Memo: Historic Sanctions

We are accustomed to stories of wartime sabotage. Bridges are blown, airfields are destroyed, and transport trucks incapacitated. But those were acts by armed forces. What we are witnessing now is the disruption of trade instigated by corporate boardrooms, not military war rooms. It’s beginning to have an effect.

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine will be remembered as a war of corporate intervention at a level not seen in previous wars. One by one, corporations are taking sides before many nations are. It’s divided the retail community, for one. The Chief Executive Officer of Uniqlo, Tadashi Yanai was recently quoted in Nikkei:

Clothing is a necessity of life. The people of Russia have the same right to live as we do.

The company’s 50 stores will continue to operate in Russia. Uniqlo is one of the last retail corporations to voice support for its commerce business in the country that is the aggressor in this war. Yanai’s stance is in the minority. Some of the world’s biggest brands have exited or suspended operations in Russia, putting an end to decades of post-USSR investment into the region, at least for now.

Since Russian troops invaded Ukraine on February 24, western companies have begun pulling out of Russia in a sign of anti-war sentiment and support for Ukraine. The motion spans across industries, with airlines, automobiles, tech giants, mass and luxury retailers, energy companies, consulting firms, logistics and shipping operators, financial firms, and media companies all halting operations in Russia.

Notable companies include Nike, which has closed stores and stopped eCommerce orders in Russia. Apple has stopped selling its products and ceased all exports to Russian sales channels. Google suspended advertising. H&M has also paused operations in the country.

And despite exemptions for luxury goods, higher-end fashion retailers have followed their peers with their own private sanctions against the country. Luxury conglomerates LVMH, Kering and Richemont plus Chanel, Hermès and Prada have closed stores and stopped shipments into Russia, cutting off wealthy shoppers’ spending. A recent report in the Guardian explained the ripple effect:

On Friday LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton, owner of brands including Christian Dior, Givenchy and Bulgari, said it was shuttering its 124 boutiques in Russia from Sunday, while Kering, which owns Gucci and Saint Laurent, confirmed it would close its two shops in the country.

The private sanctions have extended to fintech. Visa, Mastercard and PayPal have blocked Russian banks from using their systems, while Apple Pay and Google Pay have also been blocked. In the entertainment industry, you’ll find more of the same. Disney has suspended movie releases in the country.

In the case of social media platforms, the Russian government made the first move in banning Meta platforms, YouTube and Twitter; TikTok then acted to stop streaming in the country in response to Russia’s fake news law enacted to control media narratives.

Ceasing business in Russia has been framed by a number of companies as an act of safety for employees and a response to a complex situation. Some companies including Nike have said they will keep paying employees’ salaries while businesses are closed. The goal is to put pressure on Vladimir Putin to put an end to his aggression towards a sovereign country. While the U.S. military industrial complex has been largely quiet, retailers and technology companies have seemingly taken to a different kind of war, amplifying the potential of long-term financial turmoil directly in response to the ongoing invasion. In this way, Russian citizens and millions of workers are the collateral damage. For western companies, the risk is hurting their own share prices. But the public pressure to signal support for Ukraine is a factor.

The war is playing out on social media in an unprecedented way, making it more difficult for businesses to carry on as usual. From TechCrunch, regarding TikTok’s decision to pull out of Russia:

​​TikTok has been a crucial platform of the war. The New Yorker called the conflict in Ukraine “the world’s first TikTok war” because of how Ukrainians have used the app to document the situation on the ground.

Not only are companies pulling out of Russia, they’re also sending support to Ukraine. Millions of dollars have been donated by corporations to UNICEF relief efforts. Elon Musk sent Starlink satellites to Ukraine to enable high-speed internet connections. And private citizens have departed the country to work along the border of Poland to aid refugees.

The decisions from major companies to pause operations in Russia will serve as a one-two punch when combined with western sanctions against Russia. Whether or not the combined efforts will hit Russia’s economy hard enough to have a material impact on the war remains to be seen, but what’s clear is just how interlaced politics and private corporations are today. In the internet’s war, silence seems to be an act of war for businesses. There has never been this type of galvanization around a cause. Once considered an expansion opportunity to countless western corporations, Russia is now the most sanctioned country on earth.

