No. 272: Um caminho "Tier A" para o futuro

tierapathforward.jpg

A pior coisa que aconteceu ao shopping center americano foi o boom das empresas de luxo modernas que priorizam a Internet. E também é a melhor coisa que aconteceu com o shopping center americano.

Existem mais de 1.100 shopping centers nos Estados Unidos e aproximadamente 320 são classificados como Tier A. Temos um excesso de oferta de shopping centers, mas isso não significa que os shopping centers tradicionais e ancorados não tenham mais lugar no consumo. Nós diríamos que os shoppings de Nível A ainda não tiveram seus melhores anos. Esperamos que seus KPIs de tráfego de pedestres cresçam, enquanto os shoppings das camadas B e C continuam suas tendências de reaproveitamento de imóveis e outros métodos para manter os KPIs de tráfego de pedestres (oportunidade de shopping, oportunidade de vendas e desempenho da loja).

Suzanne Mulvee, diretora de pesquisa da CoStar, cita que "shoppings de qualidade inferior em mercados com populações menores e rendas mais baixas continuarão a fechar" - uma tendência que persiste atualmente. E aqui está uma posição baseada em dados:

A Green Street Advisors, uma empresa de pesquisa, prevê uma queda de 6,0% na receita de mercado por pé disponível (RevPaF) para shoppings de classe B e C de 2018 a 2022, em comparação com um aumento de 0,5% para shoppings de classe A durante o mesmo período. 

Os valores de mercado privado dos shoppings de classe B e C também sofreram a maior queda desde janeiro de 2017, de acordo com a Green Street, caindo 27,0% e 25,0%, respectivamente, em relação ao ano anterior. Enquanto isso, os valores dos shopping centers de classe A caíram 14% em relação ao ano anterior.

Investidor imobiliário nacional

Então, o que isso significa para as marcas nativas digitalmente verticais (DNVB), antigas e novas? Em resumo, as marcas que priorizam o online devem posicionar sua oferta de produtos para inclusão em shoppings de nível A. Primeiro, vamos dar uma olhada no que está estabelecido. A presença de varejo para as DNVBs varia, como tal:

  • A Harry's tem uma posição de destaque nas lojas da J. Crew (Nível A)
  • A Shinola tem um posicionamento de marquise como lojas autônomas (Tier A)
  • A Mizzen + Main tem uma posição de destaque na Nordstrom (Nível A)
  • A Bevel tem um showroom imobiliário na Macys (Nível A / B)
  • A Warby Parker tem ótimas lojas autônomas (Nível A)
  • A Greats tem um posicionamento de destaque na Nordstrom (Nível A)
  • O Ministry of Supply tem ótimas lojas autônomas em áreas de nível A
  • A Homage tem ótimas lojas autônomas (Nível A)
  • A Bonobos tem lojas autônomas e o posicionamento da Nordstrom (Nível A)
  • A MeUndies tem posicionamento na Nordstrom (Nível A)
  • A Goop está abrindo pop-ups patrocinados (Nível A)

Há pouquíssimas presenças em shopping centers de nível B e praticamente nenhuma presença da DNVB em shopping centers de nível C. Essas marcas fizeram um excelente trabalho ao se posicionarem como empresas de luxo modernas. Elas foram incubadas on-line por cinco a dez anos e se tornaram proeminentes o suficiente para viver como marcas de estilo de vida em espaços de varejo tradicionais. É uma conclusão óbvia que as operações omnicanal devem ser um foco para os DNVBs; a análise de imóveis de varejo é uma habilidade que está se tornando cada vez mais importante. E os DNVBs estão bem posicionados para se beneficiarem da adoção de marcas on-line de nível A. Lembre-se desta citação da edição nº 265:


Meghan Terwilliger, do 2PM, disse o seguinte:

O luxo, seja qual for sua definição, é a incorporação de características de uma marca que a tornam desejável. Historicamente, essas características têm sido mais características de "o quê", como qualidade, exclusividade e custo. Você ainda pode definir luxo como características que tornam uma marca desejável, mas essas características mudaram. A qualidade é o que está em jogo.

