备忘录历史性制裁

We are accustomed to stories of wartime sabotage. Bridges are blown, airfields are destroyed, and transport trucks incapacitated. But those were acts by armed forces. What we are witnessing now is the disruption of trade instigated by corporate boardrooms, not military war rooms. It’s beginning to have an effect.

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine will be remembered as a war of corporate intervention at a level not seen in previous wars. One by one, corporations are taking sides before many nations are. It’s divided the retail community, for one. The Chief Executive Officer of Uniqlo, Tadashi Yanai was recently quoted in Nikkei:

Clothing is a necessity of life. The people of Russia have the same right to live as we do.

The company’s 50 stores will continue to operate in Russia. Uniqlo is one of the last retail corporations to voice support for its commerce business in the country that is the aggressor in this war. Yanai’s stance is in the minority. Some of the world’s biggest brands have exited or suspended operations in Russia, putting an end to decades of post-USSR investment into the region, at least for now.

Since Russian troops invaded Ukraine on February 24, western companies have begun pulling out of Russia in a sign of anti-war sentiment and support for Ukraine. The motion spans across industries, with airlines, automobiles, tech giants, mass and luxury retailers, energy companies, consulting firms, logistics and shipping operators, financial firms, and media companies all halting operations in Russia.

Notable companies include Nike, which has closed stores and stopped eCommerce orders in Russia. Apple has stopped selling its products and ceased all exports to Russian sales channels. Google suspended advertising. H&M has also paused operations in the country.

And despite exemptions for luxury goods, higher-end fashion retailers have followed their peers with their own private sanctions against the country. Luxury conglomerates LVMH, Kering and Richemont plus Chanel, Hermès and Prada have closed stores and stopped shipments into Russia, cutting off wealthy shoppers’ spending. A recent report in the Guardian explained the ripple effect:

On Friday LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton, owner of brands including Christian Dior, Givenchy and Bulgari, said it was shuttering its 124 boutiques in Russia from Sunday, while Kering, which owns Gucci and Saint Laurent, confirmed it would close its two shops in the country.

The private sanctions have extended to fintech. Visa, Mastercard and PayPal have blocked Russian banks from using their systems, while Apple Pay and Google Pay have also been blocked. In the entertainment industry, you’ll find more of the same. Disney has suspended movie releases in the country.

In the case of social media platforms, the Russian government made the first move in banning Meta platforms, YouTube and Twitter; TikTok then acted to stop streaming in the country in response to Russia’s fake news law enacted to control media narratives.

Ceasing business in Russia has been framed by a number of companies as an act of safety for employees and a response to a complex situation. Some companies including Nike have said they will keep paying employees’ salaries while businesses are closed. The goal is to put pressure on Vladimir Putin to put an end to his aggression towards a sovereign country. While the U.S. military industrial complex has been largely quiet, retailers and technology companies have seemingly taken to a different kind of war, amplifying the potential of long-term financial turmoil directly in response to the ongoing invasion. In this way, Russian citizens and millions of workers are the collateral damage. For western companies, the risk is hurting their own share prices. But the public pressure to signal support for Ukraine is a factor.

The war is playing out on social media in an unprecedented way, making it more difficult for businesses to carry on as usual. From TechCrunch, regarding TikTok’s decision to pull out of Russia:

​​TikTok has been a crucial platform of the war. The New Yorker called the conflict in Ukraine “the world’s first TikTok war” because of how Ukrainians have used the app to document the situation on the ground.

Not only are companies pulling out of Russia, they’re also sending support to Ukraine. Millions of dollars have been donated by corporations to UNICEF relief efforts. Elon Musk sent Starlink satellites to Ukraine to enable high-speed internet connections. And private citizens have departed the country to work along the border of Poland to aid refugees.

The decisions from major companies to pause operations in Russia will serve as a one-two punch when combined with western sanctions against Russia. Whether or not the combined efforts will hit Russia’s economy hard enough to have a material impact on the war remains to be seen, but what’s clear is just how interlaced politics and private corporations are today. In the internet’s war, silence seems to be an act of war for businesses. There has never been this type of galvanization around a cause. Once considered an expansion opportunity to countless western corporations, Russia is now the most sanctioned country on earth.

Let’s just hope that closed doors accomplish what ground troops and and weaponry have long been used for – winning wars.

作者:Web Smith | 编辑:Hilary Milnes,美术:Alex Remy 和 Christina Williams

备忘录:BigCommerce 和 Bolt 联合

There is a 1988 advertisement by Philip Morris that describes the enriched flavor of a brand of cigarettes. It called it a solution with Merit. It begins: “If you can’t join ’em, beat ’em.”

Bolt’s former CEO Ryan Breslow felt slighted by Shopify executives; he’s taken it personally. Now, what appeared to be just a fiery Twitter thread looks more like a strategy backed by Bolt’s board. If you can’t join Shopify in owning the market, beat them by joining its de facto rival. BigCommerce is a platform with distinct philosophical differences. For Bolt, an enemy of an enemy is a friend.

