第 290 号关于 DtC 品牌的可辩护性

Screen Shot 2018-10-09 at 8.19.20 AM

If you’ve seen a battle scene from a movie about knights, soldiers, and castles, you may understand the concept of an economic moat. If you watched an old war film lately, a moat is often depicted as a water-filled ditch. It typically helps to defend a fort, village, or castle. In that film, you may have seen projectiles fly toward the castle and cannons fire from atop, in return. Enemy combatants rush the castle only to encounter a deep and wide area of water, poison, hot tar, and sharp spears. As the castle faces fire on all sides, the offensive is often ineffective. The moat helped the castle defend its position. 

People don’t know what they want until you show it to them.

Steve Jobs

In traditional tech, there are moats all around us. Apple builds moats into many of their hardware devices. Your Macbook prefers its Safari browser (until you otherwise designate Chrome), Apple Car Play exclusively defaulted to Apple Maps until iOS 12, and your Airpods defaulted to Apple Music unless you specified Spotify. For physical goods, there are brand moats as well. The best example happens to be at Nike.

Nike works with youth leagues to outfit elite teams, providing young players (and their parents) incentives to purchase all of their wears from the brand. The sportswear manufacturing giant outfits the NFL, the NBA, and the vast majority of NCAA sports. When fans purchase licensed apparel, consumer psychology tips in favor of Nike.

Amazon Prime has become a funnel for the retailer’s private label brands and their high margin devices. Walmart has operated at such a low cost-basis, that their most loyal consumers have little to no market substitute. Shopify attract new merchants with little revenue and fosters them along their path to $20 million per year, introducing a suite of products to keep them from replatforming.

And then there’s Whole Foods Market, who – prior to acquisition – competed in a red ocean. They succeeded for a long time by building an economic moat around their brand and user experience. For decades, Whole Foods’ economic moat was a collection of subtle advantages: nicer fixtures, a wider assortment of organic foods, great lighting, and a knowledgeable floor staff. There was little to nothing technical about the retailer’s growth, but the collection of these advantages locked customers in. An economic moat can be built by more than a company’s technological advantages.

How do you compete against a true fanatic? You can only try to build the best possible moat and continuously attempt to widen it.

Warren Buffett

The internet didn’t destroy the moat, it changed the definition. The smaller the niche, the less the competition. For products in a small niche, there’s less of a need for brand defensibility. But for product manufacturers in a red ocean, defensibility is the difference between stalling out and taking flight. Yet, brand defensibility is often deprioritized. In some cases, brands will focus on customer acquisition (at all costs), often at the expense of building a lasting economic moats.

Old consumer economy. Initially, there were three influences to consider when launching a product in this new consumer economy: brand, product, distribution, the hive, and acquisition model. Prior to the rise of direct to consumer retail, a brand’s moat consisted of these:

  • brand: the impression made upon consumers. The perception created around a physical good mattered most. This impression helped brands remain top of mind between their visits to their shopping centers or the occasional television advertisement.
  • product: the quality of the goods. The value created by the manufacturer influenced brand perception, customer satisfaction, and even word of mouth influence.
  • old distribution: where it is sold. The better the product, the more likely that a consumer could find it anywhere. This signaled that there was consensus around the quality and durability of what is being sold.

With this model, a brand’s trajectory and defensibility was mostly predictable. This was pre-internet: before the rise of the internet and digitally native vertical brands. With the proliferation of direct to consumer brands, influences have changed.

New consumer economy. With the internet, any retailer can market, sell, and deliver physical goods. Brick and mortar distribution is no longer defensible against upstart brands. The web democratized the ability to build product-based brands. In the new consumer economy, a brand’s moat is not only its features, price, and availability. It’s a consideration of product experience, technical advantages, and brand evangelism.


If you don’t land the first and loyal 100, your brand is less likely to earn the early adopters who look like the first 100. Without early adopters, you will not achieve the attention of the masses. The first 100 are the foundation. Without the support of the 100, the masses will not adopt. Made famous by Simon Sinek, heed the diffusion of innovation theory: the early majority will not try something until someone else tries it first. Brands are judged by this early majority.

No. 277: The Power of the 100


In the new brand economy, maintaining defensibility has become more complicated. In physical retailers, traditional luxury brands know their buyers’ preferences. Today, the savviest DNVBs are in direct contact with many consumers by way of customer service, email, and private messaging. They are using these channels, pricing strategies, branding to influence outcomes. Brands have optimized around, beautiful packaging (see: Lumi) fast shipping (See: ShipBob), and easy returns (See: Loop). And with these technological and brand advantages, they are siphoning the loyalty away from incumbent brands like Gillette, who are still operating under the rules of the old consumer economy.

