第 310 号博诺博斯曲线

bonoboscurve.jpg

The history of digitally native vertical brands (DNVBs) goes back just 12 years. However, the framing of the industry has evolved and so has its terminology. Appointed by Bonobos’ founder and current Walmart executive Andy Dunn in 2016, the DNVB acronym has given way to a simpler version: “DTC” or direct-to-consumer. It rolls off of the tongue and it’s all-encompassing – reporters, analysts, and sources like 2PM and Lean Luxe can apply the terminology across the board. For Bonobos and Dunn, there is symbolism in the paths of the company and the executive. It’s emblematic of the curve that many companies and executives will follow.

By the end of this, you may see how short-sighted the DTC descriptor can be. I believe that the acronym should be viewed as a title of a sales channel or perhaps an emblem of a retailer’s core competency. It’s a misnomer when product manufacturers are appointed the title DTC, as if it’s main channel denotes the character of the entire company. To the mere observer, the consumer has evolved. To operators within digitally native retail, it’s a complicated conversation.

Platforms like Shopify democratized opportunity for early-stage product manufacturers. Led by Tobias Lütke, the CEO led the burgeoning commerce platform at the onset of the Great Recession of 2008 and remains there today. Under his leadership, the company is trading at a $22 billion market capitalization. The timing of Shopify’s ascension is significant. By 2009, the Wall Street Journal was publishing articles like “Recession turns malls into ghost towns.” And given the lack of eCommerce presence for many of the brands that lived and died by big box retail, the macroeconomic effects on the worst recession of this lifetime thwarted brand sustainability. In some cases, the product manufacturers had to seek bankruptcy protection as overall consumer demanded dwindled between 2007 and 2010. This era of web-first retail was fortuitous, it happened at the weakest point for traditional brands in the last 60 years.

The retail industry has changed, not the consumer.

Younger brands had few if any places to turn to effectively market their products. With their lean teams and inexpensive architecture, these brands were capable of surviving the treacherous waters of American consumerism. In 2013, this is what Kevin Lavelle and I wrote for the Wall Street Journal in 2013:

Startups like ours can focus our energy on developing our product, service and brand because of the platforms and tools available today. With the emergence of new web applications and plugins, the face of e-commerce is changing dramatically. A business can launch a product or service worldwide and reach millions without the massive infrastructure investment required just a few short years ago.

[…]

Platforms such as Shopify and Stitch Labs have enabled Mizzen+Main, along with myriad other companies, to focus on brand and product first — essentially democratizing e-commerce. That’s not revolutionary news, but with the robust, cloud-based add-ons available, we really can run an entire business with two partners in two states and nearly all systems run virtually. 

Most challenger brands focused on direct to consumer sales in 2007-2014 because distribution through the likes of department stores, Walmart, and Target were inside games navigated by industry veterans. Coupled with this historic economic downturn, there was little to no access to those channels. And when their were, ERP technology was difficult for newer brands to adopt. In short, those distribution deals were difficult to land.

In this way, direct to consumer sales efficacy was a sort of social proof for potential big box retail contracts. These contracts are much easier to land now; big box retailers invite breakout challenger brands to their shelves. This is enabling traditionally digitally native companies to expand their physical footprints by way of owned storefronts and wholesale agreements.


Bonobos Curve: the path of diffusion from a siloed direct to consumer (DTC) method to a holistic organization of online channels (native, marketplace), physical brand stores, and wholesale partnerships.


By the time that Andy Dunn wrote the heralded rise of digitally native vertical brands, his company successfully raised over $120 million with at least a dozen Bonobos Guide Shops and a nationwide partnership with Nordstrom. In his famed blog, he discussed this in detail:

While born digitally, the DNVB need not end up digital-only. This means the brand can extend offline. Usually its offline incarnation is through its own experiential physical retail, or pop-up strategy, or highly selective partnerships. In nearly all cases of partnerships with third parties, the brand controls its external distribution versus being controlled by it.

