第 318 号垂直品牌

VB

Michael Rubin is always in the news. The founder and executive chairman of Fanatics is often courtside as the co-owner of the Philadelphia 76ers, placing bids for NFL teams, palling around with friend and rapper Robert “Meek Mills” Williams, or advocating for a cleaner justice system. But it all seems like a distraction; he’s quietly building a sports licensing monopoly. Behind the scenes, Kynetic is owned and operated by Rubin. It’s a fascinating company with a rich history; Rubin’s understanding of the internet’s marketing levers has helped Fanatics capture lightning in a bottle.

Shopping cart + Insatiable Demand + Product Exclusivity = Lightning

The parent company of Fanatics has built one of the more innovative and fundamentally-sound, online retailers in all of commerce. Valued at $4.5 billion, the private retailer is equal parts: marketplace, licensed manufacturer, and digitally-native brand. Rubin’s brand has amassed extraordinary power as a vertical retailer in its relatively short birth and rebirth. To better understand its evolution, review a corporate history that spans the majority of the online retail era. One can argue that Fanatics grew the first digitally native vertical brand.

vCommerce brands are born online. They cut out the middle by selling directly to consumer, maintaining 1:1 relationships with consumers. These brands manufacture, market, sell, and fulfill the products. They own the entire consumer journey.

The history of Fanatics is a complicated one. In 1991, Rubin founded KSR Sports, a sporting goods and footwear retailer. The company grew to $50 million in annual sales by 1995 but with razor thin margins. This pushed Rubin towards a v-commerce model, acquiring Apex One in 1996 and merging with Ryka in 1997 to form Global Sports Inc Commerce (GSI Commerce).

This reorganization moved Rubin and his team a bit closer to the licensed merchandising operation that we see today. But this period was more symbolic of another part of Fanatics DNA: logistics excellence. The company went on to move $100 million in GMV in 1999. Just two years later, GSI inked a deal with Dick’s Sporting Goods, Sports Authority, and Gart sports to provide their eCommerce solutions at scale. In a move that may have influenced Amazon’s early partnership with Toys “R” Us. From a 2017 Business Insider article:

Toys “R” Us may have set itself back when it signed a 10-year contract to be the exclusive vendor of toys on Amazon in 2000. Amazon began to allow other toy vendors to sell on its site in spite of the deal, and Toys “R” Us sued Amazon to end the agreement in 2004. As a result, Toys “R” Us missed the opportunity to develop its own e-commerce presence early on.

By 2002, GSI Commerce powered NASCAR’s first online store. The MLB, NHL, and NFL each followed suit by 2006. In a bit of irony, later that year – Toys “R” Us hired GSI to build its first native eCommerce experience after their failed Amazon experiment. After the NBA agreed in 2007, GSI became the first online retailer to partner with all major North American sports leagues.

To develop a brand around its professional sports focus, Rubin acquired the “Football Fanatics” name and operation in 2011.  Football Fanatics was founded by Alan and Mitch Trager as a brick and mortar retailer in Suburban Jacksonville in 1995. After the brothers had trouble scaling beyond that point, Rubin swooped in to acquire it for $171 million and $101 million in GSI stock. By this time, GSI was managing 2.5 million square feet of fulfillment space. eBay would go on to acquire GSI Commerce for $2.4 billion in 2012.

Shortly thereafter, Rubin purchased the rights to Fanatics from eBay. In full – Rubin retained the rights to Fanatics, ShopRunner, and Rue La La: incorporating Kynetic as the parent company to the three online retail properties. Within one year, Andreessen Horowitz and Insight Ventures valued Fanatics at $1.5 billion, investing $150 million into the company. Fanatics would go on to raise capital from Alibaba Group, the Softbank Vision Fund, and Silver lake Partners. It shouldn’t surprise that Fanatics is considered one of the top three in sports apparel licensing. So in that Toys “R” Us / Amazon moment, Dicks Sporting Goods is now a chief competitor and Sports Authority is done for good.

What’s more impressive than the company’s trajectory is how Rubin continues to find innovative ways to reach new, top funnel customers.