Here are the revised influences:

  • brand: the reputation of the product manufacturer. The collective sentiment of the brand’s consumers.
  • product: the value created by the product. But also, the value created by the ease of purchase, the fulfillment process, and the customer follow-up  upon purchase.
  • new distribution: how is it sold? The better the product, the more likely that a consumer has a 1:1 relationship with the brand.
  • acquisition model: how does the brand achieve meaningful foot traffic? And what is the right combination of paid and organic growth? Is organic growth sustainable?
  • the hive: who is the product’s first 100? Has the brand experienced organic growth on the foundation of this digital community? Will the “100” defend the brand when skeptics criticize it?

A practical example of competition

In this recent post by Harry’s, their team addresses Gillette head on:

In the face of competition from companies like Harry’s, Gillette has lowered its prices for certain razor models. Yet, Harry’s may still be the best value if you’re looking for a 5-blade razor with a flexible head, lubrication strip, and trimmer blade—the key features many guys consider to be most important for a great shave.

How long have you been overpaying for your razors?

At Target stores, Harry’s maintains the majority of the mindshare in the men’s skincare aisles. Often in spite of Gillette’s legacy of long-term performance. And today, Procter & Gamble disclosed that the company is downsizing it’s valuable Gillette real estate in Massachusetts. Presumably, the P&G label is preparing to more efficiently compete with online-first brands that are eating into their market share.

A moat for DtC brands is the competitive advantage earned by focusing on brand, product, distribution, acquisition, and the hive – the brand’s most visible customers and product activations. This competitive advantage fuels incremental growth in established industries.

I’ve compiled two distinct lists of the DNVBs that have emerged in industries that are highly competitive: luggage, skincare, supplements, digital media, and athleisure. These brands aren’t notable because of their lack of competition; rather, they are notable because they rise above tremendous competition. Paul Munford, founder of Lean Luxe, reports on direct-to-consumer brands. He made the following selections:

  1. Away
  2. Rapha
  3. Soylent
  4. Outlier
  5. Wone
  6. Bevel
  7. Hodinkee
  8. Monocle
  9. Casper
  10. Rxbar

And here is 2PM’s list (more at our DNVB Power List):

  1. Away  | revenue leader in the carry-on travel DNVB industry
  2. Casper | revenue leader in the DTC mattress space, distributorship through Target
  3. Harry’s | leader in the men’s shaving, effectively growing into other verticals.
  4. Chubbies | top performer in the men’s casual space
  5. Glossier | leader in makeup, a substantial amount of traffic driven organically
  6. Hodinkee | there isn’t a more credible community of watch journalists
  7. Four Sigmatic | the leader in alternative coffee sales
  8. Mizzen + Main |combines DtC commerce with a targeted physical retail presence
  9. Serena & Lily | leader in DTC furniture, organically driven by quarterly brochures
  10. Wone | redefined ultra-premium in athleisure by selling out of $320 leggings.

One similarity that our lists seem to share: brands’ focus on its customers. And not just traditional customer service but the incorporation of customer feedback in many of their decisions. Above and beyond price and product, a brand’s hive can influence its defensibility.

A common mistake made throughout the consumer economy is the belief that customers are won and lost on features and price – alone. It’s a product manufacturer’s responsibility to build 1:1 relationships with consumers who are power users. In our recent report on Nike’s physical retail efforts, we began with this:

我走进梅尔罗斯店时,觉得它根本不适合我。我不是千禧一代的奢侈品消费者。而这正是耐克所追求的。洛杉矶的零售店在美学和产品方面都非常符合该地区的特点。店里的每一平方英尺都是为 Instagram 打造的。一瞬间,我意识到,虽然我是千禧一代,但我不是耐克所追求的千禧一代。这家店就是为他们准备的。

第 289 期耐克与超本地化

A defensible product becomes consumer’s first choice. Building a community around this is very difficult but this is what separates defensible brands from the brands without it.

A common misconception is that a brand with a strong economic moat has no competition. Quite the opposite, brands with the strongest means of defensibility often have numerous competitors vying for increased sales and brand equity. What sets the one apart from the many? A focus on relationships, value, and retention – not acquisition, alone. The conversation begins when the purchase is made.

As more brands focus on DtC commerce, an economic moat does more than protect the product manufacturer from growing competition. Without an economic moat, existing customers may depart for alternative options based on price, merit, and availability. In this context for brands, defense can be the best offense.

New to 2PM? Read the latest subscriber curation here.