Assuming that the economy continues to hold steady and Tier A and B malls continue redeveloping real estate to attract this new wave of brands and their followers, we will see the curve continue and with rare exception. Even companies like Glossier, who are notably opposed to diverging from DTC marketing, have begun to invest in physical retail. And there will be more. In this way, the retail has boomeranged. The retail industry has changed, not the consumer.

Below, is the “Bonobos Curve.” This is the behavioral path toward sales maturity that the brand winners of this era will pursue. As such, many of the most successful brands have relationships with Nordstrom, Macy’s, Target, Walmart, or direct partnerships with progressive mall development companies.

A typical path followed by DTC brands | Souce: 2PM

Few brands will remain online-only. In a recent conversation with Betakit, Shopify discussed their plans to address the “Bonobos Curve”:

The pair see vast opportunity for Shopify to grow in the brick-and-mortar retail market. It’s Shopify’s goal, stated Black, to span the entire ecosystem to meet the needs of all its merchants. He emphasized that it doesn’t matter if merchants approach Shopify from a Shopify Plus standpoint or from Shopify Retail, the company hopes to create seamless solutions that span both markets.

Legacy product marketers, like P&G, have equipped their brand management teams to infuse their operations with many of the same tools and practices that their challenger brands counterparts made popular. It’s true that those challenger brands will mature with online retail operations as a core competency. Given the age of many of today’s founders, digital-first competency will be as natural as walking or eating.

But DTC was never the goal of these retailers and consumerism hasn’t evolved as much as we’d like to believe. Brand traction was the goal for many brands like Bonobos and platforms like Shopify, WooCommerce, and BigCommerce leveled the digital playing fields for a while. Time will tell who holds the advantage as brands compete on traditional grounds but Andy Dunn is now a Walmart executive. And Bonobos is a Walmart brand with flagship stores and Nordstrom distribution. This represents the end of the curve and the closing of the Book of DNVB.

Read the No. 310 curation here.

报告人:Web Smith |大约 2PM

第 309 期:哈德逊院子并非适合所有人

Non omne quod nitet aurum est: all that glitters is not gold. This is a widely used line derived from Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice – a story of a merchant who must default on a loan. To understand the new era of high-visibility retail developments, you have to understand the times that we are living in. The 41 page report by the Schwarz Center of Economic Policy Analysis (SCEPA) details the funding initiatives, costs, and opportunity for Hudson Yards. There is a passage that summarizes the gist of the entire document:

The cost overruns and revenue shortfalls of the Hudson Yards project stem from the realization of financial and economic risks common to large development projects. While well known in multi-faceted development projects, the cost of these risks were not included in the project’s budget, leaving the city to bear the responsibility if they materialized.

The start of the one million square foot Hudson Yards development was billed “the largest private real estate development in the United States by square footage” [note]. In the midst of 2008’s Great Recession, developer Tishman Speyer ceded the rights to the property to developer and Miami Dolphins owner Stephen A. Ross, the magnate who also owns a sizable stake in Gary Vaynerchuk’s 880 person Vaynermedia agency. While completing the deal, Ross reduced his company’s risk by introducing stalling mechanisms to give the economy time to recover before the clock began on the costly project. The rights were purchased during the 2008 downturn and the development team broke ground in 2012.

The idea of Hudson Yards was born out of recession. This is important to note, 2008 was a frightening time for retailers and consumers. The previous downturn allowed direct to consumer brands to take advantage of the physical retail shortcomings of incumbent product marketers.  Like many of the higher end mega-developments that are now in the works, Hudson Yards is both a barometer for our consumer economic health and a localized antidote for the next downturn. Originally intended to attract commercial partners with tax benefits, Ross’ development eventually extended the commercial benefits package to retailers – incumbent and challenger brands alike. These brands include: Rhone, Mack Weldon, Milk & Honey, Stance, B*ta, Batch, M. Gemi, and a yet-to-be-announced deal with Wone. On page 18 of the New School’s SCEPA report:

Another factor feeding the revenue shortfall was the IDA’s decision to extend PILOTs to retail development projects. With PILOTs were originally designated only for commercial developments, the extension of the tax break for retail development was not included in C&W’s 2006 revenue projections.

