第 315 号数字原住民

Native

Aggregation defined an era. The aggregation throughout media, retail, and service platforms determined the economic viability of many in the vendor-class throughout the modern digital economy. Uber began as a luxury black car service. Spotify streamed music. Youtube published silly videos. Amazon began by selling books. And Netflix rented films by DVD. Imagine a world without these companies as aggregators. Companies grew market share by adding products and services, rendering their analog competitors incapable.  Like the inevitability of westward expansion, the aggregation theory continues to move certain platforms towards critical mass.

The theory is akin to the digital version of Manifest Destiny. For a time – platforms maintained an advantage, much like physical retailers possessed an early advantage over e-tailers. In the traditional retail model, individual product brands were less important than the shelves that they were marketed on. Consumers came for product selection, ease, and the universal checkout process. The one stop shop was the draw; product loyalty was a secondary feature.  In this way – content publishers, product brands, and services were merely value-additives for existing platforms. Few learned this hard lesson like popular musicians at the beginning of the streaming era. Podcasts seemed to have learned from those difficult lessons.

Gaining leverage is the mission.

The market-making opportunities that began with early digitally vertical native brands (DNVBs) began to influence adjacent industries as that sales model had its success. For decades, it was nearly impossible to achieve critical mass in retail without partnering with a brick and mortar retailer or a department store. To defend against what seemed (for a time) to be physical retail’s Manifest Destiny, digitally natives circumvented the infrastructure and went direct to consumer (DTC). This meant that they had access to increased margins, efficient customer acquisition, access to data, and stronger relationships with the consumer.

With little access to mainstream consumer channels, physical brands launched native channels with the help of platforms like Shopify and BigCommerce. It’s unclear whether or not the intent of the DTC industry was their indefinite independence from big box retail. I’d argue that it wasn’t the goal. But, regardless, the result of the last ten years has been palpable: product brands have never possessed more leverage than they do right now. Even if that leverage is temporary.

As newer platforms go to market, vertical brands are beginning to notice a shift in leverage from platform to the vertical. This is an untimely shift in momentum for platform companies, businesses that once had the leverage to act indiscriminately.

DNVB-speak in digital media

In early April, comedian Russell Brand was interviewed by the host of the Joe Rogan Experience (JRE), a wildly popular podcast that covers everything from combat sports and geopolitics to archaeology and sociology. It’s important to note that JRE is consistently ranked in the top five of the most downloaded podcasts. Toward the end of the discussion between the two men, Rogan prompted Brand to promote his business interests. And though it was a subtle promotion, this is where things became interesting.

Luminary is the premium audio publisher and content aggregator that has set out to become the Netflix of podcasting. Founded in 2018 by Lauren Sacks, the company raised $100 million from New Enterprise Associates. The funding equipped Sacks and team to recruit several sizable podcast networks and high visibility media personalities to include: The Ringer, Guy Raz, Trevor Noah, and Wondery Media. Wondery is the last remaining podcast network known for its original programming and Ringer, a successful podcast network in its own right, is still in search of Barstool Sports-level network effects. In hindsight, Spotify’s acquisition of Gimlet and Parcast were as defensive as they were offensive developments.

In the episode – Russell Brand promoted his latest venture, a podcast with Luminary. The elevator pitch had somewhat of a dual purpose: (1) use one of the most influential platforms in audio to promote a business interests and (2) recruit Rogan into the fold of the Luminary-faithful. The second part did not work, the jury is still out on the first proposition. But the effects of that conversation were immediate. Within 72 hours, JRE was pulled from Luminary’s catalogue. From Hotpod News

The [JRE] team explicitly cites licensing issues as the reason behind the intent to withdraw. “There was not a license agreement or permission for Luminary to have The Joe Rogan Experience on their platform,” a representative from the team told me last night. “His reps were surprised to see the show there today and requested it be removed.”

The Joe Rogan Experience wasn’t the only big name in podcasting that removed content from the platform. Spotify denied Luminary access to their shows and the New York Times pulled The Daily. PodcastOne, Barstool Sports, Endeavor Audio, and many others followed suit. From No. 304: In-app audiences:

The pending acquisition of Gimlet Media is about more than building a direct-to-consumer podcasting powerhouse, it’s about monetizing DTC audio in new ways. Spotify doesn’t own the music that millions of us listen to, they license the rights from three music labels: Universal Music Group, Sony Music Entertainment Group and Warner Music Group. With Gimlet’s pending acquisition, Spotify is positioning themselves squarely as the Netflix of audio. And Gimlet’s portfolio of audio properties could be another tool that Spotify uses to convert casual subscribers to premium, paid users.

