额资金、在纽约或洛杉矶设立办事处、过多的营销支出(相对于总收入而言)、高昂的高管薪酬、优质房地产租赁以及初创企业的福利待遇。通过减少这些开支并转向第三方销售,Casper 可以成为向华尔街宣传的上市品牌。Mattress Firm 等现有竞争对手将欢迎 Casper 与Sleepy's、Purple 等公司合作。与上述每一家零售商合作,卡斯珀都能为他们的商店带来新的顾客。

以 5000 多万美元的息税折旧摊销前利润(EBITDA)计算,Casper成为他们憧憬的价值 10 亿美元的品牌。就像开疆拓土的淘金者一样,菲利普-克里姆(Philip Krim)和他的团队可以为Away和Glossier这两个有IPO意向的数字原生品牌规划前进的道路。为了在公开市场上竞争,这些品牌必须以更传统的方式运营。

DTC 时代经历了十年不择手段的营销和往往被过多风险资本掩盖的低效运营。作为私营公司,只要能筹集到资金,这种情况就会持续下去。但现在,它们已经走到了尽头。这在某种程度上是对 DTC 行业的一次清算。当矿工们来到这里时,他们通常会选择把带来的东西放在一边。对一些人来说,那是贵重物品,而对其他人来说,那是自我价值的膨胀感。在边疆地区,牺牲和不适是必须的,关键在于你用那把昂贵的镐头带回家的是什么。

研究与报告:Web Smith | 编辑:Carolyn Penner |关于 2PM

注: 在此订阅,将于美国东部时间周二下午 2 点收到第 344 号信件。

第 338 期UpWest 和 Hygge

Hygge-2PM

A publicly-traded retailer launched a DTC brand. This is a deep dive into their reasoning, the build, and their internal expectations. 

Middle-class retail is at an impasse. Since the beginning of 2019, there have been 19 bankruptcies to include Forever 21, Gymboree, Charlotte Russe, Payless ShoeSource, Diesel, and Destination Maternity. And there are another eight retailers at risk to include: J.C. Penney, Neiman Marcus, J. Crew, and Hudson’s Bay. In Gilded Age 2.0, I explain that our current retail era signals a casualty of the middle class consumer; a class that once emerged in response to the industrial and financial booms of the late 19th century and the governmental reforms of the mid-20th century.

With a flailing gig economy, stagnant wages, and rising personal debts, 2019 presents a break from the mid-century momentum that defined the 20th century. We are beginning to hear faint echoes of an earlier time of boom or bust and feast or famine. Rather than appealing to pure luxury consumers or fast fashion-loving millennials, the “long middle: erroneously remains the bullseye of the target. Retailers have been slow to optimize for a new market of coveted consumers.

In a recent report by Business of Fashion proclaimed that America still doesn’t have an answer to LVMH. They explain:

Spoilt for choice, consumers are less interested in mid-priced products available at scale: they want dangerously affordable fast fashion or pure luxury. (And preferably at a discount.) It’s harder for consumers to see the value in something that is not cheap but not that expensive, either. Especially if it’s not utterly unique. That’s a problem for Tapestry in particular, which deals exclusively in accessible luxury. [1]

Against the backdrop of abundant choice and a bifurcating market, Ohio retailer Express launched a new brand. Express is currently trading at a $265 million market cap with north of $2b in sales. The cost of that revenue is extraordinarily high compared to healthier retailers. Trailing twelve months, Ralph Lauren Corporation earned north of $6.5 billion with a $2.45 billion cost of revenue.

In contrast, Express earned (TTM) north of $2.1 billion with a $1.5 billion cost of revenue. A 25% gross profit margin heading into a crucial holiday season, the Columbus-based retailer hopes to use the DTC initiative to improve their long-term outlook. The effort has been met with a mix of pessimism and optimism. 