By Web Smith |About 2PM

Member Brief: The Grocery Report

Screen Shot 2018-10-05 at 3.21.20 PM

When you think of online retail, grocery is not one of the first industries that come to mind. That was until Instacart launched in 2012. Since then, grocery fulfillment has become the wild west of sorts, a new frontier with the retailers of old adopting new strategies to achieve parity with companies like Amazon.

本会员简报专为以下人士设计 执行委员为了方便加入,您可以点击下面的链接,获取数百份报告、我们的 DTC 权力清单和其他工具,帮助您做出高水平的决策。

在此加入

第 289 期耐克与超本地化

耐克热泵

我走进梅尔罗斯店时,觉得它根本不适合我。我不是千禧一代的奢侈品消费者。而这正是耐克所追求的。洛杉矶的零售店在美学和产品方面都非常符合该地区的特点。店里的每一平方英尺都是为 Instagram 打造的。一瞬间,我意识到,虽然我是千禧一代,但我不是耐克所追求的千禧一代。这家店就是为他们准备的。

今年 7 月,耐克在洛杉矶梅尔罗斯(Melrose)地区开设了首家 "Live "零售概念店。 该品牌与亚马逊和诺德斯特龙一样,利用消费者数据为店内产品和营销决策提供信息。Nike by Melrose零售店位于洛杉矶西好莱坞的梅尔罗斯大道 8552 号,占地 4557 平方英尺。该店面位于一个时尚的零售开发区内,该地区有月租金 6000 美元的公寓和显赫的独栋别墅,这进一步肯定了耐克的奢侈品定位。诺德斯特龙百货公司(Nordstrom)的本地概念店就在路边。

耐克正通过吸引高利润消费者向奢侈品领域进军。


2PM 数据

屏幕截图 2018-10-01 at 11.42.54 AM
耐克计划在 2019 年重视线下门店,同时不再强调奥特莱斯零售 - on
屏幕截图 2018-10-01 at 11.44.55 AM
随着耐克转向利润率更高的 DTC 模式,收入会下降,而利润率会上升。
屏幕截图 2018-10-01 at 11.40.51 AM.png
前卡佩尼克与后卡佩尼克:耐克的营销将强调高利润的千禧一代

耐克公司通过启动千禧一代驱动的体验式零售,利用其可观的电子商务流量来引导他们的商品决策。对千禧一代来说,参与品牌开发是最重要的事情。热情的消费者参与的过程越多,他们就会对结果越感兴趣。

最佳客户是您希望进行投资的地方。他们对品牌有更强的亲和力,购买量比非客户大,而且获取非客户的成本很高。

NPD 的马特-鲍威尔

实体零售的超本地化考虑到了消费者体验的以下变量:

  1. 直接面向消费者的商务数据
  2. 耐克网站最畅销产品
  3. Nike Plus 会员参与
  4. 实际地点 3-5 英里范围内的买方人口
  5. 相邻地块的家庭收入中位数
  6. 性别和健身数据(Nike Plus)

Nike by Melrose针对不同地区提供不同的款式,这并不具有革命性。像迪克体育用品公司(Dick's Sporting Goods)这样的商店针对当地市场推出团队商品,或针对郊区高级人群推出运动装备,并不鲜见。但这些风格将完全取决于:该地区的购买模式、应用使用情况和参与度。这就意味着,梅尔罗斯的耐克可能会忽略更广泛的趋势(全国性和全市性的),而代之以该街区品牌拥护者喜欢的产品。

零售市场显然正在发生巨变,但这并不是零售业的末日。在我们看来,这是一场复兴--由经济、竞争和消费者选择的巨大变化所驱动,而这一切都离不开指数级技术进步的推动。

零售业大分叉[.pdf],德勤著

这就是耐克的魅力所在。耐克和亚马逊 Go 以及其他在线到离线领域的公司一样,都在努力消除摩擦。在店内,顾客可以使用耐克公司的应用程序扫描产品,了解相关信息。通过该应用程序,会员还可以在路边取货,并在前往商店的途中使用手机锁定的储物柜存放可能购买的商品。耐克公司通过迎合顾客的需求,为高购买概率的商品备货,从而利用数据降低在线和店内的顾客获取成本(CAC)。

耐克的商店正在挑战我们今天对电子商务看法的极限。在某种程度上,这家商店强化了我们对电子商务和数字媒体的依赖。耐克直销店总经理凯茜-斯帕克斯(Cathy Sparks)正在跟踪会员参与度和参与度等关键绩效指标,以衡量直销店的成功与否。下一步,耐克将在美国和欧洲扩大 "Live "商店的规模。该鞋类品牌的首要任务是什么?消费者忠诚度。

补充阅读:DNVB 能否实现现代奢华?

By Web Smith |About 2PM