And here’s Luminary CoFounder and CEO Matt Sacks:

We want to become synonymous with podcasting in the same way Netflix has become synonymous with streaming. I know how ambitious that sounds. We think it can be done, and some of the top creators in the space agree.

Spotify and Netflix were exclusively aggregators before they began to pursue their modern subscription growth strategy. By acquiring popular properties (like Gimlet and Parcast Network) or by investing in the development of  the native properties that Netflix is now known for, both companies moved further away from aggregation and closer to becoming digital natives. For Netflix, this was timely. Media companies like Disney have begun to pull their properties to develop their own digitally native businesses. Another sign of aggregation theory’s diminished role for newer companies.

Perhaps, the age of aggregation is nearing its maturity. According 2017’s Defining Aggregators by Ben Thompson:

Aggregation Theory describes how platforms (i.e. aggregators) come to dominate the industries in which they compete in a systematic and predictable way. Aggregation Theory should serve as a guidebook for aspiring platform companies, a warning for industries predicated on controlling distribution, and a primer for regulators addressing the inevitable antitrust concerns that are the endgame of Aggregation Theory.

Two years later, we’re witnessing a war over proverbial land rights. As platforms have begun to lose leverage over specific verticals, they’ve heavily invested into the development of their own properties (private labels / native brands / native media projects). In some cases, like Spotify’s acquisitions – they chose to acquire the properties to move consumers along the content-to-subscription funnel. For Luminary Media and their Head of Partnerships / Business Development Meaghan Quindlen, the stakes are much higher than they would have been 3-5 years ago.

She has an unenviable job; she must convince alienated podcasts to work with them by communicating her vision, by employing a new licensing compensation structure, or a combination of both. Even Spotify and Apple Music had their own similar episodes. But with $100 million in funding and grandiose aspirations – Luminary will have to out-Spotify Spotify on its way to becoming the Netflix of podcasts – a title that the first audio platform to achieve 100 million paid subscribers wants all to itself.

Who is to say whether digital media properties returns to the types of  platforms that were once required for growth; there is now a dueling loyalty between independence and potential reach. This contradiction didn’t exist a few years prior.

Digitally native retailers are open to working with big box retailers (the original aggregators) as long as they can maintain a unique in-store appearance with access to some form of consumer data.  In this way, DTC retail is a decent enough analog for what’s happening in podcasting today. Product and media brands now hold the levers – they’re the draw. Consumers walk through the door, proverbial or otherwise, for their beloved brands. Aggregators must learn to operate in a world where the leverage exists with digitally natives. At the very least, aggregators need to learn to develop real symbiosis.

Luminary may need to raise more money.

Report by Web Smith | Join the Executive Membership

第 314 号关于线性商务

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我从未见过这样的场面。这是我第一次来到奥古斯塔国家高尔夫球场,我不仅仅是这股热潮的旁观者,还是一名自愿参与者。刚到奥古斯塔不到两个小时,我就说服父亲和我一起观摩这项赛事的盛大传统之一。参加者平均花费 700 多美元购买商品。

店里的客人大多是富裕而悠闲的人,而Berckmans Place的观众则将这种富裕提升了一两个档次。有报道称,一位大师级顾客的平均订单价值(AOV)超过了 750 美元。而在 48 小时内,观众就能在易趣上以建议零售价的 2-5 倍买到这些产品。而这些转售产品也从产品页面上一飞冲天。不过,尽管纪念品和纪念品很容易买到,但这并不像是高尔夫比赛的圈钱行为。价格是合理的。在泰格-伍兹挥拳之后的 15 分钟内,专卖店就对公众关闭了。

作为高尔夫球界最负盛名的赛事,观众们可以说是全神贯注。我观察到的不仅仅是参与,还有一种眩晕感、不自然的亲切感,以及现场大多数人压抑不住的喜悦感。也许是因为没有手机的缘故(手机必须放在入口处)。但有一种特殊的效果,我却说不出来。这是一种品牌只希望模仿的效果。当体验指数如此之高时,消费者别无选择,只能通过给品牌更多的钱来回报其价值。以下是2018 年《GQ》杂志一篇文章中的轶事:

排队入场的队伍就像一个大师博物馆,结账后,顾客还可以选择直接从店里把购买的东西寄回家。不过,最有趣的还不是你可以在一个地方买到这么多大师赛的装备,而且效率很高。更重要的是,在佐治亚州奥古斯塔的这家店,是全世界唯一能买到这些东西的地方。正因为如此,大师赛的商品受到了追捧,催生了一批痴迷者,甚至形成了一个庞大的转售市场。换一种说法:官方品牌的 Masters 产品基本上就是爸爸们的Supreme

当然,部分原因是 "我去了,我想让你知道我去了"。这是影响大量现代零售业的理性诱因。但有时,触发因素远不止于此。一个事件、一次体验、一个流媒体属性,甚至是一个被广泛阅读的博客,都能唤起影响消费的情感。这些表现形式几乎可以保证有机销售的基线。但很少看到品牌利用这些原则促进自身发展。长久以来,我一直在寻找我称之为 线性商务.我在奥古斯塔找到了它。

当精心策划的热心观众与销售机会相遇时,美国大师赛是为数不多的实例之一。据保守估计,2018 年的美国大师赛在一周内创造了 6000-7000 万美元的销售额。在为期四天的比赛中,估计有 16 万人次参观了大师赛,在不到一周的时间里,大师赛的收入就超过了所有数字原生品牌中排名第 40 位的品牌的年收入。

线性商务

数字经济奖励那些处于数字媒体和传统电子商务交叉点的实体。优秀的产品需要有机的、充满激情的受众。受众需要为他们量身定制的产品和服务。

线性商业法则:媒体与商业之间的分界线正在消失。对于最适合现代零售经济的品牌而言:媒体和商业运作的目的是优化受众和销售转化。这是实现持续增长、保持和盈利的有效途径。

品牌将把出版作为核心竞争力,出版商将把零售作为核心竞争力。以下是直接面向消费者领域常见的发布战略的直观示意图。

DTC 线性商务的五个基本阶段。

虽然版本(1)和(2)是风险投资支持的 DTC 品牌最容易预测的路径,但我们开始看到更多版本(4)的实施。Recess 的创始人 Ben Witte 推出了 "IRL"。这是一种重新利用实体零售空间的形式,旨在加深消费者对 Recess 品牌及其产品线的了解。这个空间的设计是为了给饮料赋予意义。在 IRL,Witte 安排了各种教育活动,以丰富和启发该 CPG 品牌的目标人群。

与此同时,在 Away,《这里》杂志在 Steph Korey 和 Jen Rubio 的第一个市场(北美)和他们的国际发展之间起到了纽带作用。因此,"Here "是版本(4)和版本(5)的混合体。虽然Away的许多北美目标消费者都知道 Away 的存在,但 "Here "在国外却起到了介绍品牌的作用。该刊物近 12% 的国际流量来自 WhatsApp,这表明教育国际消费者的方法是切实可行的。

虽然第(5)版并不多见,但首席营销人员已开始了解其价值。艾米丽-韦斯的市场推广战略是第五版发布计划的最佳实践范例。Into the Gloss起初是 Glossier 化妆品和饰品系列的主要销售驱动力。作为一家新晋独角兽企业,Glossier.com的 260 万月访问量现在来自多种可持续的客户获取方式:通过Into The Gloss和 Instagram 的有机流量、付费搜索、Facebook/Instagram 广告,以及与 BuzzFeed 悄悄签订的联盟协议。以下是艾米丽-魏斯(Emily Weiss)对Glossier 增长的介绍:

我们正在打造一个全新的美容公司:一个拥有分销渠道、以顾客为利益相关者的公司。通过与消费者直接联系,Glossier 可以获得无穷无尽的新产品灵感。

正在制作的第五版

策划受众是一个复杂的过程,既有长远利益,也有短期困扰;营销主管们长期以来一直低估了这种社区发展和营销方法的价值。在这方面,一些数字出版商走在了前面。2PM 最近就 Erika Nardini 在 Barstool Sports 的计划采访了Front OfficeSports。纳尔迪尼介绍她最近推出的产品:

高尔夫之所以吸引人,是因为我们热爱高尔夫,我们的年轻粉丝也和我们一样热爱高尔夫。我们努力让所做的每一件事都充满乐趣,并以一种随和、平易近人的方式进行。Barstool Classic 就是一个很好的例子。

这家前卫的媒体公司拥有直接面向消费者的商品、业余版付费体育节目和成功的订阅会员制的悠久历史,现在他们推出了第三种商业产品--这也是将近 900 万月访问量和数十万每日听众推向体育排行榜前十名的另一种盈利方式。Barstool Classics是该媒体品牌首次涉足高价赛事,它从本报告开始的地方--高尔夫开始。

随着媒体与商业的不断融合,这两个行业的主要关键绩效指标是相似的:访客是否成交?以每张门票 600 美元的价格,Barstool 的营销团队打赌:a) 他们了解他们的受众;b) 受众会急切地向 Barstool 付款以表达他们的支持。这样一来,DTC 线性商务概念就类似于奥古斯塔国家赛上那些传说中的专业商店。对于希望实现可持续发展的挑战者品牌来说,从这些例子中可以学到很多东西。受众驱动型企业已经摸索出如何通过提供吸引注意力的价值来为访客赚钱。另一种方法是花钱让受众来参加你的派对,而这一成本正在逐年上升。

点击此处阅读第 314 期策划

报告人:Web Smith |大约 2PM

第 313 期:秘制调味汁

 

On McDonald’s, Uber Eats, and the effort to systemize last mile commerce in food retail. On a Wednesday night at home, I was looking to repeat order a frequent order at a local restaurant. For years, it’s been my go-to for a healthy dinner. Ohio’s Northstar Cafe is a fixture within the community, the food is great and trustworthy. It’s the rare meal that tastes great when delivered. But on that day, it was no longer present within the Postmates app. Neither were my second and third choices. A Postmates faithful, I chose to walk to a local restaurant instead. There is something interesting happening in the food delivery space. Vendor fragmentation is increasing and companies like Postmates and DoorDash seem to be positioning for their own eventual exits. Let me explain.

A four or five star hotel would prefer that you booked through their own channels rather than booking through HotelTonight. After polling 72 hotels that use HotelTonight, 2PM found that only nine viewed the partnership as “very positive”, the majority characterized the partnership as “fair.” The order communications between HotelTonight (now Airbnb) and the hotel venue is still analog and far from instantaneous (some hotels receive confirmation via fax). HotelTonight receives a margin of the sale that many hotels don’t believe should go to the booking app. This is also how many restaurants view food delivery apps. And rather than cooperate with Postmates, GrubHub, DoorDash or others – these restaurants often ask removal from the app or close their businesses to internet orders. Uber has found multiple solutions for this supply and demand issue. From No. 293:

By building digitally vertical restaurants, Uber has gained the ability to engineer product loyalty that competing platforms cannot yet compete against. Uber Eats’ explosive growth between 2017 and 2018 is a result of the logistics company incentivizing its regular drivers to become delivery hands and also by incentivizing Uber users to become Uber Eats users. By increasing supply and demand-side economics, Uber Eats has leverage to that Postmates cannot yet manufacture. This is essential when approaching existing restaurants and offering them a private label product opportunity.

This is just one of two recent developments in Uber’s competition for delivery market share. The partnership between McDonald’s and Uber may be one of the consequential deals in all of eCommerce by the end of 2019. Uber will provide the logistics to help McDonald’s build an efficient and sustainable direct-to-consumer sales business. This is a sales effort that both companies will need. Uber’s deal with McDonald’s will lay the groundwork for, what I believe will be the race to land exclusive restaurant deals. Here is a wonderful deep dive into Uber’s unit economics by Aswath Damodaran. A standout excerpt:

The first is that Uber is not a pure ride sharing company, since it derives revenues from its food delivery service (Uber Eats) and an assortment of other smaller bets (like Uber Freight). It is worth noting this table while suggests that while some of Uber’s more ambitious reaches into logistics have not borne fruit, its foray into food delivery seems to be picking up steam. Uber Eats has expanded from 2.68% of Uber’s net revenues to 13.12%.