New York’s newest mini-city is just one of a number of developments popping up around the country. But Hudson Yards is perhaps the most vulnerable; it’s an experiment with the most to lose. Far from a private development, a city rife with public transportation and infrastructural shortcomings has and will be footing the bill for the one million square foot property. This tax burden is distributed to all New York residents but the development will directly benefit upper-middle class residents and visitors alike.

What Hudson Yards represents

In the The First Roundtable, 2PM explained:

Physical retail is rebounding because DNVBs are achieving great success with shoppers that are moving up market or, sometimes, down market (Boxed, Brandless, Dollar General). Additionally, data-driven customer acquisition is extending to physical retail. This is making it easy to account for investments into physical marketing and retail.

Hudson Yards is not for everyone, despite Ross’ recent, disingenuous public relations attempts. This fact should be by design and it likely would have been had the deal gotten done without taxing the middle class. A recent Forbes article mentions the high-end retailers like Cartier, Dior, Fendi, and Michelin-starred restaurants. And the financial service providers like BlackRock and Point72. It goes on to cite a range of $2 – $30 million for condos on the property. Ross’ wager is one that brands, developers, and retailers should take note of. This is one of the first developments to be built after the lessons of the last downturn: the middle class withers, the poor get poorer, and the wealthy remain so.

America saw the growth of middle class malls for nearly 60 years and those malls are now failing. Hudson Yards is built for a polarized consumer economy where middle class retail is penalized for their lack of focus. And the timing couldn’t be better for the brands in the direct to consumer economy who focus on upper-middle to upper class consumers.

The Overton Window

In a masterful article chock full of polymathic thought, David Perrell weaves a narrative that blends political, economic, and psychological research. His flowing essay connects the evolution of mass media, commerce, higher education, and politics in a way that is rare for publishers today. The three pillars that he discussed: commerce, higher education, and politics. One line summarizes the entire piece:

Commerce and media are interdependent. You can’t understand commerce without understanding the media environment.

This is a capstone belief for 2PM readers. Perrell goes on to discuss the current vulnerability of many traditional CPG brands who’ve – thus far – depended on mass media and traditional ad buying to generate demand for their product. At first, the rise in availability of information gave rise to challenger brands. For a window of time, obscure brands could compete with larger conglomerates by pursuing 1:1 relationships with consumers.

This era of connectivity gave rise to brands who took advantage of an Overton Window-like time for the consumer web (2007-2016). As diffusion increased, so did the difficulty in which brands met when acquiring new customers (rising CAC). In one essay, Perrell directly communicates the collapse of the Overton Window in the context of American politics. But unbeknownst to him, he also communicated the collapse of the Overton Window in the context of DTC retail and the advertising that propelled it. Compare the two paragraphs in What the hell is going on?

(1) The media’s monopoly saw its first cracks with the rise of cable, and now, due to the internet, the Mass Media environment is going to crumble. The internet — where everyone can find, select, edit, and distribute content — has already left its mark. The Overton Window has been shattered. The media is no longer a barrier against diverse thought and opinion.

(2) By creating unlimited shelf space and reducing information asymmetries, power in the internet age is shifting from suppliers to customers. The world is increasingly demand driven. Customers have more choices than ever before. They can buy anything, at any time. Through the internet, brands can serve a long-tail of unmet consumer needs, which weren’t served by big box retailers.

The web democratized information but, also, pop cultural and socio-economic distraction. We used to watch the same television shows at the same hours of the night. We’d view the same advertisements. And the America of late was a mostly centrist-thinking political body. The ideas to the left and to the right of the Overton Window went mostly unobserved – for a time. Today, the areas outside of the window dominate our conversations. As such, America used to vote for candidates that represented ideas within an Overton Window of acceptable belief. As 2016’s political race would suggest, America is more polar than ever. This one part of American consumerism is indicative of the whole.