As características que tornam as marcas mais desejáveis são características de "como", como excelente experiência do cliente (como eu vivencio a marca), missão significativa da marca (como eles retribuem/fazem a diferença) e envolvimento da comunidade. Ela é criada por artistas e excessivamente cara? Talvez não. Mas se for um produto, ou até mesmo uma experiência completa altamente desejável, pode ser considerada uma marca de luxo. Acontece que as DNVBs possuem uma ótima infraestrutura para apoiar as características que definem o luxo moderno.


Há DNVBs que são lançados diariamente. É importante que essas marcas entendam que a mecânica do varejo on-line tem seus limites. Para que essas marcas expandam para US$ 30 milhões ou mais em receita anual, a estratégia omnicanal pode proporcionar crescimento a longo prazo. Além disso, isso pode revigorar o topo do funil de vendas por meio de canais on-line.

Aqui estão as cinco principais sugestões para o lançamento de DNVBs hoje:

  • Domine o primeiro produto. A Bonobos começou com calças, a Mizzen + Main com uma única camisa branca e a Bevel com uma lâmina.
  • Desenvolver um forte senso de embaixador do produto. A Mizzen + Main tem como alvo a geração do milênio, mas os compradores mais capazes têm entre 34 e 45 anos. Desenvolver um senso de fidelidade com eles pode render dividendos. Para seus pares que não fazem compras on-line, eles se tornarão um dos principais condutores do funil para suas lojas físicas.
  • Evite promoções de desconto, mesmo no início. A estabilidade de preços ao longo do tempo é fundamental. No momento em que uma marca é vista como uma marca de descontos, o grupo demográfico do shopping de Nível A perde o interesse (com poucas exceções).
  • Enfatizar a publicidade para consumidores de shopping centers de Nível A. Quando as DNVBs crescem on-line, elas precisam se concentrar nos clientes que possuem o maior potencial de LTV (valor vitalício). Isso se correlaciona com os compradores de shopping de Nível A.
  • Estabeleça relacionamentos com varejistas não concorrentes. Pode ser um sinal poderoso de viabilidade em longo prazo quando as marcas existentes assinam seu produto inicial. Isso é visto com mais frequência por meio de colaborações de produtos, promoção cruzada ou merchandising de seus produtos em suas lojas principais.

Os varejistas que atraem... a classe alta estão prosperando. Uma olhada no Galleria de Houston, no Easton Town Center de Columbus ou no Bal Harbour Shops de Miami confirmará isso. Esse é o futuro que muitos no varejo estão planejando. Portanto, não, o varejo não está morto. Mas o varejo está deixando a classe média para trás porque, francamente, nós também estamos.

2PM Member Brief No. 5

Na primeira frase, escrevi que o varejo on-line é a melhor e a pior coisa que aconteceu aos shopping centers. Em muitos aspectos, isso é verdade. O fechamento de varejistas e shopping centers mais fracos já deveria ter ocorrido há muito tempo. Os especialistas atribuem essa tendência ao surgimento de marcas de varejo on-line (e à dívida excessiva de private equity que esses varejistas acumularam para competir com elas).

Temos mais imóveis de varejo do que qualquer outro país desenvolvido do mundo. Os shoppings não estão morrendo, os ruins é que estão. Embora a eficiência do comércio eletrônico seja atraente para os profissionais de marketing digital, o canal de tijolo e argamassa é de ouro para os operadores de marca que estão estabelecendo suas marcas como produtos de luxo modernos. O marketing é aritmético, enquanto a construção de marcas é mais uma arte subjetiva. Se você perguntasse aos executivos-chefes de cada uma das marcas mencionadas acima, eles apontariam seus sucessos em lojas físicas como grandes marcos. Haverá menos shoppings nos próximos anos, mas uma aposta antecipada nos que restarem posicionará as jovens DNVBs para o sucesso omnicanal.

Leia o restante da edição.