Often characterized as the largest IPO of the year, Uber will go public in May to fanfare and, potentially, that glorious day one pop that will solidify gigantic returns for early and preferred investors. Like any public offering, there will be an initial discomfort on behalf of the retail investors when Uber’s stock settles. But this conversation isn’t about the IPO, or Uber’s uphill battle to achieve profitability (at the expense of public transportation – according to critics). This is about the long-term potential of its delivery business. With the $100 million raise that may allow the $90-100 billion brand to further invest in long-term partnerships like the one with McDonald’s. Uber’s market performance will be tied to the value proposition of Uber Eats. And for companies like Postmates, though it has raised nearly $700 million, Uber’s post-IPO advantages will be a concern within their San Francisco boardroom.

In 2019, Uber’s key partner will be McDonald’s. If successful, exclusive restaurant relationships will begin to place Uber Eat’s delivery competitors in regrettable positions.

More than two-thirds of McDonald’s business is earned through its drive-thru operations. And internal figures suggest that nearly ten percent of many franchisee’s 2018 sales were attributed to third-party deliveries from: Uber, Amazon, Delivery Hero, Zomato, Postmates, Deliveroo, Swiggy, DoorDash, and Grubhub. Of these services, Uber is best positioned to compete for the long game. To accomplish this, McDonald’s will:

  • streamline kiosk and drive thru order response and processing
  • cut hourly human capital in favor of kiosks and third-party delivery
  • and speed up delivery by using artificial intelligence to speed drive thru and kiosk orders.

With this context, McDonald’s acquisition of Dynamic Yield shouldn’t be a shock to those who’ve followed these developments. I’ll summarize why a bargain-driven fast food chain like McDonald’s would pay $300 million to acquire an artificial intelligence company. McDonald’s revolutionized the kitchen. With Uber’s partnership, McDonald’s is aiming to revolutionize the speed of order processing and delivery while shifting labor costs to Uber.

Dynamic Yield’s AI-powered omni-channel personalization engine helps businesses personalize every customer interaction to improve performance and overall customer satisfaction.

Dynamic Yield

To do this, store owners are on the hook for a redevelopment effort that will take time and trust between McDonald’s corporate and their franchisees.  McDonald’s is essentially building infrastructure for omnichannel excellence at scale. With net sales being affected by smaller margins typical of third-party delivery, McDonald’s management is positioning to offset those shrinking margins by equipping store owners with artificial intelligence and automation to cut their own payroll liabilities. This, while increasing third-party sales from 10% to 30% per store.

With McDonald’s prioritizing technological redevelopment at kiosks and the drive thru, it casts a new light on the potential of a McDonald’s partnership with Uber Eats. And Uber will mostly benefit by establishing a growth path that may be as lucrative as the app’s digitally vertical restaurants (DVR). For Uber, DVRs may earn the company a higher margin than what’s typical but Uber’s partnership with McDonald’s will drive critical market share.


2PM summary:

Key takeaway no. 1: McDonald’s Corp will partner exclusively with Uber. Other delivery apps will no longer be able to sell McDonald’s products within their apps.

Key takeaway no. 2: McDonald’s Corp will invest and promote Uber’s value. With institutional support from one of America’s greatest consumer brands, retail investors will be assured that Uber is a long-term value despite its glaring profitability concerns.

Key takeaway no. 3: Uber will negotiate for more national restaurants to agree to category exclusivity. This will increase pressure on DoorDash, Postmates, and GrubHub to do the same.


On the night of April 14, Postmates earned a bit of social media buzz with an easter egg promo for HBO’s “Game of Thrones.” Founder and CEO Basti Lehmann retweeted praise from droves of users who admired the savvy brand gamesmanship. To celebrate the premiere of HBO’s last season of Game of Thrones, Postmates added an illustration of a dragon flying over your in-app mapping experience. It was clever and it will likely earn major media for the effort. But flying dragons are not trademarked, so it’s not clear that HBO had any role in the marketing promotion.

In this way, we’re witnessing another contrast between Uber and Postmates. One company is solidifying exclusive, long-term relationships with strategic growth partners. The other is still shifting away from driving growth with flimsier marketing and logistical decisions like featuring restaurants without signed agreements in place. Postmates is growing up and I remain a frequent user but it’s hard to ignore the infrastructure that Uber Eats is building, in anticipation of its May IPO. By capturing the most well-known restaurants in America, Uber Eats is positioning to be the preferred food marketplace of middle America. And it just might work.

Read the no. 313 curation here.

Report by Web Smith | About 2PM