Days after we wrote about Bolt’s bold challenge to Shopify, the checkout company took a further step in taking on the eCommerce leader. Shopify rival BigCommerce and Bolt are partnering to bring Bolt’s one-click checkout to BigCommerce’s merchants.

The move contends with Shopify’s native approach to checkout options. With Shopify, platforms like Bolt and Fast have been excluded from checkout workflows. Shopify is on record as being opposed to alternative checkout options, making Shop Pay the ubiquitous checkout provider. Both BigCommerce and Shopify are approaching eCommerce in different ways: Shopify is a quasi-closed ecosystem and BigCommerce is open-source. Shopify allows non-merchants to use Shop Pay, spreading a core technology outside of its own walls. It’s a way to make Shopify more ubiquitous, even when it’s not the eCommerce provider. BigCommerce lets its merchants choose its own tech providers, meaning its platform employs APIs and external SaaS solutions in a way that Shopify doesn’t.

Bolt immediately jumping into a partnership with BigCommerce is part of its strategy to undermine Shopify, both institutionally and as a brand known for “arming the rebels.” Shopify’s villain is Amazon. With this move, BigCommerce and Bolt position Shopify in the same way. From Monday’s 2PM memo:

It may not work but it’s a gutsy strategy. Bolt is trying to out-rebel the armory of the rebels. The call to action is clear: “Switch to Bolt.” In another fiery thread by Bolt founder Ryan Breslow, he began: Shopify is eating their ecosystem.

Transitioning from a one-click checkout platform to a fully-fledged eCommerce solutions provider is not something that happens overnight; this is why the BigCommerce partnership is relevant. The two align in that they have a common competitor they want to overtake, but there’s also a potential future where Bolt acquires BigCommerce or vice versa. Currently, BigCommerce is worth one-ninth in the public market what Bolt is worth in the private market. See this insight from Business Insider’s report on Bolt and BigCommerce’s partnership:

BigCommerce, for its part, isn’t quite so overt about the competition, with [chief commercial officer Russel] Klein referring to Shopify as “the company whose name shall not be uttered” in an interview with Insider.

As we wrote on Monday, Bolt is rising up to fill the spot Shopify once held as the underdog, the challenger to Big Retail, the platform for the people. In the same way Shopify took on Amazon, one is not likely to actually defeat the other, but with enough differentiation, room will be made in the ecosystem for both. Then, another company will rise up to take on Bolt when its britches get too big for its market cap.

Where BigCommerce fits in is more interesting. Can Bolt arm the rebels in the same way Shopify did by aligning itself with a mainstream competitor? It’s an approach likely born of necessity. Bolt has a big valuation to meet. It doesn’t have time to slowly build a full response to Shopify. BigCommerce has growing revenue but widening losses. With Bolt as a marketing and sales partner, I can see how management at BigCommerce can envision the checkout solution as meaningful value-add beyond the OpenSaaS philosophy that both share. Bolt is excelling in sales and marketing in ways that BigCommerce has not.

The company posted revenue of $64.9 million in Q4 2021, beating analysts’ expectations of $62 million. For the year, the company reported a loss of $76.7 million. Revenue was reported as $219.9 million. And the bet is that together, Shop Pay will be overtaken as the premier checkout solution. This quote by Bolt’s Chief Business Officer was notable:

By having Bolt be that one agnostic player that’s creating this shopper network that works with all payment providers and all e-commerce platforms, it will grow bigger. It will eclipse Shop Pay.

Breslow sees Bolt as the third-generation of commerce enablers, a position shared by a number of headless competitors including its rival Fast. BigCommerce is in position to benefit from Bolt’s gutsy marketing strategy, that is unless Shopify finds a way to counter the partnership first. In the meantime, Bolt hopes to prove that it is the ultimate solution with merit.

作者:Web Smith | 编辑:Hilary Milnes,美术:Alex Remy

Update: This is something that I learned today. At the time of publishing this, BigCommerce employs over 100 in the Ukrainian city of Kyiv. Men between the age of 18 and 60 have been ordered to remain in the country. The banking system has been disrupted so funds have been difficult to ascertain for many of the employs. CEO Brent Bellm is in an unenviable position, Ukraine is an eCommerce-rich country with top engineers and nearly 10% of the company’s workforce is located within the wartorn country.