Fanatics and Rubin’s Systemized growth

Just one of the latest partnership innovations,  it was announced that a resurgent Kohl’s signed a long-term deal with Fanatics to distribute the sporting goods company’s licensed products through Kohl’s native channels. While Kohl’s stock price is not necessarily reflecting Kohl’s long-term investments, the department store is having its own renaissance. The brick and mortar retailer recently signed a deal with Amazon to handle service all returns, a play to cozy up with the eCommerce titan while improving a key performance indicator: increased foot traffic.

Later this fall, Kohl’s will amplify hundreds of thousands of Fanatics’ SKUs through its native channels. As such, Fanatics will gain access to a new, primed audience. In return, Kohl’s can earn third-party revenue without holding inventory. It is the perfect corporate marriage: Kohls.com averages 40+ million visits per month, a number that dwarfs Fanatics.com’s 5.2 million monthly visitors.

860 respondents; 18 years and older who purchased sport clothes in the past 12 months | Source: Statista

Earlier this year, Fanatics began selling merchandise on Walmart.com in a similar deal. That one supplied Walmart with coveted access to licensed apparel. In exchange, Fanatics’ products are in front of an estimated 305 million estimated monthly visitors. Unlike the Kohl’s agreement, Fanatics has a branded store on the Walmart site. This model resembles the company’s agreement with JCP, the middle-market retailer has begun to regroup by partnering with relevant brands like Fanatics.

A savvy move by CEO Doug Mack; these merchandising agreements are subtle signals to customers that Fanatics is a low-substitution brand. Mass-market retailers can barely compete in costly, licensed merchandising without a Fanatics co-sign. And in an effort to expand internationally, Fanatics also partnered with Coupang – South Korea’ largest online retail marketplace to launch a store within a store on the platform. This effort goes live this summer.

Consolidate and Capture

Rubin’s team built an extraordinary commerce play and retail brand atop key partnerships. This stack has helped Fanatics secure the rights to run the following stores:

  • The National Football League | NFLShop.com
  • The National Basketball League | NBAShop.com
  • Major League Baseball | MLBShop.com
  • NASCAR | NASCARShop.com
  • Major League Soccer | MLSStore.com

Meanwhile, the list of merchandising acquisitions haven’t slowed for Kynetic. In 2012, it acquired one of its main rivals, Fansedge; in 2017, it bought Majestic and Lids, the brick and mortar hat retailer.

With the exception of Kohl’s agreement (one that was surely influenced by Amazon’s counsel), Fanatics has succeeded in maintaining its branding across its growing portfolio of retail partners. This has helped them maintain direct relationships with consumers. Fanatics built a competitive advantage where there was none. While far from the traditional DNVB, it’s become one of the most successful digitally native brands on the market by protecting intellectual property, achieving manufacturing superiority, and emphasizing industry-leading fulfillment operations.

Rubin and Fanatics found a way to modernize a commodity product; Fanatics is now the premier retailer for sports apparel. And it has a growing legion of fans who see what Rubin envisioned a long time ago. To own the merchandising market: you need airtight contracts, a great consumer experience, brand equity. Most importantly, you need strong, organic demand to offset steep licensing fees. This lack of organic demand has served as a death sentence for smaller licensing retailers; there’s little margin available for traditional CAC. More than ever, consumers see a team name on the front of a shirt, a player’s name on the back, a league patch on the sleeve, and a brand label that says “Fanatics.”

Michael Rubin’s decades-long eCommerce evolution may not have the typical arc of DNVBs. But Fanatics shares digitally-native DNA and there is a tremendous amount to learn from an operation that maintains growth while paying for less than 9% of its traffic. Modern brands should license a page from the Fanatics playbook.

Read the No. 318 curation here.

报告人:Web Smith |大约 2PM

Member Data: Retail Media

Note:  this report has been updated with a full version of the top reporter index. The TRI will be updated as a separate database.