Let’s just hope that closed doors accomplish what ground troops and and weaponry have long been used for – winning wars.

Por Web Smith | Editado por Hilary Milnes com arte de Alex Remy e Christina Williams

Memo: BigCommerce and Bolt Unite

There is a 1988 advertisement by Philip Morris that describes the enriched flavor of a brand of cigarettes. It called it a solution with Merit. It begins: “If you can’t join ’em, beat ’em.”

Bolt’s former CEO Ryan Breslow felt slighted by Shopify executives; he’s taken it personally. Now, what appeared to be just a fiery Twitter thread looks more like a strategy backed by Bolt’s board. If you can’t join Shopify in owning the market, beat them by joining its de facto rival. BigCommerce is a platform with distinct philosophical differences. For Bolt, an enemy of an enemy is a friend.

Days after we wrote about Bolt’s bold challenge to Shopify, the checkout company took a further step in taking on the eCommerce leader. Shopify rival BigCommerce and Bolt are partnering to bring Bolt’s one-click checkout to BigCommerce’s merchants.

The move contends with Shopify’s native approach to checkout options. With Shopify, platforms like Bolt and Fast have been excluded from checkout workflows. Shopify is on record as being opposed to alternative checkout options, making Shop Pay the ubiquitous checkout provider. Both BigCommerce and Shopify are approaching eCommerce in different ways: Shopify is a quasi-closed ecosystem and BigCommerce is open-source. Shopify allows non-merchants to use Shop Pay, spreading a core technology outside of its own walls. It’s a way to make Shopify more ubiquitous, even when it’s not the eCommerce provider. BigCommerce lets its merchants choose its own tech providers, meaning its platform employs APIs and external SaaS solutions in a way that Shopify doesn’t.

Bolt immediately jumping into a partnership with BigCommerce is part of its strategy to undermine Shopify, both institutionally and as a brand known for “arming the rebels.” Shopify’s villain is Amazon. With this move, BigCommerce and Bolt position Shopify in the same way. From Monday’s 2PM memo:

It may not work but it’s a gutsy strategy. Bolt is trying to out-rebel the armory of the rebels. The call to action is clear: “Switch to Bolt.” In another fiery thread by Bolt founder Ryan Breslow, he began: Shopify is eating their ecosystem.

Transitioning from a one-click checkout platform to a fully-fledged eCommerce solutions provider is not something that happens overnight; this is why the BigCommerce partnership is relevant. The two align in that they have a common competitor they want to overtake, but there’s also a potential future where Bolt acquires BigCommerce or vice versa. Currently, BigCommerce is worth one-ninth in the public market what Bolt is worth in the private market. See this insight from Business Insider’s report on Bolt and BigCommerce’s partnership:

BigCommerce, for its part, isn’t quite so overt about the competition, with [chief commercial officer Russel] Klein referring to Shopify as “the company whose name shall not be uttered” in an interview with Insider.

As we wrote on Monday, Bolt is rising up to fill the spot Shopify once held as the underdog, the challenger to Big Retail, the platform for the people. In the same way Shopify took on Amazon, one is not likely to actually defeat the other, but with enough differentiation, room will be made in the ecosystem for both. Then, another company will rise up to take on Bolt when its britches get too big for its market cap.

Where BigCommerce fits in is more interesting. Can Bolt arm the rebels in the same way Shopify did by aligning itself with a mainstream competitor? It’s an approach likely born of necessity. Bolt has a big valuation to meet. It doesn’t have time to slowly build a full response to Shopify. BigCommerce has growing revenue but widening losses. With Bolt as a marketing and sales partner, I can see how management at BigCommerce can envision the checkout solution as meaningful value-add beyond the OpenSaaS philosophy that both share. Bolt is excelling in sales and marketing in ways that BigCommerce has not.