Por Web Smith e Meghan Terwilliger | About 2PM

No. 271: A Modern Luxury Update

There is a famous scene in The Social Network where Justin Timberlake’s portrayal of Sean Parker tells Jesse Eisenberg’s Zuckerberg contemporary the story of the Victoria’s Secret rebirth. In the script, it was Sean Parker that explained the genius of Les Wexner and his ability to change with the times after acquiring the $6 million / year business for a fraction of its real value, only to turn it into a $500 million dollar brand just four years later. The brand grew from four to nearly 100 stores in that short amount of time. It was a historic turnaround for a brand that was more niche than it was main street at the time.

The fundamentals of the brick and mortar lingerie business changed because Wexner emphasized the appeal of the brand to female consumers. He set aside the money-losing model of selling lingerie to men and replaced it with one that focused on female customers. But more importantly, he recognized that it should have been that way all along. It was an authentic move that evolved Victoria’s Secret (and its parent company: L Brands) into the $10 billion dollar company that it is today. But the brand is overdue for another shift. And it’s worth considering the recent hires and acquisitions by Wal-Mart to turn L Brands‘ most valuable ship around.

Screen Shot 2018-05-29 at 3.23.27 PM

Now led by CEO Jan Singer (former CEO of Spanx and Global VP at Nike), Victoria’s Secret cites the lingerie icon’s struggles on corporate restructuring, ending the famous catalog, and exiting the swimwear category. These are contributing factors, in addition to increasing pressure from eCommerce-first retailers. Business of Fashion:

The growing competition is promoting more variety in models and products. Now in its fifth year, online retailer ThirdLove has shoppers answer a series of intimate questions about their breasts — which of these nine illustrations matches your breast shape? — while reassuring consumers that every woman’s body is unique. The company has raised $13.6 million from investors and expects to double its sales this year. Companies like Adore Me, True&Co. and Everlane are taking a similar approach.

Their chief challenger, Adore Me (21) was founded in 2010 with the express intent to challenge Victoria’s Secret by giving consumers an online-first, inclusive alternative to the lingerie titan. The latest Inc. 5000 list has Adore Me’s growing 1,400% from 2014 and 2016 with revenues exceeding $100 million. Now, Adore Me is looking to expand offline and the timing couldn’t be worse for the L Brands subsidiary. GlobalData Retail Managing Director Neil Saunders:

Niche players may only have a small share compared to Victoria’s Secret, but their innovative approaches mean they are nibbling away at its market share.

Além das marcas íntimas que estão se expandindo no território da VS, há pressões adjacentes do mercado de atletismo, um mercado de beleza em evolução e a rejeição da lingerie pelos consumidores que buscam conforto, funcionalidade e individualidade. Em vez de continuar competindo com marcas como Adore Me(21), THINX, Inc.(31) e Third Love(51), ou Savage x Fenty, a Victoria's Secret poderia reinvestir na marca, nas mensagens e nos processos de ponta a ponta, seguindo o exemplo do Wal-Mart.

Making a strategic acquisition to evolve Victoria’s Secret’s prized retail real estate could be just what the forty-year old retail property needs. The brand has a history of retail innovation. In addition to Wexner’s early decision to rebrand the shopping experience, Victoria’s Secret was one of the first brand’s to invest in early eCommerce (1999). In a recent retail roundtable, it was proposed that L Brands execute a Lore-like acquisition to oversee the brand’s eCommerce and omni-channel experience.

In addition, an interesting pivot was discussed. Victoria’s Secret could house brands and content across beauty, women’s athleisure, and intimates. The express goal would be to rebuild Victoria’s Secret as the premiere women’s-only destination – a house of brands, with their VS namesake positioned as the most premium offering within the store.

DD dan 1 relja 205
Lean Luxe Founder, Paul Munford

In a conference call with Lean Luxe’s Paul Munford, he added, “Not every brand deserves to exist forever.” He also added that L Brands‘ recent track record has been less than favorable, making the idea of a pivot like this highly unlikely. Specifically, he cited the $710 million dollar La Senza acquisition (2006) that did not achieve the intended effect. According to Munford, there was no indication that the retail group could operate with the same speed and precision that Wal-Mart has since Marc Lore became their eCommerce CEO. Munford added, “With Lore coming in at Wal-Mart, there wasn’t a negative track record of Walmart acquiring brands and dropping the ball. Walmart just started from scratch. So comparatively, Victoria’s Secret’s task seems harder.” 