At first, commoditized information helped challenger (DTC) brands compete against incumbents. But costlier advertising and distracted consumers are tipping the scales to incumbent forms of retail and brand promotion. For developments like Hudson Yards and other efforts by developers like Macerich, the bet is on the need for physical retail to acquire customers. In smaller markets like Columbus, Ohio – developments, like the Easton Town Center, have proven the appeal of this elegant simplicity. And DTC brands have flocked to this premium real estate.

Physical Retail 2.0 (PR2.0) will be defined by the public / private partnerships like the Hudson Yards development. With the consumer web becoming louder, more volatile, fragmented, and less reliable for pure direct-to-consumer (DTC) brands, PR2.0 is two bets: (1) traditional retail infrastructure and attracting DTC brands to develop new behaviors for higher-end millennial consumers (2) consumer web fatigue. In a recent conversation with Digiday, here is what Ken Morris of Boston Retail Partners told Hilary Milnes:

Retail has needed to change, and brands that are popular online are forcing that change with temporary stores and leases that require flexibility. Landlords and developers are no longer in a place to turn that down, and if you need proof, look at Hudson Yards. The most massive retail development made adjustments to get digitally born brands on the floor. They drive foot traffic, point blank. And malls need foot traffic.

Hudson Yards: the present, not future

For Stephen A. Ross’ development to withstand traditional market forces, it will have become a mecca to upper-middle to upper class consumerism. But while many publications are posing the question: will it work? A better question is: how soon? The $20 billion dollar retail project was funded by taxpayers to serve a greater purpose than the leisure and window shopping that’s been reported on. Hudson Yards was imagined at the end of a bull run and built to survive the next. Founder of Stray Reflections, a global macro research advisory, Jawad Mian recently published a series of tweets on the upcoming period of IPO liquidity for Silicon Valley investors.

In the thread, he is speaking directly to skeptics of our system of privatized high growth companies. Companies that IPO later in their cycles than earlier ones of previous generations and he raises some serious concerns. With surgical precision, he narrates through the credit bubble of 2007 and the commodity bubble of 2011. Then he notes the speed upon which unicorn investments (valuation of $b+) are crowned today: Bird, the scooter company, became a unicorn in less than 12 months. He cites the 10-fold increase in VC-stage investment by mutual funds between 2016 and 2019.

And lastly, he cites Saudi Arabia’s late-stage presence in US startups to the tune of $15 billion since mid-2016. Softbank’s Vision Fund, a home to some of SA’s sovereign wealth, has nearly $100 billion under management. It is no surprise that America is home to over 250 unicorns. In contrast, China is home to 168 unicorns worth $628 billion on an aggregate $11 billion in Chinese investment since 2000.

With a highly influential IPO window on the horizon, Mian’s concerns are founded. What happens if the values of Uber and Lyft don’t hold up in the public market? And how would their market vulnerabilities affect the growing influence of foreign, late-stage investment into American tech companies? Mian concludes with parallels from 2000, 2007, and 2011 but regardless of the successes of decacorn tech stocks, it is easy to see that late-stage investments are masking vulnerabilities in the private-to-public pipeline. This while the entire concept of the gig and freelance economies raise sustainability questions. For developments like Hudson Yards, the aim is to be above these pesky questions.

A 2PM reader recently shared a story about a new resident of a Hudson Yards condominium. His two bedroom apartment needed room for a couple and their two dogs. He came to find that the space was inadequate for his family and his belongings – so he also bought a unit across the hall. Hudson Yards was not designed with everyone in mind. And the financing of the property is so entangled that – while it was built for the higher class – everyone will eventually play a role in propping it up (if they haven’t done so already).

In this way, this ostentatious development is as close to recession proof as one can be. This, thanks in part to the influence of the challenger brands and their cohorts of wealthier millennials. As the consumer web continues to diffuse conversations, preferences, and opinions beyond the Overton Windows – Hudson Yards and the developments that will mimic it may become the safest places for DTC brands to expand in America’s number one retail market and beyond. But all that glitters is not gold. Hudson Yards was designed to become a haven for those who have, the types of consumers who can thrive throughout the natural cycles of our market-driven economy. Few retail developments can say the same.