The company posted revenue of $64.9 million in Q4 2021, beating analysts’ expectations of $62 million. For the year, the company reported a loss of $76.7 million. Revenue was reported as $219.9 million. And the bet is that together, Shop Pay will be overtaken as the premier checkout solution. This quote by Bolt’s Chief Business Officer was notable:

By having Bolt be that one agnostic player that’s creating this shopper network that works with all payment providers and all e-commerce platforms, it will grow bigger. It will eclipse Shop Pay.

Breslow sees Bolt as the third-generation of commerce enablers, a position shared by a number of headless competitors including its rival Fast. BigCommerce is in position to benefit from Bolt’s gutsy marketing strategy, that is unless Shopify finds a way to counter the partnership first. In the meantime, Bolt hopes to prove that it is the ultimate solution with merit.

Por Web Smith | Editado por Hilary Milnes com arte de Alex Remy

Update: This is something that I learned today. At the time of publishing this, BigCommerce employs over 100 in the Ukrainian city of Kyiv. Men between the age of 18 and 60 have been ordered to remain in the country. The banking system has been disrupted so funds have been difficult to ascertain for many of the employs. CEO Brent Bellm is in an unenviable position, Ukraine is an eCommerce-rich country with top engineers and nearly 10% of the company’s workforce is located within the wartorn country.

Resumo do membro: b8ta Testado

O encerramento das operações da b8ta foi uma perda para a comunidade de varejo, encerrando um esforço valente para mudar um setor de varejo que está evoluindo mais rápido do que nunca. De certa forma, a b8ta tentou recriar a sensação do Soho ou da área de South Congress de Austin em uma única loja. No Neighborhood of Goods de 2018, eu expliquei:

Mas quando você sai dos caminhos de tijolos das ruas do Soho, é improvável que encontre outro lugar igual. Não na recente colaboração da Macy's no Facebook, ou nas lojas b8ta, Four Post ou até mesmo na Neighborhood Goods. Há deficiências dignas de nota em cada uma delas: na maioria dos produtos encontrados na b8ta e na Neighborhood Goods, os consumidores não podem sair da loja com o produto que você comprou.

A b8ta é a mais recente vítima de um setor de varejo que está lidando com as consequências de uma pandemia. O CEO Vibhu Norby disse que a decisão de fechar sua empresa se deveu, em última análise, a negociações fracassadas com os proprietários. Mas não foi apenas a pandemia que forçou a b8ta a fechar suas portas nos EUA em 18 de fevereiro, o que foi anunciado hoje em seu site. Para as marcas digitalmente nativas, o setor de varejo físico evoluiu para além da competência principal do varejista. 

O varejista foi projetado para ser um destino para os consumidores que procuram experimentar marcas da nova era e digitalmente nativas que desejam exposição sem abrir experiências de compras próprias.

A b8ta foi lançada em 2015 como uma loja que servia principalmente para testar produtos de tecnologia de consumo, como alto-falantes e bicicletas ergométricas. Mas a visão da empresa era repensar a relação entre atacado e marca, agindo não apenas como uma loja, mas como um provedor de "varejo como serviço". Nesse sentido, ela fez uma promessa maior para as marcas que vendiam em suas lojas. As marcas pagavam uma taxa à b8ta para aparecer em suas prateleiras e também para ter acesso ao seu software, que fornecia insights sobre a análise do comportamento do cliente, como tráfego de pedestres e tempo gasto em demonstrações. Durante o auge do varejo experimental, que coincidiu com a mudança das marcas diretas ao consumidor para as lojas físicas, a b8ta se mostrou uma parceira promissora. Seu modelo era amigável para novas marcas sem grandes pegadas de loja que queriam testar a recepção do cliente pessoalmente. Ele também atendia aos clientes que gostavam de experimentar antes de comprar e queriam uma seleção selecionada de novos produtos em um só lugar.

Desde 2015, houve uma série de esforços semelhantes por parte de grupos proprietários de shopping centers: A Unibail-Rodamco-Westfield lançou pop-ups em vários shoppings da Westfield; a Macerich tinha projetos para operações semelhantes; a Brookfield também tinha o seu. A b8ta também foi um trunfo para shoppings e lojas de departamentos que buscavam maneiras de gerar novo tráfego de pessoas. A Macy's liderou um investimento na b8ta e usou sua tecnologia em seu conceito Market @ Macy's. À medida que muitas marcas começaram a investir em experiências omnicanal, o varejo experimental passou a ser terceirizado. Elas queriam sua própria presença nos shoppings, queriam ter estoque disponível e um local para processar devoluções.