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第 317 期:DTC 游戏手册是个陷阱

dtcplaybooktrap.jpg

哈利公司(Harry's)最近以 13.7 亿美元的价格退出,取得了可观的成果。这家男士美容公司在某种程度上为 DNVB 的领导者敲响了警钟。是的,Harry's 公司销售的是一种简单的产品,但它在退出的过程中也打破了 DTC 的游戏规则。该公司编写并遵循了自己的游戏规则,为什么更多的数字原住民不这样做呢?据报道,哈利公司的销售额中只有 20% 来自直接面向消费者的收入。哈利公司的一切发展都违背了直接面向消费者时代的假定操作指南。

是的,Target 和 J. Crew 占 Harry's 整体销售额的近 80%。但这并不是 Harry's 有别于其他数字原住民的唯一原因。据报道,Harry's 是一家运营良好的企业:物流运作完美无瑕,据说公司盈利颇丰,而且他们基本上已经根据 DTC 时代的要求重新调整了生产流程。简而言之,安迪-卡茨-梅菲尔德(Andy Katz-Mayfield)和杰夫-雷德(Jeff Raider)是非凡的领导者。

哈利公司在六年时间里取得了巨大的成就。这家剃须刀制造商是早期的全渠道先驱:与 Target 和 J. Crew 的合作对其随后在主流市场取得成功至关重要。与Uncrate等数字出版商的合作提醒消费者,Harry's 是一个高大上的品牌,比竞争对手更胜一筹。Harry's 是最早推出弹出式活动的品牌之一。这些决定都与当时的传统观念背道而驰。


摘自 2014 年 CNBC 采访:华比帕克挑战吉列

雷德尔和卡茨-梅菲尔德认为,哈利公司发展的关键在于这种垂直整合,也就是他们所说的 v-commerce。简单地说,公司现在拥有从研发到制造再到直接销售给消费者的整个过程。"卡茨-梅菲尔德说:"这创造了一个良性循环,让客户真正满意,然后他们成为我们最好的拥护者。


当哈利公司收购了其生产合作伙伴后,该公司成为 DTC 时代为数不多的真正垂直品牌之一。这也是对立的。但是,这使他们能够更快地迭代核心产品,并简化护肤品、肥皂和剃须添加剂等采购产品的迭代。结果,Target 的货架开始反映出 Harry's 不仅是一个产品品牌,更是一个品类的领导者。这样,哈利公司开始以一种不对称的方式挑战吉列,成为首批真正的 DTC 类别品牌之一。通过在其他垂直产品领域设计有吸引力的产品,哈利公司获得了优势。这一优势帮助他们攫取了整个剃须刀市场超过 2.4% 的份额。简而言之,哈利公司不仅擅长营销和设计,他们还颠覆了自己的行业。

我看跌。这很难,只有颠覆者才能生存。

匿名创始人

对直接面向消费者的网络零售时代持怀疑态度并不新鲜。大橡树风险投资公司(Great Oaks Ventures)的普通合伙人亨利-麦克纳马拉(Henry McNamara)最近在推特上写道

亨利-麦克纳马拉在 Twitter 上

DNVB 估值超过 10 亿美元及融资 👓Warby 17.5 亿美元- 2.9 亿美元融资 (6x) 👟Allbirds 14 亿美元- 7,700 万美元融资 (18x) 🪒Harry's 13.7 亿美元- 4.61 亿美元融资 (3x)* 💄Glossier 1.2B- 筹资 1.87 亿美元 (6.5x) 🛏️Casper $1.1B- 筹资 3.39 亿美元 (3.5x) 🪒Dollar Shave $1B- 筹资 1.63 亿美元 (6x)* 🧔Hims $1B- 筹资 1.97 亿美元 (5x)

他后来更正了关于 Harry's 公司的数字(已售出 3.75 亿美元的股权),但重点依然存在。投资数字原住民值得吗?值得。但前提是该品牌有能力颠覆之前的增长策略和品牌定位。Dollar Shave Club 和 Harry's 是 DTC 时代最著名的两个退出案例,它们都找到了获取客户并向其销售不断增长的产品目录的方法。这两家公司的估值都在融资额的 4-6 倍之间。这些公司找到了创新的营销、分销和增长方式。反过来,它们通过创新赢得了市场份额,牺牲了现有企业和其他挑战者的利益。