成员简介: b8ta 已测试

b8ta 的停业是零售业的一大损失,它结束了为改变这个发展速度比以往任何时候都快的零售业所做的勇敢努力。在某种程度上,b8ta 试图在一家店里重现 Soho 或奥斯汀南国会区的感觉。在 2018 年的《商品街坊》(Neighborhood of Goods)中,我解释道:

但是,当你离开苏荷区街道的砖砌小路时,你就不太可能再找到一个与之完全相同的地方了。无论是梅西百货最近在 Facebook 上推出的合作项目,还是 b8ta 商店、Four Post,甚至是 Neighborhood Goods,都不例外。每家店都有值得注意的不足之处:在 b8ta 和 Neighborhood Goods 发现的大多数商品,消费者都无法带着购买的商品离开商店。

b8ta 是零售业应对大流行病后果的最新牺牲品。首席执行官维布-诺比(Vibhu Norby)说,关闭公司的决定最终是由于与房东的谈判失败。不过,迫使 b8ta 于 2 月 18 日关闭美国门店的不仅仅是大流行病,该公司今天也在其网站上宣布了这一消息。对于数字原生品牌来说,实体零售业的发展已经超越了零售商的核心竞争力。 

该零售店旨在成为消费者体验新时代和数字原生品牌的目的地,这些品牌希望在不开放自有购物体验的情况下获得曝光。

b8ta 于 2015 年成立,当时是一家主要用于测试扬声器和健身自行车等消费类科技产品的商店。但该公司的愿景是重新思考批发与品牌之间的关系,它不仅是一家商店,还是一家 "零售即服务 "提供商。从这个意义上说,它对在其商店销售的品牌做出了更大的承诺。品牌商向 b8ta 支付一定的费用,以便在其货架上出现,并获得其软件的使用权,该软件可提供人流量和演示时间等顾客行为分析的洞察力。在体验式零售的高峰期,恰逢直接面向消费者的品牌向实体店转移,b8ta 被证明是一个很有前途的合作伙伴。b8ta 的模式对没有大型实体店的新品牌很友好,它们希望亲自测试顾客的接受程度。它还迎合了喜欢先试后买的顾客的需求,他们希望在一个地方就能买到精心挑选的新产品。

自 2015 年以来,购物中心所有者集团做出了许多类似的努力:Unibail-Rodamco-Westfield 在几家 Westfield 购物中心推出了 pop-ups;Macerich 也设计了类似的运营模式;Brookfield 也有自己的运营模式。但许多品牌开始完全跳过这个试验场。b8ta 也是商场和百货公司寻找新客流途径的一种资产。梅西百货主导了对b8ta的投资,并在其Market @ Macy's概念中使用了b8ta的技术。随着许多品牌开始投资于全渠道体验,体验式零售被外包。他们希望在商场里有自己的足迹,他们希望手头有存货,他们希望有一个处理退货的地方。

然而,该公司的软件正是许多商场建立数据驱动战略所需要的。b8ta 出售的软件类型与 Placer.ai 所说的商场为适应新一代需求所需的软件类型不谋而合。Placer.ai 在其 2021 年 "商场深度调查"报告中这样概括商场适应数字时代的需求:

大型商场容纳的租户不是几十家,而是上百家,因此连接所有不同零售商的库存数据库需要先进的技术资源。衡量这样一个平台的成功与否则更具挑战性,需要能够同步在线和离线数据的工具。因此,尽管已经有一些例外情况,但目前大多数商场仍然缺乏这种综合性在线应用程序或电子商务渠道。

b8ta 的衰落部分是由于缺乏电子商务销售。大流行导致人流量减少,甚至在商店停业重新开张后也能感受到这种影响,一些商店在重新开张后人流量下降了 98%。这份零售接触点报告描绘了一幅严峻的图景:

据媒体报道,即使在重新开业后,这些商店的经营状况也不尽相同;据《纽约时报》报道,b8ta 在休斯顿的分店在大流行前的一个典型周末平均有 1,000 名顾客,但在 2020 年 5 月的第一个周末,顾客人数下降到 40 人。 协议.奥斯汀店的客流量同样下降了 98%。

对于大多数零售商来说,实体店可以间接推动电子商务销售。而在 b8ta,门店直接负责在线零售销售。在大流行病初期的几个月里,由于门店关闭,b8ta 没有电子商务先行的机会可以依靠。然后,该零售商很可能要忍受无数影响其产品选择和供应的供应链问题。总之,市场力量、消费者行为变化和供应链偏好都导致了公司运营的终结。

但是,为了躲避最近的公告,b8ta 不得不尝试一种转机:把商店变成视频工作室,进行现场直播。这其中还有另一个教训。大流行时代的主流技术可能是一种资产,但不是救生艇。诺比告诉《现代零售业》,现场直播销售未能弥补 b8ta 面临的差距,最终导致一位房东决定不就其租约进行谈判:

"诺比说:"我们在整个科威德都很有创意。但他最后说他总结道:"可能钉在棺材上的钉子是房东的整体待遇,以及他们是否觉得你的公司很重要。我们用尽了所有办法,这是必须要做的事情"。

b8ta 的倒闭并不是简单的概念失败,而是市场力量吞噬零售业未来的结果。未来的迭代者最好注意:不要把所有精力都放在一个渠道上,即使是你正在重塑的渠道。该公司花了七年时间进行测试,而在此期间,整个行业经历了翻天覆地的变化。

作者:Web Smith | 编辑:Hilary Milnes,美术:Alex Remy 和 Christina Williams