Though Munford and I disagreed on the approach that the vaunted L Brands subsidiary should take, we did agree that VS is a brand that is long overdue for a modern luxury update. One of the first names that arose when discussing who’d be a great number two to Jan Singer was Emily Weiss, founder of Glossier.

Por Web Smith | About 2PM

No. 270: For DNVBs, brand matters.

cópia do anúncio do facebook 4

A look at Raden’s shuttering (DNVB No. 119) and Away’s persistence (DNVB No. 40). With the news of Raden shuttering and their founder’s commentary on the online luggage industry’s outlook, 2PM has a deep dive into what may have influenced Raden’s shuttering (it wasn’t just regulation). And Away cofounder and CEO Steph Korey provides commentary on what will shape Away’s bright future.

Founder of Raden, Josh Udashkin had this to say to Conde Nast Traveler about the future of the smart luggage industry: 

I hate to say this, but I think [the future] is nonexistent. All these companies rely on word of mouth, but buying this product now gets you hassled. I don’t see how you can continue selling it.

We disagree. Millennial consumers are practical, savvy, and even slightly territorial. These consumers seek brands that appeal to their lifestyles, their timing, their values, and their personal preferences. The narrative matters because their lifestyle matters.

The key to building a strong DNVB can be attributed to perceived quality, price value, and ease of purchase.

Convenience Change + Price Change + Perception of Quality Change > 0 

Convenience: ease of purchase, superior customer service, ease of return, and quality warranty.

Price: is the price comparable and or cheaper than the premium incumbent brand prices.

Perception of quality: how is the brand perceived? Is there an affinity for the product?

Whereas, if the DNVB’s sum “change” is greater than zero, the DNVB may be a better option than the incumbent. It’s through this lens that DNVBs and CPG brands have been able to position their products against stodgier, traditional brands. One of the keys to building an online retail presence is emphasizing both components of a winning formula: product and narrative.  That narrative communicates quality, community, and brand equity around the product. For DNVBs with $5M or less in total funding, you can argue that the narrative is as important as the product itself.


Issue No. 254: An Open Letter to DNVB CEOs

DNVB executive teams build two products from scratch, supply and demand:

  1. The product: the shirt, or the luggage, the pants, the shades, the coats, or whatever it is that people know you for.
  2. The brand: the aura of that product, the name recognition, the association, the behind-the-scenes partners, the spokeswomen, the ambassadors, the inevitability of success.

Both Raden and Away were founded in the early months of 2015. Raden raised a seed investment from Lerer Hippeau, First Round Capital, and Gin Lane – the famed and de facto kingmaker of DNVBs. Away raised a star studded seed round that included Andy Dunn, the now-Walmart executive who coined the DNVB acronym.

When Udashkin was interviewed by Loose Threads in 2015, Udashkin indicated that product was the entirety of his focus. He went on to add that the product’s narrative wasn’t something that Raden was going to emphasize.

After spending almost a year in the prototype phase, working out of San Francisco, Los Angeles, Montreal, and Taiwan, Raden emerged as a product company that rejected the imagery and celebrity of lifestyle brands.

Udashkin went on to say: “How can you have a lifestyle on day one around your product unless you’re faking it? I think that works in the short term, but over time the customer gets smarter. If you don’t keep working on your product, eventually you lose.”

Cofounders Steph Korey and Jen Rubio took a nearly opposite approach to building their competing brand. In a July 2017 segment in Inc Magazine called “How I did it”, here is what was said about the duo:

Steph Korey and Jen Rubio had a problem. Their planned launch of Away, a new luggage brand, was fast approaching–and none of their suitcases would be ready to sell in time. Luckily, the two had a social media trick packed in their bags. They turned a proven retailing tactic, the preorder, and an idea for a book into a campaign that went viral on Instagram and beyond.