No entanto, o software da empresa é exatamente o que muitos shoppings precisam para criar estratégias orientadas por dados. O tipo de software que a b8ta estava vendendo está de acordo com o que a Placer.ai diz que os shoppings precisam para se adaptar a uma nova geração. Em seu relatório "Mall Deep Dive" de 2021, a Placer.ai resumiu a necessidade do shopping de se adaptar à era digital da seguinte forma:

Os grandes shoppings não acomodam dezenas, mas centenas de locatários, portanto, conectar os bancos de dados de inventário de todos os diferentes varejistas exige recursos tecnológicos avançados. Medir o sucesso dessa plataforma é ainda mais desafiador e requer ferramentas que possam sincronizar dados on-line e off-line. Como resultado, embora já existam algumas exceções, a maioria dos shoppings atualmente ainda não possui esse tipo de aplicativo on-line ou canal de comércio eletrônico abrangente.

A própria queda da b8ta foi, em parte, devido à falta de vendas de comércio eletrônico. Quando a pandemia sufocou o tráfego de pedestres - um efeito sentido mesmo depois que as lojas reabriram após os lockdowns - algumas lojas tiveram uma queda de até 98% no tráfego de pedestres após a reabertura das lojas. Esse relatório da Retail Touchpoints mostra um quadro sombrio:

As lojas nunca mais foram as mesmas, mesmo depois de reabertas, de acordo com relatos da mídia; a unidade da b8ta em Houston tinha uma média de 1.000 compradores em um fim de semana típico antes da pandemia, mas caiu para 40 clientes durante o primeiro fim de semana de maio de 2020, de acordo com o Protocolo. A loja de Austin registrou uma queda semelhante de 98% no tráfego de pedestres.

Na maioria dos varejistas, suas lojas físicas podem impulsionar indiretamente as vendas de comércio eletrônico. Já na b8ta, as lojas são diretamente responsáveis pelas vendas de varejo on-line. Não havia nenhuma oportunidade de comércio eletrônico em primeiro lugar com a qual a b8ta pudesse contar, pois as lojas estavam fechadas durante os primeiros meses da pandemia. Além disso, o varejista provavelmente enfrentou inúmeros problemas na cadeia de suprimentos que afetaram a seleção e a disponibilidade de seus produtos. Em suma, as forças do mercado, as mudanças de comportamento do consumidor e as preferências da cadeia de suprimentos contribuíram para o fim operacional da empresa.

Mas como uma última tentativa de evitar o anúncio recente, a b8ta teve que tentar uma reviravolta: transformar as lojas em estúdios de vídeo para transmissão ao vivo. Há outra lição nisso. As tecnologias da era pandêmica que se materializaram no mainstream podem ser um ativo, mas não um bote salva-vidas. As vendas por streaming ao vivo não conseguiram preencher a lacuna enfrentada pela b8ta, que acabou se resumindo à decisão de um proprietário de não negociar seu contrato de aluguel, disse Norby à Modern Retail:

"Fomos bastante criativos em toda a Covid", disse Norby. Mas ele concluiu: "provavelmente o prego no caixão foi o tratamento dado pelos proprietários em geral, e se eles sentiam ou não que sua empresa era importante. Esgotamos todas as opções, e isso era o que tinha que acontecer".

O fechamento da b8ta não é uma simples falha de conceito, mas sim um resultado das forças do mercado que consumiram um futuro do varejo que ainda está se delineando. As futuras iterações devem ser sábias e observar: não coloque todas as ações em um único canal, mesmo aquele que você está reinventando. A empresa passou sete anos em fase beta e, nesse meio tempo, o setor passou por grandes mudanças.

Por Web Smith | Editado por Hilary Milnes com arte de Alex Remy e Christina Williams