Read Brief No. 309 here.

报告人:Web Smith |大约 2PM

Additional Reading: 

(1) Stephen Ross is building New York City’s Next Must-See Destination 

(2) Private Equity Firm Eyes China Malls

(3) The Mall is Making a Comeback

(4) Hudson Yards isn’t the future of retail

(5) Billionaire Stephen Ross believes that Hudson Yards is For Everyone 

(6) Hudson Yards: open to all but not for all

(7) Manhattan’s Opulent New City 

(8) The Cost of New York City’s Hudson Yard’s Development [41 page .pdf]

第 308 期传统品牌可以重新定义 DTC

关于宝洁公司以及他们为什么要进一步投资实体零售。如果 2019 年拉斯维加斯的 Shoptalk 大会能说明什么,那么品牌代表可能标志着从自我维持、直接面向消费者(DTC)品牌的转变。消费包装品(CPG)的传统竞争期待重新获得 DTC 时代所阻碍的发展势头。今年,著名的 DTC 品牌越来越少。在Shoptalk,Bonobos 是传统品牌,但该品牌现在归沃尔玛所有。另一个支柱品牌 Dollar Shave Club 现在归联合利华所有。Trunk Club 现在归 Nordstrom 所有。这本身就具有象征意义。与 DTC 领域的许多品牌一样,它们越来越依赖传统零售渠道来实现临界质量。

在今年的 Shoptalk 与会者中,代表前 100 强 DTC 品牌的人数较少。以下是出席会议的数字垂直品牌的简短名单:Allbirds、Brandless、Boxed、Dirty Lemon、Everlane、Frank + Oak、Glossier、Harry's、Mack Weldon、Mizzen + Main、Native Deodorant(宝洁)和Tuft & Needle。在这些公司中,很少有避开批发零售的,更没有避开实体零售发展的。虽然这些公司通过大型零售合作、收购或实体零售增长来改变传统格局,但传统势力对由此带来的变化却反应迟缓。

在最近一期《会员简报》中,我们发布了《目标报告》

塔吉特、沃尔玛和亚马逊(TWA)都面临着在线杂货销售商品化的问题,新的挑战者不断阻碍着 TWA 市值的增长。为了应对这些挑战,每家零售商都在采用产品营销商和 DTC 品牌作为新业务和忠实客户的来源。在每种情况下,TWA 都将自己定位为时尚、美容、电子产品和生活方式品牌的实用之家。亚马逊正在聚合。塔吉特正在策划。沃尔玛正在收购。 

虽然 DTC 品牌的辉煌可能会逐渐消失,但联合利华(Unilever)和宝洁(P&G)等传统品牌正在重新投资 DTC 时代的解决方案。从 2010 年到 2019 年,CPG 挑战者品牌形成了一股势头,传统公司不得不与之抗衡。迄今为止,传统企业尚未对挑战者和追捧他们的零售商发起真正的攻势。据《Happi》杂志报道,宝洁占沃尔玛店内销售额的 18%。这一数字高于2016年的15%。迄今为止,尽管沃尔玛在 DTC 业务、CPG 独家合作和自有品牌开发方面投入了大量资金,但这一数字仍在增长。

2PM 数据:宝洁公司

主要美容 CPG 生产商的收入(2016 年),单位为十亿美元
宝洁公司息税折旧摊销前利润预测(单位:百万美元)(2018-2020 年
全球领先个人护理品牌的品牌资产(百万)(2018 年
宝洁公司按业务部门划分的全球净销售额(单位:百万美元)(2014-2018 年

宝洁公司正处于十字路口。这个拥有 182 年历史的消费品牌在 2012 年获得了最高收入,此后虽然成功削减了开支并提高了利润,但仍未达到这一高度。即便如此,宝洁 2018 年的净收入数字仍是其过去 13 年来第二低的。这一下降与 DTC 零售行业的增长相对应。这种增长以及大卖场零售商中营销良好的自有品牌 CPG 品牌的持续发展,导致宝洁和联合利华等营销商对传统产品的替代增加。