Pierre Kim of Away

For years, retailers have been criticized for not evolving quickly enough to meet the demands of their customers, so what do they have to lose with this new strategy? Their core labels may be faltering, but they still have brand equity. Why not use it to experiment and launch new businesses?  [2]

Paul Munford of Lean Luxe

There’s baggage associated with being under a legacy retailer’s umbrella—it decreases the value of the brand to the savvy consumer,” he said. “However, execution will always ultimately be the key here. Spinoffs need to feel like their own entity, as opposed to a sub-brand of the legacy retailer. [2]

There are merits to both arguments. And a little bit of digging provided more clarity for this report. Under the umbrella of Les Wexner’s Limited Brands, Express launched as women’s clothier “Limited Express” in 1980 Chicago. Led by CEO Michael Weiss, the brand expanded to eight stores in 1981 and by 1986, Express began a test for menswear in 16 of its 250 stores. The men’s line spun out as Structure in 1989.

I remember the brand very clearly. As a twelve year old in 1995, the halls of my middle school were split between the haves and the have nots. For the ones with, shirts by Polo and Structure were the daily wears and all I could remember is the sensation of having neither.

4
Remember this?

The advancements that Express made during that 20 year run are astounding to think about. In 2001, Express became a dual gender brand – a pivot that Madewell is currently attempting to execute. Structure “sold” to Express, or at least that’s how I remembered it. Because immediately, I became a fan of Express. In actuality, the brand was owned by the same holding company. It funneled its mens business to a brand that provided more opportunity. L Brands then, quietly, sold the mark to Sears in 2003. The Structure brand was never heard from again.

Express is no longer owned by L Brands, one of the most prolific builders of retail brands in history. It was sold to Golden Gate Capital Partners, a private equity firm with $15b in assets under management. And then, in May of 2010, the retailer went public.

Demographic vs. Psychographic | Part Two 

In 2016, Express made its first play for the direct-to-consumer era by acquiring a minority stake in HOMAGE, the Columbus Ohio retailer led by founder Ryan Vesler. It’s a genuine brand, one where the founder-product fit is as valuable as its product-market fit. The minority investment with vintage t-shirt company meant that Express bought a new audience of a key demographic: the college-aged millennial.

Homage President Jason Block said in an email that Express will consult with the company on an ongoing basis and the investment will allow Homage to expand both its digital and brick-and-mortar presence. [3]

Aside from investing in a growing company,  Express gained the rights to include a limited selection of HOMAGE products in store. The investment was intended to bolster foot traffic while, potentially, benefitting from the long-term flip – if and when the HOMAGE brand grew with the help of Express. It’s unclear whether or not this initiative was successful for either of the brands. The company is currently trading below the price it maintained during the period that Express began its partnership with HOMAGE. The publicly-traded retailer’s missteps over the past two years were due, in part, to a number of macroeconomic shifts.  The launch of UpWest represents a strategy shift of its own.

In Psychographics in Focus, I explain the difference between a demographic and psychographic. Consumer psychology involves the interest in lifestyle, behavior, and habit. It’s an encompassing measure that considers our idiosyncrasies, our temperament, and even our subtle personality traits. These are the variables that influence our behavior as consumers. Psychographic segmentation is the analysis of a consumer cohort’s lifestyle with the intent to create a detailed profile. [4]

Taking a community-building approach, UpWest plans to connect with new customers through experiential events, including a regional tour across the US that features the UpWest Cabin, a mobile pop-up exhibit featuring relaxation-focused experiences like yoga and meditation classes. Slated stops include Columbus, Chicago, Nashville, Denver and Austin.  [2]

From the typeface, to the story-telling, to the merchandising – the UpWest brand is designed to attract fans of the digitally-native industry. Rather than a specific demographic, Express pursued an interest (DTC) and is building a brand atop of that engaged audience.

DTC As A Psychographic

推特上的网络史密斯

DTC, 2012: a tech stack strategy. DTC, 2016: a logistics strategy. DTC, 2020: a brand strategy.

In a span of three days, I received multiple emails and texts from contacts close to the launch of UpWest. Kaleigh Moore, Forbes writer and 2PM collaborator had a story in queue by then. In the Lean Luxe Slack, it was a topic of conversation. Rather than building in-house with Express’ existing engineering group, UpWest contracted Shopify agency BVAccel to handle the design and development work. This was a nod to several of the most successful digitally native brands in the space to include Untuckit, Cubcoats, Chubbies, and Rebecca Minkoff. 