Burt Helm, Inc. Magazine

This thinking permeates through their entire product position. Whereas Raden’s Instagram focused solely on the products being sold, Away’s Instagram account features as much lifestyle and usability as it does the products that Away sells.

Screen Shot 2018-05-21 at 12.28.07 PM

While Away focused on the destination and brand affinity (to include a print magazine called “Here”), the relationship that Raden maintained with customers was altogether different than the one that Away hopes to continue. The difference between the two approaches greatly affected each brand’s product offering: Raden’s was narrow, Away’s is wide. Here’s a pivotal point in today’s featured article by Fast Company:

He walks me through the math. The target market for a direct-to-consumer suitcase brand is relatively narrow. This is not a mass purchase. Your audience is people with enough disposable income to spend between $200 and $400 on a carry-on, but also be digitally savvy enough to be willing to buy the case online, rather than in a department store.

Once the startup has convinced someone within their target market to buy a carry-on, the relationship is basically over. With some persuasion, the brand can try to sell them a piece of checked luggage or perhaps another small travel accessory. But the lifestyle value of each customer is relatively small, compared to other categories. A direct-to-consumer luxury shoe brand like M.Gemi can sell a woman a new pair of $300 shoes twice a year for the rest of her life. Everlane can sell a customer wardrobe updates every month.

Elizabeth Segran, Fast Company

Here Udashkin suggests that he did the right thing by focusing on product superiority alone (just one of the three components to the DNVB formula). But because he saw no value in building a brand and narrative around Raden, there were fewer alternative products that he could offer to his existing customers. This, in addition to his luggage’s immovable battery and the startup’s shorter runway influenced his position that the luggage maker had no choice but to cease operations. He also suggested that there was no market for these types of products in the long run, a far-reaching assertion.


In an email to 2PM, Away CEO Steph Korey explained Away’s position: 

A brand’s success isn’t determined by the amount of money it raises, or by any other one thing, but by the right combination of a lot of little things.

For us, it’s been the combination of having a customer-obsessed approach to everything we do (taking the time to listen to our customers, deeply understand what they’re telling us, and then quickly acting on it), being conscientious about the way we introduce them to the brand in the first place (ensuring what we’re marketing will be interesting to who we’re marketing it to, and simultaneously creating a narrative that’s authentic to who we are as a brand no matter the channel or intended audience), and not limiting ourselves to any one product or plan for the future (expanding from one suitcase to dozens of travel goods since launch, and setting our sights on fixing everything that’s currently wrong with the travel experience).


One of the early lessons in DNVB branding is one that cannot be explained by analytics and logic, alone. It’s too subjective. Phil Knight’s once-fledgling shoe operation sold shoes but Nike was never a shoe company: it was a company that enabled champions. Tesla sells cars but Tesla is a company for futurists. Apple sells computers but it’s a company for creators.

For aspirational products, consumers choose brands that fit their lifestyle, belief system, and goals. From the very beginning, Away achieved something that very few DNVB’s understand early on. Building the product is only half of the battle. This means that no matter what arduous regulations they may encounter, they will maintain a canvas to build products that are relevant to their community of passionate, millennial travelers. It’s likely that as traditional sales continue, you’ll see a growing number of SKUs, styles, and add-ons that are beloved by millennial travelers and commuters. Yes, Steph Korey and Jen Rubio sell luggage, but Away is a travel company. And Away will go where she wants.


Updates: On June 26, Away announced the Away x Dwayne Wade collaboration. On June 28, Away announced a $50M round of investment, one of the largest rounds by female founders in history. According to their Comms Director Cassi Gritzmacher:

With this latest round of funding, Away plans to further establish itself worldwide by extending to new markets; continue to expand its product line to create the one perfect version of everything you need to travel seamlessly; expand its physical retail footprint (opening 6 new stores by the end of 2018 in addition to its current New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Austin locations); build on its existing social impact efforts (through its partnership with Peace Direct and through new initiatives); and create 249 new jobs over the next five years, transitioning the team into a 56,000-square-foot new Global Headquarters in its hometown of New York City.

Leia mais sobre o assunto aqui.

Por Web Smith e Meghan Terwilliger | About 2PM