重新定义直接面向消费者

其特许经营机会的效果图

对于宝洁公司来说,以创新的方式利用其产品是一个难得的机会。总部位于辛辛那提的宝洁公司最近推出了汰渍干洗店,这是一个特许零售体验和干洗服务中心。加盟商获得了最知名的家居用品品牌,而汰渍则获得了一个新的零售渠道来销售产品、建立亲和力、增加顶部漏斗广告以及实现服务驱动型收入流。

汰渍是宝洁公司最知名的品牌之一,它被重新利用来提供按需洗衣服务。汰渍干洗店允许顾客在应用程序中选择所需的服务、付款,然后将衣物放在店面,在收到推送通知后取回。顾客回来时会发现自己的衣服已经洗好、烘干并叠好。这些干洗店面目前已在辛辛那提、波士顿、芝加哥、华盛顿特区、费城、丹佛和达拉斯开设。这种新的零售体验引出了一个问题:为什么不将 "Everyday "实体店面扩展到垂直零售领域呢?

宝洁公司现有 DTC 工作的一个例子

关于 "宝洁日常 "和可防御性。截至 2018 年,哈利公司和美元剃须俱乐部(联合利华)凭借直营模式和与零售商的合作,赢得了吉列超过 12% 的市场份额。宝洁公司将进一步受益于 DTC 实体零售模式的发展。通过拥有店内的 "Everyday "体验,宝洁公司将能够实现一些目标,而这些目标在亚马逊、沃尔玛和塔吉特继续开发竞争性家居用品品牌以解决自身盈利问题时将非常有用。

  • 实体店可以减少对作为主要销售渠道的沃尔玛和塔吉特的依赖,同时使宝洁公司有更多的筹码在塔吉特和沃尔玛或亚马逊(目前的广告合作伙伴)上谈判更好的条款和店内营销抵押品。
  • 通过直接面向消费者,这些自有店面将减少宝洁对批发关系的依赖,从而提高每次销售的利润率。
  • 有了自己的店面,宝洁就有能力推出自己的送货服务和最后一英里业务。

尽管 "直接面向消费者 "是当今零售业的流行语,但实体店面再次成为健康的客户获取生态系统的关键组成部分。但是,品牌制造商不能再像这个时代之前那样依赖大卖场零售商的经营方式了。数字原生品牌正在优先考虑实体零售,以降低获客成本并建立长期忠诚度。由于互联网第一零售商的这一转变,沃尔玛和塔吉特等大型零售商已将与这些品牌的合作和收购放在首位,以将顾客吸引到他们的商店。

沃尔玛公司希望通过向包括宝洁公司(Procter & Gamble Co.

宝洁会花钱在商店里做广告吗?

零售业的 DTC 时代已开始使联合利华和宝洁等营销人员处于不利地位。就在十年前,宝洁公司还拥有塔吉特(Target)等商店的美容美发货架。在一些商店里,Harry's 和 Flamingo 装置最引人注目。而在其他商店,则是Native的除臭剂或Casper的枕头。随着沃尔玛等第三方零售商重新评估货架空间和店内营销,宝洁开始失去对产品展示的控制。但他们对直接面向消费者的商业模式的承诺表明,这种劣势可能是短暂的。

除了汰渍干洗店特许经营系统,宝洁公司还在尝试数字原生品牌。此外,公司还在继续与 BigCommerce 合作,测试新的在线零售业态。但是,在零售业不断发展的过程中,直营店的形式才有可能带来实体零售的增长和品牌的可维护性。宝洁拥有的店面不仅仅是与老客户建立关系的地方。它将成为宝洁新的数字原生品牌测试和获取新客户的空间。直接面向消费者的零售并不局限于在线渠道,DNVB也在以这种方式进行创新。联合利华和宝洁等营销人员也可以这样做。

点击这里阅读第 308 期策划

报告人:Web Smith |大约 2PM