DTC 的游戏规则是一个陷阱

不言而喻,我对DNVB整体持悲观态度。从整体上看,该行业倾向于依赖有系统和明确计划的左脑经营者。但是,我看好挑战者品牌,他们已经意识到,取胜往往是改写游戏规则的结果。对于那些希望发展到(有效的)临界质量甚至退出市场的品牌来说,DTC 的游戏规则是一个陷阱。从零到一的过程并非以商学院的理论为支撑。品牌无法仅通过分析昨天的LTV:CAC比率来预测明天的生存能力。但DNVB的增长也不是一门艺术。数字原生品牌不仅要有漂亮的设计和精明的文案。众所周知,DTC的玩法每次都必须重写。如果编写 DTC 游戏手册,可以归结为以下几点:

没有战术手册。DNVB的发展必须是灵活机动的。品牌必须在没有机会的地方寻找机会。它们必须寻求做尚未做过的事情。

因此,是的,我看跌当今的许多 DNVB。这些品牌只是在沿袭之前品牌的发展道路,我认为这对它们的发展是弊大于利。它们通往早期阶段里程碑的道路通常都是未经证实的趣闻轶事,而这些趣闻轶事都是由可能从未售出过实体产品的投资者撰写的。

最近,Ryan Caldbeck就这一话题发表了一篇文章,Circle Up 的创始人兼首席执行官也表达了类似的怀疑,他的观点如下:

    • 我不太相信 DTC 会扼杀很多现有企业。如果我们看看百事可乐、联合利华等公司的份额损失,其中大部分并不是因为 DTC,而是因为产品/品牌满足了当今消费者碎片化的独特需求。
    • 我对 DTC 初创公司是否已经掌握了网络营销深表怀疑。几乎所有这些公司都在以 CPG 行业前所未有的速度烧钱(大部分用于市场营销)。这是否意味着他们擅长营销,或者只是他们说服了风险资本家给他们钱?
    • 问题可能是:他们能持续创新吗?我并没有看到很多初创公司推出过多的产品。大多数 DTC 公司并没有把 DTC 用在我认为它最擅长的地方,即产品开发的迭代上。

你应该看跌

在最近的一份 "会员简报 "中,我写道:"充满活力的品牌不仅能使产品获得成功,还能使品类获得成功。当以一种产品而闻名的品牌进入其他竞争者的品类时,那些拥有最多品牌资产和营销技巧的公司似乎最有能力实现从产品公司到品类品牌的飞跃。"[1] 但品牌资产只是其中的一个组成部分;哈里公司作为一家独立公司的六年来,其运营优势和全渠道技巧已经得到了充分展示。这应该给年轻的公司一个启示:要实现退出,需要的不仅仅是一个掩盖运营混乱的精美外衣(情况往往如此)。

只要 DTC 品牌试图效仿前人的做法,你也应该对这个行业持怀疑态度。许多投资者似乎都在寻找一本 DTC 指南来交给他们的投资组合公司。好像在说:"这就是怎么做的。现在执行游戏计划!"但很可能永远不会是这样。当数字新贵开始在传统零售业的领地上竞争时,传统品牌应该起到提醒作用。它们拥有通往临界质量的独特道路,很少有品牌遇到 DTC 时代所寻求的可预测性。

DNVB 应该回顾 DTC 时代的少量成功案例,而不是根据少量数据点来确定投机性的最佳实践。独角兽的诞生屈指可数,退出的更是凤毛麟角。那些退出的独角兽企业往往是以息税折旧摊销前利润(EBITDA)为驱动力的安静品牌,代表着 "可扩展的利润"。 Schmidt's NaturalsNative Deodorant 就是很好的例子。这些零售商通过顺势而为、保持灵活性、促进执行自主权以及超前思考,在市场上赢得了一席之地。这应该是早期创始人唯一需要的指导。

点击这里阅读第 317 期策划。

By Web Smith |About 2PM

编者注Edgewell于 2020 年 2 月退出了对 Harry's 公司的收购,这是在该消息发布约八个月之后。