Comparison-Upwest

The site’s architecture communicates a desire to be mentioned in the DTC conversation, this includes UpWest’s partnership with Klaviyo and its new-age loyalty program. It would appear that UpWest chose to focus on the DTC psychographic for the sake of earned media and brand positioning. As far as the nuts and bolts are concerned, the site’s build communicates that the desired target demographic is millennial-aged women. On day zero, the brand has an explicit purpose: to provide comfort for body, mind, & spirit. The clothes, are priced similar in design and price to Marine Layer – its next closest competitor.

Identifying Waves: Importing Hygge to America

In the past year, this concept of Scandinavian coziness has made inroads with an international audience. [5]

Imagine a whiteboard in one of Express’ suburban Columbus boardrooms; the word “hygge” would have been at the center of it in big and bold lettering. You can picture the brand’s chief comfort officer (and Express’ SVP of Strategic Initiatives) standing in the corner of the room, jamming as Cody’s It’s Christmas plays on the room’s four Sonos speakers. The brand wants you to feel a feeling. Analysts agree. Emily Singer, founder of the DTC newsletter “Chips and Dip” had this to say:

There’s something very boring about it. Maybe that’s intentional. This line feels a little too on the nose: ‘Welcome to curated comfort. For those who are seeking peace and calm in a stressful world.’ Brands tap into emotional states, but it’s rarely laid out so explicitly.

It’s this perceived boredom that is viewed as an understated luxury in American culture. To the Danes, hygge is free of economic status. The culture’s entire focus is on practicality, movement, wellness, and mindfulness. It’s this underlying culture that Express hopes to import with the help of some obvious visual cues from well-known DTC retailers.

The UpWest typeface is nearly identical to the typeface of Outdoor Voices and Marine Layer’s. Ironically, both retailers have references to Scandinavian hygge throughout their brand messaging. But for UpWest, there’s no understatement. Every message is turned to maximum volume. Like the primary header of Express.com: UpWest’s primary menu is a throwback to “Limited Express”, a retailer for women-first and men-second. There are elements of luxury abound. Upwest’s blog features new-age terms like: nourish, mindfulness, tranquility, and sanctuary. The traveling pop-up is a “cabin.” These are all symbols of wealthier millennials with time and resources to spare. As is the concept of philanthropy and sustainability (though UpWest sells products that are made with synthetics).

It starts with our cozy apparel, home and wellness products. We want to surround you with calm and give you balance. But it’s not just the tangible things. It’s also about slowing down. Diving deeper. And giving back.

Not to be outdone, UpWest wants consumers to help them donate $1 million to the Mental Health Association. The Express-borne retailer plays the entire DTC hand of cards. This report began with a simple statement: middle-class retail is at an impasse. To the average consumer, this DTC play is akin to Structure being launched as Express Men. Like a sheep, the seventeen year old me bought from Express as soon as my adolescent wallet would allow. The mechanics are similar here. Express is attracting an existing audience (the DTC psychographic) and using it to invigorate a brand that is plateauing.

结论

The UpWest bet is that the retailer can earn the business of the upwardly mobile DTC audience by engineering a product-market fit. One with heavy branding, ideal-alignment, and market messaging. This is one of the first upmarket attempts that we’ve seen from a specialty retailer. It’s one that deserves praise. Their management team engineered a brand with contemporary pricing and luxury messaging – void of pricing promotions (for now). They’ve acknowledged that the data shows a middle-class at an impasse. They have the supply chain, the logistics, the distribution, and a snapshot of a brand. But do the executives at Express truly understand what makes the top DTC brands work? That remains the question that could move the market.

Time will tell if Express can duplicate the brand architecting of their L Brands era – a time defined by face-less brands, clever signage, billboards, and foot traffic. My guess is that Express will find an audience that is more sophisticated and critical than the young adults of the 80’s, 90’s, and 2000’s. Messaging, distribution, and customer acquisition methods will evolve with this realization. And if that’s the case, their hygge may be tested for quite some time.

Research and Report by Web Smith | About 2PM 

Member Brief No. 8: NYT Commerce Report

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The word commerce was a dirty one in the media space, until recently. One of 2PM’s capstone beliefs is that commerce is the central engine of the digital economy. That may seem to be reasonable now. But consider that just two years ago, fewer than ten digital publishers maintained direct to consumer storefronts. Many will point to JackThreads and Thrillist, so here is the clipping from May 2010 for reference:

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